Images of Ourselves *A Special Supplement*

RITTER LIBRARY
BALDWIN WALLACE
COLLEGE

THE NEW REPUBLIC

A Journal of Politics and the Arts—November 23, 1974, 50 cents

Anything but Sweet

The Editors on Sugar Prices

Slipping It to Thieu—*Fred Branfman*
The Colorado Story—*Paul R. Wieck*
Kissinger's Quest—*Stanley Karnow*
Christmas Books—*Doris Grumbach*
On Writing History—*Millicent Bell*
A Reply to Draper—*Noam Chomsky*

PAR NEWSPAPER
44017
NR BAD4 W189 1 1075
BLADWIN WALLACE COLLEGE
RITTER LIB PERIODICALS
BEREA OHIO

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



"A valuable book on a lurid subject." —*TIME*. "Continuously fascinating." —ELIOT FREMONT-SMITH. Illus. $10.00


HERBLOCK
SPECIAL REPORT
Words and pictures on Nixon's career from freshman congressman to "full, free, and absolute pardon."
BY HERBERT BLOCK

Nixon's career from congressman to "full, free, and absolute pardon," in 450 cartoons and text. $7.95



"Brilliant, provocative . . . a biography that no one should miss."—*Washington Post Book World*. Illus. $12.50



"Engrossing . . . Every American can profit from reading this swiftly-paced and lively account."—RAOUL BERGER. $8.95



"Provides new insights into the nexus of forces that . . . is shaping the destiny of man."—*New Republic*. $5.95



1974 National Book Award for Poetry. "Extremely beautiful." — *Village Voice*. Cloth, $5.95. Paper, $1.95



"Profoundly felt, superbly balanced . . . has the fascination of gospel."—MEYER LEVIN. Illus. $10.00



A poignant photo-essay of the desegregation of the Berkeley school system. Cloth, $8.95. Paper, $4.95



The new long poem by the winner of the National Book Award for Poetry in 1973. Cloth, $6.95. Paper, $1.95



"Unflinching wit and seriousness and a sustained and subtle intelligence."—*Ms* Magazine. $6.95



What must be done to protect basic social needs in both rich and poor nations. $6.95



A son's tribute to the scholar-lawyer who fought for progressive ideals in turn-of-the-century Dallas. $7.95

AT ALL BOOKSTORES

Norton

W.W. NORTON & COMPANY, INC., 500 Fifth Avenue, New York 10036

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Would you pay $8.95 for a child's gift that won't be outgrown, broken, worn out, lost or forgotten six weeks after Christmas?

The name of this unique gift is HIGHLIGHTS FOR CHILDREN. It is the most honored, and possibly the most beloved, monthly children's magazine in the world. And, in a day and age when fads in toys and trinkets and clothes appear and vanish almost before you turn around, HIGHLIGHTS FOR CHILDREN could be one of the most exciting Christmas presents you will ever give.

For HIGHLIGHTS is not only different from the usual gift; it is different from other children's magazines as well.

Its intent is not only to delight and entertain, but to challenge and teach. The editors are nationally known experts in child psychology and family life; they firmly believe that the growing child finds his greatest pleasure in thinking, creating, and surprising himself and his parents by reaching intellectual heights no one had ever suspected he could.

Eleven times a year, HIGHLIGHTS FOR CHILDREN brings its young subscribers good fiction and poetry; authoritative articles on science, music, math, nature, astronomy and famous people; lessons in good manners; craft projects; puzzles, games and just plain fun. It avoids any suggestion of violence or crime in words or pictures. Each issue is 42 or more pages long, bound in sturdy tagboard. The type is large and easy-to-read. There are no coloring or cut-out pages, for HIGHLIGHTS is meant to become part of each young subscriber's permanent library.

HIGHLIGHTS *appeals to a wide age range:* from tots of 2 who love to listen to its stories and do the simple preparation-for-reading exercises within its pages . . . to 12-year-olds who find the biographies and science articles prime sources for school reports. A special annual Resource/Index issue, coming at the end of each calendar year, organizes each year's 11-issue collection as a reference source, to be turned to again and again as the child's interests and reading ability expand.

HIGHLIGHTS FOR CHILDREN is not available on the newsstands but is sold by subscription only, for the editors feel that part of its value is its continuing program of fresh, imaginative material.

It is sent addressed to the child himself, something all his own in a world where so much seems to be decided by adults. Where there are several children in the family, a single subscription may be shared in several names.

For a relatively small price, HIGHLIGHTS brings your love and remembrance to children you treasure . . . not just at Christmas, but eleven times a year. The contribution HIGHLIGHTS FOR CHILDREN can make to a child's development, however, as it reinforces reading as a pathway to pleasure and information, is a gift that will last a lifetime.

This year give the gift that won't be forgotten: give HIGHLIGHTS FOR CHILDREN
Special Christmas gift rates: *Only $8.95 for each 1-year gift subscription (11 issues).*
Price includes free handsigned Christmas gift card for every child on your list.
Please add $1 per subscription for gifts sent to Canada, or $2 elsewhere outside the U.S.

Please send a subscription to HIGHLIGHTS FOR CHILDREN as my gift to:

child name(s) _____ *age(s)* _____

address _____ *apt. no.* _____

city _____ *state* _____ *zip* _____

Sign gift card "from _____"

11 • GSZN

child name(s) _____ *age(s)* _____

address _____ *apt. no.* _____

city _____ *state* _____ *zip* _____

Sign gift card "from _____"

11 • GSZN

• • HL-P

your name _____

address, if different from child's _____

city _____ *state* _____ *zip* _____

$_____ is enclosed for _____ gifts.

☐ Bill me after January 1st.

☐ Charge to my bank credit card, account number:

_____

☐ BankAmericard ☐ Master Charge

Interbank no. _____

(For additional orders, please give us the information on a separate sheet of paper.)

Satisfaction guaranteed or money refunded.

Highlights® for Children
2300 W. Fifth Ave., Columbus, Ohio 43216

• GDZ 45

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TRB

from Rome
November 23, 1974

Hunger

A huge quadrangular hall houses the World Conference on Hunger, the first ever held. You look down on a couple of acres of delegates arranged by countries. There's a lot of marble in the columns so you know it's Italy. On the wall in front is a great blue banner with UN surrounded by laurel wreath. The ceiling is so high that if you jumped in a parachute you would land safely. Whose is the booming voice? Your eye moves to the center stage and a bulky man in drab uniform buttoned in front. Odd how all official Chinese look like Chairman Mao.

You take your little plastic box that looks like a vest-pocket radio, put the stethoscope nipples in your ears and turn the dial to "O" for English. A woman's voice translates with feeling and rhythm. The six translators sit in respective booths in the rear balcony. You forget it is translation as the familiar charges continue: "plunder," "exploitation," "colonialism," "superpowers."

Down in the American delegation Hubert Humphrey takes notes and chairman Earl Butz chews gum.

This is the Palazzo Dei Congressi, built in the '30s by Mussolini for the 1940 World's Fair that never took place. Instead they had the war, after which they strung Mussolini up. This is now known as the EUR area, an Italian acronym for Exposition Universal Rome. Rome is the sickest capital of Europe with inflation at 20 percent, no government for six weeks and the city's splendid, moldering walls scrawled with hate. "Death to Kissinger," cries a red-daubed hammer-and-sickle appeal.

What do the people of a small planet do when they realize that population has finally overtaken food? Why, they come together, all the hostile groups, and look at each other, and wonder.

One way to meet the problem is to deny it exists. Earl Butz, head of our delegation, says the situation is "serious—yes, but not a crisis." In turn the Russian delegate simply announces that the earth will carry "30 or 40 billion more people" without any trouble, if everyone adopts socialist precepts. And last week the English-language newspaper here, *The Daily American*, carried an unforgettable front page makeup occupying the entire upper fold. On the left a pathetic picture entitled, "A despairing mother in famine-ridden Bangladesh cradles her starving child." On the right a balancing photograph of benign Pope Paul VI, blessing the delegates. And the headline between: "Pope condemns birth control as an answer to hunger."

Thinking globally is uncomfortable. It strains unaccustomed muscles. The first week is occupied with ritualistic tribal exhortations and accusations by bureaucrats of 130 countries. Who can admit the vulgar new notion that the earth is a finite planet? India has famine. So what? It also has money to explode an atomic blast. The rich nations spend billions on armaments. In the United States, the top five percent get 20 percent of the income, the bottom 20 percent get around five. But the tenant-landlord gap in many hungry lands is far more extreme. In most poor countries the farmer is poorest of all.

The "poverty line" in India is $30 a year, and 175 million people live below it. There are four billion people on earth, a third or more of them go to bed hungry at night. Are these our brothers? World Bank head Robert McNamara said last September that they survive on a margin of life "so degrading as to insult human dignity."

If Indonesia's 135 million population grows at the present rate it will be 1.5 billion this time next century. World population will double by 2010. If you say that simply can't happen, some will label you a prophet of doom and gloom. They would have said that if you had warned of a particularly virulent strain of bubonic plague in Constantinople in 1347 AD. The two-century spread of the black death reached London in the great plague of 1665, and eliminated half of Europe's population. A gloomy parallel?

One might as well be starkly realistic. Our fears may be all wrong. But a man like Philip Handler, president of the National Academy of Sciences, is no fool. He is quoted as saying that unless the rich countries are willing to undertake the colossal effort required to uplift the poor ones (which he seems to doubt), they would be less cruel, perhaps, not to interfere at all and "let nature run its course."

It is doubtful if the public even yet understands the problem. There is now enough food on earth to sustain everybody. But it is distributed crazily. The United States is Mr. Rich. With only six percent of the earth's people it consumes 40 percent of its resources. Can this last? A pound of grain a day feeds the poor in Asia, Africa and Latin America, but the American takes five times that, a little directly in the form of cereal and much more in eggs, milk and particularly meat, with liquor thrown in.

Delegates repeatedly say the poor countries must raise more food themselves. They have the land, why don't they produce more? Because it costs money to farm properly. With a social revolution, and with plenty of fertilizer, half a billion small farmers could be self-supporting. They would gain enough respect and human dignity, perhaps, to cut down on their nightmare birthrate. At least that is the hope.

That's the road to the future all right, but what a road, as narrow and cobbled as a Roman alley. An extra pound of fertilizer produces only five more pounds of cereal in the United States but would produce 10 in India. How will the tenant farmer buy it? Will rich countries finance it? America uses about as much fertilizer on its lawns, golf courses and cemeteries as India does for all its crops.

The West spends from $20 to $80 on each 2.5 acres of farm, the small farmer of Southeast Asia only about six dollars.

The excellent thing about this conference is that it is held at all. It is a crash course in educating humanity. People and nations can be shamed. The immediate emergency is the next eight months until the new harvest. After that is another matter.

It is easy to be cynical about the food conference. I won't because I did not expect too much to begin with. Delegates have moved a little way to interdependence. The problem remains: land, water, energy and fertilizer are all coming into short supply. Hunger won't go away. Those torturing pictures of mothers and children will stay on television.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE NEW REPUBLIC *A Journal of Politics and the Arts, Vol. 171, No. 21, Issue 3124, November 23, 1974. Published weekly (except the issues of January 12, July 13, July 27, August 17) and distributed by* The New Republic, *1244 19th Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20036. Phone 331-7494. Single copy, 50¢; Yearly subscriptions, $17; foreign, $20; armed forces personnel or students, $10. Send all remittances and correspondence about subscriptions, undelivered copies and changes of address to Subscription Department,* The New Republic, *381 West Center Street, Marion, Ohio 43302.* *Copyright 1974 by The New Republic, Inc.* *Item g. Second class postage paid at Washington, DC and additional mailing offices. Indexed in Reader's Guide.*

Contents

5 & 6 Comment
Anything but Sweet
7 On Alexander M. Bickel—*Gilbert A. Harrison*
8 How They Won In Colorado—*Paul R. Wieck*
9 Cover-up Trial: The Chain of Lies—*Walter Pincus*
10 Kissinger's Quest—*Stanley Karnow*
11 Slipping It to Thieu—*Fred Branfman*
13 Images of Ourselves: A Special 60th Anniversary Supplement—*Raymond Williams, Frederick Morgan, Michael Roberts, Roger Rosenblatt, Neil Harris, Barry Targan, Robert N. Bellah*
42 Theater—*Stanley Kauffmann*
43 Fine Print: Christmas Book Offerings—*Doris Grumbach*
47 Books—Reviews by *Clarice Short, Millicent Bell, Barbara Smith*
54 On Baseball—*Louis D. Rubin, Jr.*
56 A Communication—*Noam Chomsky*

The Staff

Editor-in-Chief—Gilbert A. Harrison
Chairman, Editorial Board—Martin Peretz
Publisher—Robert J. Myers

Managing Editor—David Sanford
Executive Editor—Walter Pincus
Literary Editor—Doris Grumbach
Associate Editors—John Osborne, Stanley Karnow, Eliot Marshall
Assistant to the Editors—Gwen Somers
Assistant to the Literary Editor—Cherryl Holt
Editorial Staff—Carol M. Krause
Contributing Editors:
Robert Brustein, Robert Coles, Joseph Featherstone, Gerald W. Johnson, Peter J. Ognibene, John Seelye, Melville J. Ulmer, Allen S. Whiting, Paul R. Wieck
Films and Theater—Stanley Kauffmann
West Coast Editor—Peter Barnes

Production Manager—Mary Henninger
Assistant Production Manager—Ellen Cochran Hicks
Circulation Manager—Elizabeth A. Scanlan
Business Manager—Pearl Wilmer Ramsey
Assistant Business Manager—Constance Cole Twining
New Republic Feature Syndicate—Leslie B. Seagrave
Advertising and Promotion—Ilene Briggin Kahane
Receptionist—Ruby McGowan
Advertising Representative—E. Laurence White
50 E. 42nd St., NYC 10017
(212) 986-6210

Anything but Sweet

What would this country be without all those candies and cookies and cakes and sugar-coated cereals? It would be healthier and wealthier, with more good teeth and more to spend on products more essential than sugar. We are the world's most voracious consumers of sweets, as we are of everything else. An average American consumes about 100 pounds of sugar a year (not counting 30 pounds of other liquid sweeteners), a figure that marks him as a sugar addict when compared to his ancestors. The earliest Agriculture Department records, from 1822, show that the average American then ate about 9.5 pounds of sugar a year. Today sugars and sweeteners provide 17 percent of our caloric intake. Some doctors believe we pay a price for our overindulgence in a high incidence of heart disease and intestinal disorders, but that judgment is disputed by some. The high price in nickels and dimes is not.

Last January a five-pound bag of sugar at retail cost 85 cents; this month it costs around $2.35, nearly a 200 percent increase. Wholesale raw sugar sold for 18 cents a pound in January; the latest figures show it selling for around 50 cents a pound or higher. Analysts in the government and private industry agree that demand for sugar has grown at unprecedented rates, not only in the US but in countries that in the past were considered marginal importers. During the past three years, production has outpaced demand. A hurricane damaged some of the American cane fields this year, and a spate of bad weather turned the European and Russian sugar-beet crops into a disaster. As this natural shortage developed, some experts say, Arab speculators began putting money into sugar futures on the commodities market, thus further boosting the price. Then early this month the Soviet Union decided to make up for its sugar losses at home by buying on the world market. It moved swiftly, purchasing 400,000 tons in one stroke and that catapulted the market into its present frenzy.

In the center of the frenzy lies a Rube Goldberg contraption called the Sugar Act. It now has few friends and is fortunately scheduled to go out of commission at the end of the year. But the story of the sugar crisis of 1974 is in part the story of the disintegration of this outmoded piece of legislation. The act was passed in 1934 at the request of Franklin Roosevelt who saw it as a way to aid consumers, farmworkers and refiners by insulating American sugar from the leaps and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tumbles of the international market. Roosevelt believed the government could assure a steady supply of sugar at reasonable prices, and at the same time protect our domestic industry from foreign competition by keeping prices high. The act was designed for an age of abundance. Through an elaborate arrangement of domestic subsidies, import quotas and tariffs, it attempted to keep the world's cheap sugar from pouring into American ports and overwhelming our market. By maintaining the price of sugar at a slightly higher level in the US and by making foreigners compete for import quotas, the system kept American farmers happy, meanwhile allowing millions of tons of sugar to enter the country without upsetting prices. Then the shortage hit, creating a crisis reminiscent of the big grain sales of 1972 in that it was fueled by a general crop failure and aggressive Russian buying. But in the case of sugar, unlike that of grain, the United States is not an exporter but a net importer. Other countries are pushing American sugar prices up. The high price of raw sugar throughout the world has taught producers that holding an American import quota is not necessarily a privilege any more.

There is no free trade in sugar; again the parallel is with oil, except oil is an essential import and sugar is not. All the major importers—except Canada—have preferential agreements with traditional sources: Russia with Cuba, Britain (now the Common Market) with Australia, and the United States with the Philippines, the Dominican Republic, Mexico and Brazil (but not with Cuba). Japan joined the club recently, signing agreements with Australia, South Africa, the Philippines and Brazil.

Tom Murphy, a leading sugar-beet lobbyist and a former director of the Agriculture Department's sugar division, argues that when officials at USDA began talking about getting rid of the Sugar Act last November, foreign sugar producers got the message and prepared to seek new markets. Realizing that access to the US market would no longer be privileged, Murphy claims, foreign growers ignored the threat of exclusion that the Sugar Act carries and sold to the highest bidder. But a sugar specialist at USDA strongly disagrees with this view, and we suspect he's nearer the truth. He says that wholesale prices began to skyrocket long before the act was doomed this June. Anyway, he points out, receipts of sugar from abroad were 10 percent higher this year than the year before. At current prices the demand for sugar may drop off, but so far the only noticeable effect of high prices has been to provide a wave of panic buying, driving prices still higher. American consumers bought $750 million worth of sugar in September, and deliveries to stores have been almost as high in the weeks since then.

The government can do nothing about bad weather and rotten crops, which are among the reasons for speculation in sugar this year. Nevertheless it is not a helpless bystander. It could, as with oil, help depress consumer demand for sugar by tax policies that discourage extravagant consumption. It could encourage greater price stability by requiring that raw sugar from abroad be delivered in American ports on a quarterly basis, rather than in a year-end rush, as is done now. Furthermore the government could prevent windfall profits domestic firms earn through their inventory mark-ups, a common occurrence in times of scarcity. And finally the Justice Department could keep a hawk's eye on possible price fixing and go after the offenders. The director of the antitrust division has given notice that he is watching sugar refiners, and the department has taken new interest in a review of the pricing methods of several big sugar companies in northern California. Complaints about price fixing have been received from Sen. Peter Domenici (R, NM), among others, who's discovered that there's no difference in price for wholesale sugar in Albuquerque, whether from beets or cane, delivered from Utah, Texas, Arizona or California. The profits of the nation's largest sugar company, Amstar, increased 250 percent in the last year and those of Great Western Sugar Company rose 1200 percent. Having scrutinized these figures, the Justice Department will decide in the next few weeks whether to file indictments for price fixing.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Alexander M. Bickel 1924-1974

"The law of the truth was in his mouth."

For 18 years the mark of Alexander M. Bickel has been on the pages of this journal in articles, reviews and unsigned notes. And since Alex had a deep-rooted respect for tradition and was not one to dismiss sentiment as unworthy of an intellectual, he took special satisfaction in remembering that his mentor, Felix Frankfurter, had also helped shape the thought of *The New Republic*.

When our collaboration began and we were new to each other, I one day dropped the middle initial from his name on the magazine's cover in order to save space. Alex made sure it happened only once. Symbols were not expendable, one's heritage was not expendable, M for Mordecai was not expendable. "We hold onto the values of the past provisionally only," he wrote, "in the knowledge that they will change, but we hold to them as guides. This is not, as Holmes once remarked, a duty, it is a necessity. How else are we to know anything?"

Alex was born in Bucharest and brought to America in 1939 when he was 14. His father had been a successful lawyer in Rumania but in the new country took up a new career in Yiddish journalism. Alex became a naturalized citizen in 1943, served in the army, worked for the State Department, earned a law degree at Harvard, clerked for Justice Frankfurter, taught at Yale law school, was counsel to an occasional defendant, wrote articles, books and *amicus curiae* briefs, testified before congressional committees, advised students, journalists and politicians, married, had two children and died of cancer a month before his 50th birthday.

The quality is unexpressed in the chronology. As Alex often said: facts don't speak for themselves.

The air one breathed in his company was bracing, without fog or drizzle. He perceived the "tyrannical tendency of ideas," and yet ideas were his trade and nothing was pleasanter than exchanging them, or jokes and gossip, with friends over a cigarette and a drink. "A politics without ideas" seemed to him a politics of "suicidal emptiness"—more destructive than greed. "Jim Fisk and Jay Gould and Harry Daugherty and Albert Fall look pretty good these days," he wrote last year, only partly in jest. "It would take an awful lot of them, more than can normally be expected to be in residence, to bring down the Republic. The Republic is more liable to be brought down by solemn, clean-living ideologues, lusting selflessly only after power."

It was a rare week when I did not ask Alex's opinion on something that could but perhaps would not be published in *The New Republic*. He returned one article with the remark that it was "rather simplistic and alarmist." "If it were a little more attentive to the complexities of the subject," he said, "it could not succeed in being quite so alarmist, and might not be very interesting." I sent him a statement by Gov. Faubus, which inspired him to "absolutely nothing." "Patriotism is not the sole last refuge of the scoundrel," he wrote; "democracy will evidently do as well. But that thought is an old bag of bones and not, in my judgment, worthy of a paragraph." He carefully read the press, once calling my attention to a story "in the morning's paper that one of the television reporters on the scene yesterday was egging students on to demonstrate; on the theory, I suppose, that any news is better than no news." He had an Easterner's appreciation of the West: enjoying a sunny sabbatical in California, he reported that Stanford was "good, clean middle-class fun and a great place to visit."

Alex never commented on a court decision without having the text before him. He had to know the fine points. But when he had them clearly in mind, he moved quickly. His judgments were firm and unformed by fashion. He was high-minded, but high-mindedness floating free of the facts made him squirm. He did not hesitate to commit himself for fear of later reversal. It did not matter if an opinion had to be changed. "The only abiding thing, as Brandeis used to repeat and as Burke might not have denied, *is* change," he wrote, "but the past should control it, or at least its pace." In our pages he attacked the nomination of Robert F. Kennedy for Attorney General, then several years later saluted Kennedy's "compassion, responsibility, self-reliance" and supported his presidential candidacy. His criticism was tempered by his knowledge that there have been many saints in history but only a few examples of unmitigated evil.

Since we are or try to be what we most admire, we glimpse Alex in what he wrote of Justice Frankfurter: "In such a career—pursued without compromise of principle, indeed with an utter inability to do so much as modulate moral and intellectual integrity—we feel in as pure a form as it can be sensed in this world the power of mind, character and personality, boosted in the least possible degrees by fortuitous extraneous forces. And this is a thing of beauty . . . There never was a man so quick to understand, so ready to contradict, so warm in sympathy and so warm in anger, so indulgent of the frailties of others and so intolerant of them."

I owe an unpayable debt to Alex as a journalist, I respected him as a scholar, and I loved him as a friend.

Gilbert A. Harrison

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

How They Won In Colorado

Denver

If you ask what the boys in the back room of the Democratic party will have, some will tell you: another shot of the old New Deal, straight, undiluted by any "new politics." But that isn't what gave the party its astonishing victory in Colorado this month. Of course Colorado is unique, but what area of America isn't? Before anyone buys the old-fashioned prescription of what and where "the new majority" is, he ought to examine how youthful Democratic candidates, espousing what they call "populist style" issues, managed to wrest from the Republicans every top state office but that of the Secretary of State, how they converted a GOP majority of 39-26 in the lower house of the legislature to a 37-28 Democratic majority, cut the GOP margin in the state senate from 23-13 to 18-17, and switched the Board of Regents to 6-3 Democratic. In addition they shifted Colorado's delegation in the House of Representatives from three Republicans and two Democrats to three Democrats and two Republicans (the new representative, an environmentalist in his 30s, is Tim Worth and he ran in a suburban district). And they replaced Republican Sen. Peter Dominick with the young, attractive Gary Hart. This was no one-shot rejection of Republicanism by the voters, and the explanation goes deeper than Watergate, the Nixon pardon, inflation and loss of jobs.

They were helped by the influx of young activists and retired couples into the state. But that was only the setting for what happened. The reformers early on made environment the cutting edge of their campaigns. They were helped by Common Cause, which effectively educated the public on rate padding by the utilities, on the need for full disclosure laws and for tax reforms. Then in 1972 a successful fight was made to keep the winter Olympics out. It was an extraordinary victory of conservationists over promoters, and out of that experience came cadres of practical precinct workers. One of them was the governor-elect, Richard Lamm, who went on to convert the organization he helped build against the Olympics into one that elected him this November. His theme was the same as it had been in 1972—protect the environment. Colorado, he said, better sit up and take notice of what out-of-state developers and the federal government were planning—"an energy colony." Something in the way of a new doctrine of "states' rights" began to be heard. Coloradans were asked to take their affairs in hand, to put the brakes on progress, and they liked the idea.

Sam Brown, the veteran organizer of McCarthy's Children's Crusade in 1968 and the Vietnam Moratorium in 1969, made a late entry into the race for state treasurer, a post that usually goes by default. He said it was "me against the banks." He told the voters they ought to be getting a better return from state funds deposited in banks. He accused his opponent, Palmer Burch, a 28-year veteran of Colorado politics who'd been considered unbeatable, with "favoritism." He said Burch's campaigns were financed by the bankers and that he (Brown) wouldn't take their money. He wouldn't have got their money anyway. Brown won by 50,000 votes.

J. D. MacFarlane, the newly elected attorney general, took the utilities for his target. They were already in some disrepute as the result of earlier educational efforts of Craig Barnes and David Mixner in Common Cause. MacFarlane told voters he'd be on hand personally to represent Colorado at any future rate increase hearings.

In the closing days the GOP painted Brown as a leader of riots and demonstrators, Senate candidate Gary Hart as the mastermind of McGovern radicalism, George Brown, (the new lieutenant governor and a black) as a militant busing advocate, Lamm as a "leftist." It didn't work.

When you talk about protecting the environment you run the risk of scaring workers; they may think that if you're against development you're against jobs. But the fear that workers would be alienated appears to have been exaggerated. Gov.-elect Lamm did fall a bit behind his ticket in working-class areas, but Brown, the former student leader, ran better in those areas than in the university communities. Lamm held the GOP to slender majorities in their key suburban counties, while building up big majorities in his own strongholds. When the votes were in, the Denver area, which often turns in GOP majorities, had gone Democratic by nearly 40,000.

On election night Republican Gov. Vanderhoof and his whole ticket in Colorado had only one last hope—Colorado Springs. Throughout the '50s and '60s, the GOP could count on big margins out of that haven for retired Midwestern businessmen and the military. Vanderhoof wouldn't concede until "the Springs" had come in. But "the Springs" had changed, too, and the change included throwing the developers out of control of city hall. This year it bought Lamm's conservationist ideas and gave him a 6000-vote margin.

For the upper Rocky Mountain West, long dominated by growth politics favored by the Chamber of Commerce and the old-style liberal politicians, this election brought about a switch in direction that is not going to cheer those who grew rich on development or hoped to do so in the future. There's a new breed of Democrats here, issue-minded, young, aggressive, adept at organization. They're going to be heard from.

Paul R. Wieck

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Cover-Up Trial

The Trail of Lies

How do you know when a liar is telling the truth? Convicted conspirator E. Howard Hunt, Jr., has now confessed to the Watergate cover-up trial jury that he previously lied under oath to grand juries and congressional committees about 12 different matters, at least. He even lied after being given immunity from prosecution. He decided to come clean and stop protecting former President Nixon and top White House aides, he told the jurors, after reading transcripts of the released White House tapes, in one of which Mr. Nixon refers to Hunt and the others as "jackasses."

Hunt's disclosure—after over a year of denials—that following the 1972 elections he prepared a memorandum for Nixon committee lawyer Kenneth Parkinson demanding that money be paid him and others was a significant event in the trial. Hunt had no copy of the memo when he testified, and his former lawyer, William O. Bittman, had sworn under oath that *he* had never received a Parkinson-bound memo. Government prosecutors nevertheless decided to permit Hunt to talk about it and let the jurors make up their own minds whether he was lying or not. Then, less than a week later, the memo turned up in the possession of Bittman!

Now that Hunt had finally told the truth, could it be assumed he would be equally candid about other incidents that might undermine the credibility of other witnesses? For instance Hunt informed the jurors that during the first week of January 1973 he was told by Bittman "that I would probably receive a relatively light sentence, probably even probation, and in the event of a longer sentence, well, Christmas comes around every year." Hunt interpreted this to mean that he would be paroled or pardoned by December 25. Terribly upset by the death of his wife in an airplane crash December 10, 1972, and by the prospect of the original Watergate trial beginning in mid-January 1973, Hunt wrote his White House friend Charles Colson suggesting a meeting with Bittman. Hunt was then preparing to plead guilty and—as his testimony now shows—he wanted to reach some understanding about his sentence.

Bittman and Colson did meet, twice, once on January 3, 1973 and again the next day. Colson told the House Judiciary Committee that he gave no assurance of clemency to Hunt, although Bittman "might have inferred that if Hunt received an unreasonably long sentence, my willingness to go to bat for Hunt would result in Hunt's sentence being reduced by executive action of some sort." Bittman told the same committee that he and Colson had discussed the possibility of a tough sentence for Hunt, following which Colson would "do anything whatsoever to assist Howard Hunt as a friend whether he was in or out of the White House." Neither Colson nor Bittman has explained the origin of that "Christmas comes around every year."

At the Senate hearings John Ehrlichman testified there was no talk of Hunt's situation during a lunch he had on January 4, 1973 with former Attorney General Kleindienst and former White House counsel John Dean. Kleindienst, however, told the Senate committee that leniency *was* brought up by the two White House aides, and that Assistant Attorney General Petersen, who was in charge of the original Watergate prosecution, was asked by Kleindienst after the lunch to call the White House and tell Dean what sentence the government planned to demand. Petersen told the senators he called Dean and said, "We are going to recommend jail time. . . ." If Petersen was that tough, how did it happen that Bittman implied to Hunt that a light sentence, if any, was in the offing?

Two weeks after Hunt's trial testimony, former acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray III was called as a witness. Gray has not been charged with anything, although he is under investigation for possible perjury committed during his ill-fated confirmation hearings. He was asked to shed light on the false allegations that FBI investigation of "laundered" checks from Mexico and Florida would expose covert CIA operations. Gray's replies portrayed him as misused by White House aides, a portrait that suited the prosecution. But the jurors could only have learned from earlier Watergate investigations and the impeachment inquiry itself that Gray had been sympathetic to limiting political damage to the President's reelection that could come from the FBI inquiry.

Gray told the jurors that John Dean on June 28, 1972 gave him documents from Hunt's safe that Dean said were unrelated to Watergate but were political dynamite. "They should not see the light of day," Gray quoted Dean telling him. Gray then recounted how he hid the documents in his apartment under his shirts, then moved them to his office safe and finally took them to his home in Stonington, Connecticut where finally he burned them with the Christmas trash. On April 16, 1973 Assistant Attorney General Petersen asked him if Dean had given him documents from Hunt's safe. Gray recalled answering "B.S. [bullshit], Henry. That's not true." Having lied to friend Petersen, Gray said at the trial, "I was warm and hot all over . . . like a woman with the menopause." He could not sleep. He said he told Petersen the truth the following day. As I heard him say this in court, I wondered why Gray's conscience had not bothered him in February 1973 when, according to his own Senate Watergate testimony, he lied to Petersen about those documents. And I wondered why Gray had not then recalled Dean telephoning him in late December 1972, about the time he says he destroyed the documents.

Walter Pincus

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Peace in the Middle East

Kissinger's Quest

A fortnight ago, after completing a prodigious journey from Moscow through South Asia and around to Eastern Europe, Secretary Kissinger zigzagged back across the Middle East in a desperate attempt to salvage the desultory talks between Arabs and Israelis that he set in motion following the Yom Kippur conflict last year. He returned to Washington from the detour with the cautious claim that "possibilities" exist for further mediation, but he carefully refrained from expressing optimism—and understandably so. For the Arab leaders at their summit in Rabat disrupted his plan for a step-by-step approach to a compromise, and unless he can get the bargaining back on track soon, the prospect of a fresh war looms large. With both sides now wielding the latest in sophisticated conventional weapons, such a war portends not only appalling casualties and devastation; it also augurs another petroleum embargo by the Arab oil producers that would shatter the industries of Western Europe and Japan and indirectly subvert the US economy. The potential consequences of a renewed collision are frightening, yet the chances for an accommodation seem bleak.

The Arab leaders delivered a stinging blow to Kissinger's hopes when they unanimously voted at Rabat to acknowledge the Palestine Liberation Organization as the "sole legitimate representative" of some three million Palestinians and endorsed the movement's right to an autonomous state on "any Palestinian land that is liberated" from Israel. More significantly they agreed to include the Palestinians in full-scale negotiations with Israel should the Geneva Conference, which opened in December and quickly bogged down, be resumed. These decisions guarantee trouble. In the first place Israel flatly refuses to consult with the Palestinians, since, as Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin said the other day, they advocate the dissolution of Israel and therefore "negate our existence." This rebuff may prompt the Palestinians to step up their terrorist activities or urge their Arab supporters to trigger hostilities in order to achieve at least their minimum objective of taking over the Gaza Strip and the West Bank of the Jordan, which have been occupied by Israel since 1967. Meanwhile the Rabat agreement to permit the participation of the Palestinians in a broader Middle East parley effectively gives them a voice in arrangements that other Arabs may wish to reach with Israel. This makes it extremely difficult for Kissinger to encourage bilateral understandings, and it seriously compromises his strategy of gradually sponsoring an array of separate deals between the different Arab groups and Israel.

One of the cloudier questions in the Rabat episode is why conservative Arabs like Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat and King Faisal of Saudi Arabia underwrote the Palestinians, since these leaders claim to sympathize with Kissinger's calibrated quest for a settlement. Some experts contend that they went along with Yasir Arafat, head of the Palestine Liberation Organization, out of fear that his movement might be overtaken by more radical elements were its aspirations ignored. Kissinger, who may be trying to put a better face on a bad situation, has described Arafat privately as a relative moderate. Arab diplomats explain that King Hussein of Jordan finally backed Arafat, whom he has distrusted since their clash in 1970, because both Kissinger and the Israelis rejected *his* proposal that a Jordanian administration be authorized to function in parts of the West Bank. According to this account Hussein recommended that the Israelis withdraw eight miles west of the Jordan River and be supplanted by Jordanian civil servants who would have put the Palestinians under their aegis and thereby undercut Arafat. I cannot vouch for the accuracy of that story. Yet it seems to me that the Israelis, who have consistently held that Hussein must serve as a spokesman for the Palestinians, mistakenly failed to extend him those or other concessions that would have strengthened his position and perhaps made his stand against the extremists easier. A key question here is whether the Rabin cabinet in Israel, which governs by the skin of its teeth, could have made such concessions.

A similar question for the future is whether the Ford administration is going to lean on the Israelis to deal with the Palestinians—a course that, to Kissinger's dismay, the President openly favored at a news conference last month. This is a path that the administration will have to tread gingerly in light of its own domestic political problems. The record-breaking rally held in Manhattan the other day to protest against the invitation to Arafat to appear at the United Nations is one indication of a strong pro-Israel attitude that Mr. Ford will have to take into account as Kissinger strives to play broker in the Middle East. Opinion polls show that sympathies for Israel are not confined to New York City.

Secretary Kissinger's room for maneuver, moreover, is apt to be narrowed further by the new Congress, since American Jews are large contributors to the Democratic party, and few politicians will want to alienate them as the presidential elections draw near. Under these circumstances the best Kissinger can hope for is that the Israelis will themselves realize that they must do business with the Palestinians. For that reason he is working to keep the diplomatic avenue open even though, I gather, he has no grand design for pulling together all the threads.

The belligerents may decide, as they have before, that they cannot gain at the conference table what they have not won on the battlefield. The consensus among

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

American specialists is that the Israelis would, unless other options arose, strike first—partly to preclude the kind of surprise Arab attack that stunned them last fall, and partly to take advantage of their present military superiority. Israeli strategy, these specialists submit, would initially be to destroy the "Scud" surface-to-surface missiles given to Egypt and Syria by the Soviet Union before they can be launched against Israel's cities. The Russians have also given MIG-23 jets to the Syrians, and these are a match for the Phantom fighter-bombers that Israel has received from the US. The Arabs can be expected to retaliate against Israel from the air while keeping up the ground pressure in the Sinai and on the Golan Heights. The Israelis have the edge in military skills, but no one knows how the US would resupply them if the left-wing Portuguese government joins the other West Europeans in denying refueling privileges to American transport aircraft. At the very least another round of fighting would cripple everyone involved, no matter which side ultimately came out on top. But the momentum of the situation appears to be carrying both the Arabs and Israelis toward a conflict that may make the four other wars in the region seem to have been skirmishes.

Stanley Karnow

Is This the Way the Congress Wants It?

Slipping It to Thieu

by Fred Branfman

A closed-door meeting of the World Bank, ignored here but reported abroad, was held in Paris on October 17. It was said to be a routine "consultative" gathering to consider an aid request from two Bank members, Laos and the Republic of Vietnam, still represented on the bank by the Thieu government. Fifteen nations attended. Representatives from the International Monetary Fund, UNICEF and the UN Development Program were also present.

The meeting was anything but routine. Strong US pressure on the Bank to aid Saigon created unusual controversy, embarrassing several donor nations and the Bank staff itself. The pressure was applied because Congress cut military aid to Vietnam from $1.6 billion requested to $700 million appropriated, economic aid from $750 million to under $450 million (the matter is still in committee), and put a ceiling of $125 million on Food for Peace ($300 million last year).

According to Treasury Undersecretary Paul A. Volcker, the US is considering $50 million in World Bank loans to South Vietnam as "an *initial* annual lending program." While not sufficient to maintain the Thieu government, this aid is regarded as essential to compensate for congressional cuts and as a prod to private investment and other international aid.

The World Bank initiative was also stimulated by the impending break-up of the coalition in Congress that has supported generous bilateral US aid since 1945. As former Treasury Assistant Secretary John Hennessy told Rep. Otto Passman last April: "There is a large segment of the Senate that feels we shouldn't do anything on a bilateral basis . . . By having these multilateral programs, then, it seems to us we have a very good argument before the Senate that we are balanced . . . which may keep them happy." Experienced congressional sources say they can remember no previous instance where such multilateral channels have been used to circumvent congressional opposition to a bilateral aid request.

US officials made no secret of their intentions prior to the October 17 Bank meeting. Secretary of State Kissinger notified Sen. Kennedy on March 25, 1974 that the US would be pushing "sub-groups" among donor countries to help favored parties in Indochina. As early as July 2 three representatives—Blackburn, Crane and Williams—said that US Treasury officials had assured them that "the Republic of Vietnam will receive favorable consideration for loans of $50 million a year" from World Bank funds.

This US push has not pleased a number of World Bank officials, for if there is one government that does not meet the Bank's minimal criteria for "economic development," it is the Thieu government, beset by war, corruption and political repression. One of Sweden's largest newspapers, *Aftenbladet*, has called

FRED BRANFMAN *is co-director of the Indochina Resource Center.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for Swedish withdrawal from the bank. Numerous European personalities signed a petition denouncing the Bank. In France socialist and Communist deputies posed questions to the government, indicating that the left might make an issue over French participation in the Saigon plan. In an unusual statement Bank spokesmen in Washington went out of their way before the October 17 meeting to stress that "there is no official agenda. No positive recommendations have been prepared or discussed. The Bank does not recommend any form of aid." The reassurance was somewhat disingenuous.

Well informed sources within the Bank reveal that the State Department explicitly linked its willingness to persuade Congress to authorize a $1.5 billion "Fourth Replenishment" to the World Bank, to a reciprocal understanding by the Bank to aid Saigon if the replenishment was approved. (It was, finally, in early July 1974.) This $1.5 billion, out of a worldwide total of $4.5 billion, gives the US 23 percent of the votes in the Bank's weighted voting system. (The US, France, Germany, England, Canada, Japan and Taiwan together have 51.57 percent of the votes.)

Given this background it is not surprising that when the October 17 meeting opened, its chairman, Bernard Bell, took the unusual step of starting off with a discussion of the press release to be issued at the conclusion of the meeting. Bell, the Bank's vice president for East Asia and the Pacific, said this was necessary because of "misinformation" that had appeared in the world press. After an unproductive discussion, during which no text could be agreed upon, the matter was referred to a subcommittee. (The final release, ratified in the afternoon, was a terse four sentences merely listing the participants and noting they had come to "exchange information and views."

The US delegation was the only one that delivered a lengthy case for World Bank involvement in South Vietnam. Led by Charles Cooper, now a Treasury Assistant Secretary and formerly an economic counselor with ministerial status in Saigon, the US team was unusually high-powered. Mr. Cooper stressed that the Saigon government has shown both the will and determination to pursue proper economic policies, putting a large emphasis on production and undertaking such fiscal reforms as revaluing the currency. He referred to such pluses as "the world's greatest land reform," the imminent discovery of offshore oil, and South Vietnam's export of rice for the first time since 1967. He ended by stressing that World Bank aid could bring a degree of "stabilization."

His basic proposal was that the Bank establish two sub-groups, one for Laos and another for South Vietnam. In addition to World Bank funding, such subgroups would also "coordinate bilateral aid programs."

The Swedes objected. Lennart Klackenberg, Undersecretary of State, said that "the Saigon regime does not represent the people of South Vietnam." Referring to the Paris Agreement, he argued that there are "two authorities, Saigon and the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG), which are supposed to work out together a political settlement." The nonimplementation of the agreement, he said, "does not make it any more legitimate for the World Bank to intervene to strengthen one of these two parties." The Swedes also asked how the American government had been so certain prior to the meeting that the $50 million would be approved. Chairman Bell responded that no such figure had been discussed, and that none could be until Congress actually appropriated (not simply authorized) Fourth Replenishment Funds.

None of the other delegations dealt with the political issues raised by the Swedes and Americans. (The US delegation made it clear that it would not support Bank aid either to North Vietnam or the PRG.) The Australians stated categorically that they did not wish to aid Saigon. So did the Norwegians. The French favored aid to Laos but said the time was not ripe for helping Saigon. The Swiss representative said he could not return to his country as a participant in a plan to fund the Thieu government and noted his "observer" status. The British and Italians spoke of their own domestic woes and showed little interest in an Indochina "sub-group." The Germans, Finns, Dutch, Danes and New Zealanders were noncommittal; only the Germans left the door open to acceptance.

The only nations that openly backed the US plan were Japan and Canada. Japan has substantial investments in South Vietnam. The decision of Canada was a surprise. On May 2, 1974 the head of its overseas aid organization, Paul Gerine-Lajoie, had told the House of Commons that "Canada did not support initiatives from the Republic of Vietnam, USA, and World Bank last May for a consultative group under the aegis of the World Bank and which would have been limited to South Vietnam."

Despite the inconclusiveness of the October 17 meeting, chairman Bell indicated at the end of the day that he would be recommending to Bank President McNamara that his sense of the meeting was that a majority supported World Bank aid to both Laos and South Vietnam. The next step, he indicated, would be for the Bank to convene two separate sub-group meetings, one for Laos and another for South Vietnam. Only those donor nations interested would come. Presumably after the sub-group meetings foreshadowed by Mr. Bell, proposals will be made to Mr. McNamara. After analyzing them Mr. McNamara will then put forward staff-recommended projects for the usual pro forma approval by the Bank's directors.

Administration attempts to pressure the Bank into aiding Saigon may still backfire in Congress, however. Many who are against bilateral aid to dictatorships in general and Thieu's in particular may be just as opposed to giving such aid under a multilateral cover.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

IMAGES OF OURSELVES

A Special 60th Anniversary Supplement

On High and Popular Culture

by Raymond Williams

What is the relationship between high culture and popular culture? This question, which is common in contemporary discussions of the humanities, is sometimes real but as often rhetorical. Two positions usually follow from the rhetorical question. First, it is said that high culture—"the best that has been thought and written in the world"—is in danger, or is indeed already "lost," because of widespread popular education, popular communications systems, and what is often called "mass society." Secondly, that high culture—"the tradition"—is, in the main, the product of past stages of society, that it is ineradicably associated with ruling classes and with elites, and that it is accordingly being replaced in modern democratic

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

conditions by a popular culture. The debate between these two positions has practical results in social policy both in the allocation of resources and in the political shaping of cultural institutions. Yet the two common positions and the debate between them are intolerably confused by failures of definitions, and the social policies that follow from them largely ignore the realities of contemporary society.

In its earliest senses, in several major languages, the term "culture" always referred to the culture *of* something: originally the culture of natural products and then, by metaphorical extension, the culture of mental or spiritual faculties. In either case it was a process defined by the object of cultivation. In the late 18th and early 19th centuries it was given a very different additional meaning. This begins in the universal histories, which offered a largely secular and developmental account of the growth of human civilization. To avoid identification of this process with any particular modern state (and hence to avoid the crude distinction between civilization and barbarism) but even more to emphasize the self-acting (secular) and growing (developmental) factors of human history, the term "culture," which already expressed human process, was distinguished from and often preferred to the alternative term "civilization." In the work of Herder and others a further decisive development occurred. We had to speak, Herder insisted, of "cultures" rather than "culture." At a certain level the process might be universal, but its reality was in a range and series of specific cultures: the whole ways of life of particular groups. This is the origin of the ordinary modern use of "culture" in anthropology.

But the older sense of culture as a process survived. In the course of the 19th century it acquired a specific association with the practices on which mental and spiritual cultivation were thought to depend: intellectual work and the arts. "Culture" is now often a shorthand not only for these practices but for their products. It implies at once the general process of human development and the specific organizations of such development in different societies. It implies also both the whole way of life of a people and the practices and products of intellectual work and the arts. These two implications become sources of difficulty in our notions of "high culture" and "popular culture."

What does "high culture" mean? Its most plausible use is to describe the great body of cultural skills and the great works which embody and represent them. There would be argument about which skills to include or exclude, but in common usage the skills of organized thought, writing, music, the visual arts and architecture would certainly be included.

RAYMOND WILLIAMS *is the author of* Culture and Society *and* The Long Revolution. *He is professor of drama and fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge, England.*

We then also recognize that high culture has no specific social structure. It is, by definition, a body of work from many different societies and many different periods of history. Indeed, only in abstraction can it be seen as a "body" of work at all. No individual and no single society receives or uses this whole body of work. Rather, particular societies, for historical reasons, receive selections of this body of work, which they perceive as their effective cultural traditions. There is great unevenness in this process of selection, as is quickly evident when, for example, Asian and European scholars compared their notions of "tradition" or of "classics." Moreover no society makes available to all its members anything like the whole of even its selected area of the tradition. In the processes of international conquest and domination, as most evidently in imperialism and in neo-colonialism, there is not only unevenness of distribution but a deliberate process of imposition of alien forms of selection.

"High culture," then, has no real social structure, but at best a professional structure or series of professional structures in which people inherit and practice a selection of skills and maintain and disseminate a selection of works. Such professional structures have important common interests, from an international perspective, in such activities as the study of alternative traditions, visiting, exchange-teaching, translation and so on. They also have important common interests, in national perspectives, in maintaining and extending the skills and works that they value.

Nevertheless all these professional structures exist within social structures. As members of particular institutions, and as members of particular societies in definite relationships with other societies, their work cannot be abstracted from their real social existence. "High culture" in any particular society is not only a selection from universal high culture, but a selection that relates, explicitly or implicitly, to wider elements of the society. Thus high culture, the work of more than one's own class, society, period or even epoch, is commonly incorporated into a particular contemporary social structure—a social class or such institutions as universities or churches—that owes its real contemporary existence to factors other than high culture, and that indeed often confuses its temporary, local or self-interested features with the received and selected high culture that it offers to justify or to ratify them. Similarly, between nations, an invading or dominant society projects—by imposition or by suppression of a native culture—a version of "high culture" that cannot in practice be abstracted from its direct political and economic interests.

Thus whether within or between societies, respect for "high culture" in its purest and most abstract sense must find a critical rather than a justifying form of expression and action. Within societies it is necessary to become conscious of the selective character of the "high culture" or "cultural tradition" that is cur-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rently active, and to explore the relations between the selection and contemporary social structures (including such directly relevant social formations as universities). Between societies, when in any good faith the selective character of particular versions of high culture will quickly become obvious, we must explore the connections between these variations and the real historical and contemporary political and economic relationships, and, above all, to avoid the error of supposing that a selective version made by some temporarily dominant society is "universal" whereas the selective version of some temporarily dominated society is merely "local" or "traditional." The interaction between particular local selections and what can be conceived theoretically as a universal high culture must, for cultural as well as other reasons, take place in conditions of equality and mutual respect. This, of course, does not mean that what is sought is some bland consensus; there is much necessary opposition and conflict between variant cultural traditions, as well as honest recognition of alternatives.

At this point the meaning of "popular culture" becomes critical. First, there can be no simple contrast between "high culture" (universal) and "popular culture" (local). This is because every available version of high culture is always, in the senses described, local and selective, and because, in the process of being made available in a real society, it includes (whether these are noticed or not) elements of the popular culture, in the widest sense, of its own society. Universities, which transmit and sometimes practice selections of universal high culture, are in their internal organization, which has been shaped by the selection and in their relations with the rest of the society, parts of the popular culture of their own time, with discoverable resemblances to the values, criteria and methods of organization of other institutions in the social structure that are not concerned with high culture at all. The culture of a people, in the sense of its whole way of life, inevitably shapes and colors our explicitly "cultural" institutions.

Secondly, there can be no simple contrast between the "high culture" of a social class or occupational group and the "popular culture" of the rest of the people. There are evident and important differences of degree of access and use, but these are contingent social and historical relationships. In certain societies, of the past and still in some cases of the present, there are distinguishable cultural situations: for example, court and peasant cultures, aristocratic and folk cultures, metropolitan-imperial and native-colonial cultures. Often the separated cultures will have evident differences of degree of access to a more universal high culture, but none of them can be identified with high culture as such, and increasingly, as societies develop, there is influential interaction between previously separated spheres. In industrial societies, and especially in societies with developed and developing systems of general education and communications, we are beyond the stage of influential interaction between distinguishable cultures and into a more complex process that needs to be seen from the beginning as a whole.

This brings us to the most crucial distinction between different senses of "popular" culture. There is a kind of culture that has been developed *by* a people or by the majority of a people to express their own meanings and values, over a range from customs to works. There is also a different kind of culture that has been developed *for* a people by an internal or external social group, and embedded in them by a range of processes from repressive imposition to commercial saturation. The distinctions between these two kinds are not simple; influential interaction constantly occurs. The choice of process, in the popularization of an alien culture, depends on variable historical and social conditions but usually includes close attention to the culture that is already popular. The sources of cultural activity have nevertheless to be precisely identified, in every case. In some cases this is easy, as in internationally exported religions or political ideo-

The Old Days

All the way back from the graveyard
the jazz-band played loud sweet and free—
they were earning two dollars apiece,
a hell of a lot for those days.

Along the dirt road men and boys
swung axe-handles, baseball bats, broomsticks
to drive the ghost-men away
and keep that blood moving inside them.

There'd be blood on the outside, too,
when some gang from the far end of town
paying no heed to the hex-lines
would cross where they had no damn business—

We played all our favorite hymns,
drank gin and warm whiskey and beer
and packed in fried fish and fried chicken
reminiscing about the departed.

And three or four would make speeches,
one would cry, and one tell funny stories
while the soul, rising clean from the graveyard,
fled "free as a bird to the mountain."

FREDERICK MORGAN

FREDERICK MORGAN *is the editor of* The Hudson Review.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

logies or television programs. In other cases, when in particular social conditions certain kinds of adaptive, imitative or incorporated activity begin among those who were previously only the objects of external popularization, identification may be very difficult. No simple presumption of values can in any case be made. But unless the process is made conscious, by critical examination and discussion, the state of any particular popular culture will not be understood.

Comparative and historical definitions of high culture lead us toward situations in which, by recognizing the existence of many centers of meaning and value, and by further recognizing the dynamic processes of selection, formation and interaction we can envisage precise kinds of study and work. By contrast abstract and pseudo-universal definitions of high culture and popular culture, restricting meaning and value to a single tradition and contemplating the meanings and values of the majority of people and peoples as intrinsically inferior, lead us to evade true cultural values and contemporary reality.

In the area that we consider as belonging to high culture we can properly think of some universally valuable (although very general) skills and of a considerable number of generally important and interesting works. While we treat these specifically, and follow their action through history and across frontiers, we learn deep and extending respect for their kinds of achievement, but we do not learn, except in the case of some of the most abstract skills, anything like a set of available values.

Thus, to take one major example, the *Antigone* of Sophocles has been a major work in most periods of European culture. In its dramatization of a conflict between duty to a brother and duty to a state, it raises permanent social and ethical questions. But the play gives no available answer to these. When Antigone, having chosen her duty to her brother, adds that she would not have done this for a husband, she so shocked one Victorian scholar that he "proved" the passage spurious. But the distinction is valid within the relevant kinship system, and this has to be included, with all its other definitions and problems—some of which we must now necessarily reject, or reject other whole areas of our real cultural tradition—before any available value can be abstracted.

Our contacts with some of the greatest philosophical and artistic work will often lead to questioning, rejection or a sense of ineluctable strangeness and otherness, and this is as much part of the true process of high culture as the more commonly cited experience of learning, enlargement and enrichment. Given the highly variable and extraordinary character of the more enduring elements of high culture, this is not only not surprising; it is a condition of recognizing the true conditions and qualities of this remarkable human enterprise. All traditions can become less selective and culture-bound than they now are, and every genuine effort in this direction is important. But there can be no short-cuts. The meanings and values of all particular peoples and cultures have to be respected, with no prior selection of universal values, if the next necessary stage, of contact, interaction and the dynamic processes of agreement and disagreement, intellectual conflict as well as consensus are to be reasonably conducted under conditions of equality.

Meanwhile within societies and between societies, there is very important work to be done in the recovery, and where possible and relevant the reanimation of suppressed, neglected and disregarded cultures: the meanings and values, in some cases the works, of dominated peoples and classes, and of minorities that have suffered discrimination. This is one crucial kind of popular culture program.

But it is insufficient, and could decline into mere antiquarianism and folklorism if the real present is not connected to the recovered past. To do this we have not only to study contemporary cultural change (in spite of the persistent reflex of humanistic scholars toward the past). We have also to study contemporary cultural media (in spite of the persistent prejudice of humanistic scholars against what are thought of as vulgar subcultural manifestations). We shall not now understand any popular culture unless we study, for example, the press, the cinema, broadcasting and sport. Indeed the movement toward versions of universalism is much more evident in these spheres than in those of traditional philosophy and arts. Yet it is becoming universal only in the sense that it is widely exported from a few powerful centers, within radically unequal terms of exchange. What has been called, for broadcasting, the "global village" will be neither founded nor governed by all its putative inhabitants. Rather in hitherto unimaginable terms, the use of powerful new media will enable a few to speak to and apparently for the many, and, unless powerful safeguards are constructed, to drive out of competition the more varied and authentic voices that are the true discourse of any society and of humanity.

In culture as in other matters, human resilience and creativity are still our major resource. High culture has no social structure, but the professional structures that have direct responsibility for it, in artistic, intellectual and scholarly work, have much to do of a new as well as a traditional kind: the maintenance and extension but also the critical review and intercultural examination of their own received high cultures; the understanding and critical review of received and changing popular cultures; and, in work that now necessarily takes them beyond their own frontiers, whether of country or of discipline, the understanding and critical review, leading to such action as is necessary, of the new forms and new media that reflect now our most active and vital cultural processes.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Vicarious Terrorism of the Sports Spectator

by Michael Roberts

In the fall of 1973 a man in Colorado attempted suicide by shooting himself in the head. The note he left alluded to the Denver Broncos, a professional football team that had just fumbled seven times in the course of a drubbing by the Chicago Bears. "I have been a Broncos fan since the Broncos were first organized," the note said, "and I can't stand their fumbling any more."

Poor marksmanship was all that averted a human sacrifice to the football gods. But the act itself—fumbled, appropriately, as it was—could be regarded (if only by persons relatively indifferent to the teams of the National Football League) as the *reductio ad absurdum* of the widely approved and encouraged tendency of spectators to get involved emotionally.

Not that it was the most absurd of all possible absurdities. There are time-honored precedents elsewhere in the world. In Latin America, for example, murders and suicides stemming from soccer scores are commonplace. Observers groping for explanations are usually inclined to attribute such behavior to the reputedly volatile temperament of the average Latin. The validity of such a claim must be left to the ethnologists to decide, but one needn't be an expert of any kind to discern one significant distinction: soccer, at its top levels, is conducted on an international scale, and in many cases the vexation that touches off violence against self or others is generated by wounded feelings of national pride. It's harder to comprehend a death occasioned by frustration over the inefficiency of a privately owned, profit-making business that, strictly for commercial purposes, calls itself by the name of the city in which it is located.

Here a bit of historical review is in order. Whatever their scope, strong feelings of kinship between doer and watcher find their earliest antecedents on the playing fields of ancient cultures. The Greeks, fine sporting fellows that they were, celebrated individual competition, the development of the whole man for his own benefit. With their Olympic Games, however, they also gave rise to the practice of grouping lads together to compete in the names of their respective hometowns. (As Western civilization advanced, the Romans broke away from the team-representation idea in favor, again, of contests in which the participant played on behalf of himself—particularly in contact sports involving armed men or a man and an aggressive beast. There were exceptions—occasionally church groups were asked to assemble teams for these events.)

Hence the notion that athletic glory could be shared in by the neighbors of the glorious athlete, or team, gained early acceptance and has survived, largely unexamined, to the present. When the poet reminisces to his athlete, dying young, about "That time you won your town the race," there seems no need to explain what, precisely, the town has done to be deserving.

Thus endures the foundation stone of nearly every variety of spectator sport now flourishing: the linking of the participant's destiny with the fan's, in terms of a common city, nation, race, religion or institution of higher learning. In short the whole system depends on *granfalloonery*, a Kurt Vonnegut word, to express "a proud and meaningless association of human beings."

But these are persistent, consequential (economically) forms of *granfalloonery*, and fascinated observers have striven to unravel their mysteries. One scholar finds the direct antecedents of the 19th century's town-versus-town baseball games in the older custom of town-versus-town melees. "Most of the games . . . ended up in brawls," folklorist Tristram P. Coffin writes, going on to suggest that the games represented "semi-civilized replacements for village-to-village wars. And this is an aspect of the game that has never left it." (Interestingly the word "donnybrook" has its origin in the Irish brawls of this sort.) For evidence Coffin refers to the American League pennant race of 1967, when work virtually came to a standstill in four large American cities so that everyone could pay attention to baseball. "During the final two games, when Boston amazingly defeated Minnesota to win it all, a number of classes were suspended at such an unlikely place as Wellesley College so that girls who barely knew where Carl Yastrzemski would run after hitting the ball could take rapt part in this modern village-to-village crisis."

Significant also is the fact that the object of attention was no son of the Boston soil. The Red Sox had imported Yastrzemski from Long Island, and nearly all his teammates from distant regions of the country as well as a few other places in the Western Hemisphere;

Michael Roberts *writes a sports column for* The Washington Star-News.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in fact in modern times the appearance of a local boy on a professional or college roster is the exception, not the rule, and is usually the random accident of a player draft or a recruiter's good fortune. This is a far cry from the old days when the town team was rounded up in town and its immediate environs, or when the young bucks who happened to be enrolled together at Princeton threw down a football challenge to their counterparts at Rutgers. But the evolution toward universal use of mercenaries has never affected the phenomenon of spectator identification.

The seasonal, predictable crisis of sport remain as provincial in flavor as ever. One reason this is so is instant naturalization of athletic citizens (those of indisputable worthiness, of course), a process long since rendered unremarkable by fans of pro and college teams. It takes effect with a startling fluidity and is just as easily reversible. A notable recent case is that of Moses Malone, a teenaged basketball whiz who was transformed from savior of the University of Maryland to traitor in the time it took him to decide to skip college, going instead directly from high school into the pro game. Malone now resides in Salt Lake City, where—as he had been in College Park, Maryland—he has been graciously adopted by the natives, pending proof that he'll be as useful an acquisition as the Utah Stars expect him to be.

In the matter of taking the immigrant athlete unto the local bosom, in fact, spectators tend to take more practical approach than the players themselves do. Some football players of domestic origin make no effort to hide their resentment of foreign-born field-goal kickers (whose soccer-bred skill has enabled them to dominate the field). Fans, on the other hand, invariably look at it this way: in the case of anyone who is consistently accurate from 40 yards out, prejudices will cheerfully be waived. On occasion such tolerant impulses have even been known to transcend racial hatreds, although in certain regions conflicting emotions are accommodated through the recognition of artificially distinct categories, namely "their niggers" and "our colored boys."



This specialized tolerance is explained simply enough. For the most part the spectator's stake in the proceedings is the gratification that comes from identifying with success. Whoever can provide such vicarious joy needs no other justification as a human being. The capacity of one man's actions to buttress the self-esteem of another is demonstrably a potent force—a force that has been exploited whenever possible by the entrepreneurs of sports events. In this regard the promoters of prizefighting have been more meticulous than anyone else. They are virtuosos of the ethnic sell, profiting even now from pitches that have scarcely grown more subtle since the "Golden Age of Sport." Granted, it may have been a while since anyone has instructed the public that Joe Louis, the former heavyweight champion, was "a credit to his race." But in places like New York it is still considered sound salesmanship to promote a California-born contestant as "Irish Jerry Quarry," with a liberal sprinkling of shamrocks on the posters, and to introduce another boxer as "The Jewish Bomber."

It's a reliable, if hoary, approach, appealing as it does to the inflammable sensitivities of the various branches of the human family—particularly those individuals who can feel themselves ennobled by someone else's left hook. And in much the same manner, the self-image of an entire city can be manipulated, lowered to despair or raised to giddy heights according to the capabilities of athletes-for-hire. When the Philadelphia Flyers won the championship of the National Hockey League last spring, the reaction of the populace—encouraged all the way by the local and national press—suggested that nothing in the city's past, not even the canonized epithets of W. C. Fields, had done such violence to the collective psyche of Philadelphia as the monotonously regular inferiority of its professional sports franchises. Once the Stanley Cup had been secured, publications started falling over one another in their haste to congratulate the city on, as *Time* put it, "the tangible proof that Philadelphia is at long last a winner." The curious logic of spectator sport: what was tangible, precisely speaking, was the Stanley Cup, a large, hideous piece of metalwork worth less than $100, which came into the possession

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the Flyers' management for a year. The players had won that. They also had won bonuses and probably salary increases. The owners of the franchise had won extra revenue from the playoff games and a more salable product than ever for next season. What had Philadelphia—the civic entity—won? That's an elusive, metaphysical question. But for sure millions of residents were being counseled to think more highly of themselves for the Flyers' accomplishments.

At least, given the cover of big-city anonymity, they had a choice. There are places in this country, medium to small college towns primarily, where it is a serious social liability to dissociate oneself from the ups and downs and everyday existence of the football team. According to a sociologist whose findings were reported in *New Times*, people who live in Columbus, Ohio, are "not free" to admit indifference to the Ohio State football team. Nonenthusiasts who dwell in Columbus are categorized by normal folk as "freaks." Respondents to a poll overwhelmingly listed the Buckeyes as their most frequent topic of conversation and also ventured that a sound, working knowledge of the team's activities was a *sine qua non* for doing business with fellow townsmen. Most subjects agreed, furthermore, that a lack of interest in the team could be termed "downright unpatriotic."

To say nothing of the mood on campuses themselves in such cities, where over the decades student bodies and faculties have been conditioned to a notion that long ago gained respectability in American academic life: athletic teams are what give an institution its sense of worth and unity, its verve, its feeling that life is worth living. Yet historians are firm on the point that colleges and universities predated intercollegiate athletics. To those who hold dear the school-spirit ideal, it must be sad to reflect on the gloomy aimlessness that presumably palled college life in those long-ago days before the football weekend was conceived. On the other hand it must be comforting to realize that it can never be that way again.

The academic world simply couldn't afford a relapse. Year by year, in fact, the pace intensifies in the all-out competition to seduce the best brawn available in the grant-in-aid market; to field the finest teams money and flattery can put together. Assistance comes from many quarters—from governors, senators, legendary coaches, even pretty girls recruited specifically for the purpose. It costs, but experience has proved it a prudent—if not imperative—investment, because endowments at a staggering number of institutions have been found to be dependent largely upon won-lost records. The outcome of last year's game against an arch-rival can be pivotal too. After all an alumnus can't be expected to be proud of a loser, and an alumnus who is not proud is not, statistics show, much of a contributor.

Obviously vicarious triumphs are not the only rewards alumni-patrons look forward to. For many there is that keenly anticipated weekend each year when many of society's conventions are temporarily suspended. Then, the old grad, along with the undergrad, can indulge in conduct that might be regarded as indecorous in other settings. Behavior such as assault and battery and indecent exposure are considered quite correct under the etiquette prevailing at, say, the Texas-Oklahoma football game.

In the final analysis this may be college sport's most significant service to its followers, more valuable even than the fomenting of campus chauvinism. For the public seems to need a permissible outlet for certain barbaric impulses. Sport provides that outlet, on an ever-expanding scale. Control of sporting crowds has lately become recognized as a new speciality in the armed-guard business. The Burns Security Institute reports that fan behavior nationwide has been growing markedly worse, with regard to such particulars as drinking, gambling, profanity and missile-throwing.

Paradoxically most fans are believed to harbor a highly exploitable reverence for the performers upon whom they shower such vulgarity. The commercial implications are staggering. Anyone who dared produce a razor blade commercial without an athlete would be branded a heretic. Jocks have repeatedly been employed to sell everything from bubble gum to politicians. An administrator in charge of fund-raising at a major metropolitan hospital some years ago still



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

marvels at the results of an inspired campaign of television commercials. They were testimonials from pro hockey players: "I got my knee bashed in, and this place fixed me up real good." Contributions from the public ultimately rose from $250,000 annually to more than four million dollars.

For some time sports figures have also performed a parallel job as counselors to the public on moral, social and political issues. Hence it was altogether fitting in the days just before Richard Nixon threw in the towel that the coach of the professional football team in Washington should go on record: "I don't think he should resign . . . That's the type of determination and leadership and doggedness you have to have in a President."

No vote of confidence could have been less unpredictable. In his astuteness as an interpreter of public tastes, Nixon had been cultivating the athletic community for years. (President Ford, a quick study, immediately adopted his predecessor's compulsive habit of phoning big-time sports winners right after their victories.) If Kennedy had been trying to establish Camelot, Nixon was going for something a little more familiar—a Columbus, Ohio, perhaps, or a Green Bay, Wisconsin. And during the glory days of his administration it was observed time and again that no private citizen in Washington, no congressional figure, no cabinet member save possibly John Mitchell, had as frequent access to the White House as George Allen, coach of the Washington Redskins.

Art Imitating Life Imitating Art

Residuals on "An American Family"

by Roger Rosenblatt

A little over a year ago the William C. Louds of Santa Barbara, California were the most widely discussed and written about family in the United States. They were the stars and subjects of "An American Family," an experimental exercise in television verité, invented and undertaken by a director, Craig Gilbert. For 13 straight weeks the lives and characters of each member of this family were made plain to us. We responded by analyzing what we saw, and by inspecting our own feelings. In the very short time since, the Louds have been nearly forgotten.

This is confusing to the Louds, who regarded their initial stardom as merely the beginning of future risings. Only a few months ago they reconvened on the "Dick Cavett Show" where they had also appeared in their heyday, before Bill and Pat Loud got their divorce. On the second appearance Pat was unsuccessfully promoting her book, *Pat Loud: A Woman's Story*, and the children, all five, were frantically promoting themselves as a hard rock group. They performed a song written by Lance Loud called "Muscle Boys," but again, no sale. The Louds talked with Cavett about their enormous disappointment in not being able to sustain their renown.

"An American Family" was, I think, one of the most significant events of our recent popular culture. The Louds would have a right to be surprised at their fading, were it not for the fact that all events in popular culture, no matter how big and brassy, are ephemeral. It is a tenet of popular culture that things come and go. The disappearance of an item is as essential as its rise and prominence.

But the disappearance of the Louds presents a special problem. The family's prominence did not merely wane; it was obliterated, as if by popular demand. There were those who simply disliked the show or found it boring. There were more who deeply hated the show and the idea of the show as well. "An American Family" has not been rerun. It flourished within popular culture, but it also did something to popular culture, something that even popular culture, which accepts all things, could not abide.

At a time when questions of censorship were being put so ardently in the press, it is interesting how smoothly the Louds passed by. People who debated *Deep Throat* and *Last Tango in Paris* did not include "An American Family" in their conception of debilitating and tasteless influences. The reason may be that

ROGER ROSENBLATT *is director of education programs, National Endowment for the Humanities, and the author of* Black Fiction.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Louds were not naked in their episodes, not naked in the sense of performing without clothing. Their intimacies, where they occurred, were merely verbal, thus evidently more tolerable, despite the fact that once a week we all sat down to watch an organization of human beings deliberately set out to psychologically murder each other. Despite the accuracies achieved by television verité, we started out viewing most aspects of the Louds' behavior as the antics of a family of some other country. However as the show progressed public criticism of "An American Family" became quite personal. One judged the success of each episode, and the whole series, by deciding whether one liked the Louds, a decision that hinged on our surface identifications with, and correspondences to, the family, and gradually became refined to the point where we declared some Louds better than other Louds—healthier, more honest more entertaining. Eventually we began to root for our favorite Loud.

This is a procedure with which we are quite familiar, and it is accomplished almost by reflex. Every radio and television show, movie and comic strip built on the family format has required of us the same superficial discriminations. Even as the Louds were asserting their presence in their medium, they were in direct competition with shows of the sort that continue to succeed today: "The Brady Bunch," "All in the Family," "Family Affair," "My Three Sons," "The Partridge Family" and more. It may be argued that "An American Family" was real-life drama and ought not to be yoked with "The Brady Bunch," but theoretically a semblance of reality is the aspiration of "The Brady Bunch," and of the other shows as well. The questions of propriety raised by "An American Family" were no different in kind from those raised by the Bunker family, which has been both hailed and scorned solely because of its proximity to reality.

It is far less interesting that the Louds were real than that we reacted to them as if they were not. Because they came to us on a regular schedule each week—the same cast, the same setting—because they engaged in a new and complete adventure every episode, edited largely in the same patterns, and because our appreciation and apprehension of them increased according to the sequence of the performances, we reasonably took the Louds to be fictitious. If they had been on radio, they would have brought to mind "One Man's Family." On television they became the new Ozzie and Harriet Nelson, a notable American family of another age, whose appeal, like the Louds', derived from their being the same family off-stage and on. Like the Louds, Ozzie and Harriet had teenage children, and a nice house, and confusions and misunderstandings. Ozzie did something for a living—it was never clear what—but his family, like the Louds, never wanted. Ozzie was a "good guy," just like Bill. Ricky was a rock 'n' roll star, just as Grant and Kevin hoped to be (Delilah sought to become a tap dancer).

We focused mainly on Mrs. Loud because, like Harriet, she ran her show. She answered everybody's questions, and solved all problems. She arranged airplane tickets, reminded the children of their school calendar, reinforced various routines. She insisted on the role of stabilizer and organizer—"I've got enough mutinous troops around here"—and the others conceded her that role eagerly. In fact, they made her assumption of it necessary, a fine courtesy, by affecting chaos and disorder at every opportunity. Even when the Louds simply walked together, they loped distractedly like water birds in an open zoo.

The principal difference between the two women was that Harriet used to urge on the maturity of her boys to the point of the show's survival through David's and Ricky's marriages. Harriet had the advantage over Pat of being confined by her director to the business of making peanut butter and jelly sandwiches, so her benign toleration of everybody else's changes was born partly of circumstance. Mrs. Loud quite openly did not wish her family to change. When Kevin returned from overseas, he showed signs of independence that Pat resented, and tried to tease him out of. She much preferred her neurotic Lance, who was down and out in Europe. On the phone one time Pat told Bill to wire Lance another $50, and when Bill protested, "he's got to do it for himself," she treated his comment as an aphorism.

This difference aside, Pat and Harriet could have played each other. More than any superficial similarity, they shared the fundamental condition of being simultaneously the firm foundations of their families and the romantic idols in which great dreams had been invested. Each was her Juno, of O'Casey's play, married to a dreamer and bungler whose wildest dream (and biggest bungle?) was she herself. Eventually the object of the dream had to become the solidifying agent because the dreamer wished to go on dreaming. The stability of the family came to depend entirely on her. She initially had been the end of romance, and now encouraged romance in others (the tap dancers, the rock 'n' roll stars) in order to hold on to her power. In Harriet this was theater, in Pat, life, but it was the same part played.

To parallel real and fictitious characters in this way should be an offensive idea. The suggestion it carries is that the real person is diminished by the comparison, her complexities and variations, which are the human signs, reduced to the simplifying elements of melodrama. Yet Pat was not diminished in the slightest by her identification with fiction. Indeed her complexity was enhanced by it, because she seemed purposefully to cultivate the trappings of simple-mindedness, as if she sought to be fictitious herself.

She came on from the start as a woman who had absorbed all the components of attractiveness without permitting herself to become attractive. Always in-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

formal—her white slacks were startling—she gave the impression of having studied long and hard to look so smart. By now her appearance came automatically, and the outfits that were supposed to be casual were worn like a kind of uniform. She descended to breakfast each morning like a piece of machinery, yet it was clear that she was aware of her rigidity. Instead of working counter to it, she elaborated on it, just as the children elaborated on their own loose-jointedness.

Her props were her glasses—oversized, stylish, worn like a visor. Her voice, like Harriet's, had the tone of instructions piped through earphones on a museum tour. Neither warm nor cold, it sustained rather than created conversation, a family trait. Mrs. Loud has thick dark hair, which she tied back like a young girl's, but she did not look young because of it. Nor did she look old, nor old trying to look young. She looked as if she were frozen at 35, though at the time of the show she had reached 46, yet the question of age did not really crop up. The control she exerted over herself, her body and gestures, so dominated the impression we took of her that in a sense the force of that control, which ordinarily should have been repellent for its dehumanizing effect, was her most attractive feature.

But Mrs. Loud would not allow even that attraction. She had mastered the craft of withholding herself: from her clothing, her voice, her homosexual son with whom she played a perpetual Venus and Adonis. On her visit to Lance in New York, she lolled about his pad like the siren of a world that might have been. Then she was off again, to a Baltimore shipping depot, or to a shoe store to buy taps for Delilah, or to a bookstore. When she called her husband long-distance, even before they officially became estranged, she sounded as if it were she who had answered the phone. He tried to pump up their talk, as if with an organ bellows. She gave him the time and the weather.

The terrible thing, or what ought to have been the terrible thing, was, as we learned in one of the later episodes, that Mrs. Loud knew what we thought of her. Deciding after 20 years that she would divorce her husband because of his countless infidelities, she brought her case to her brother and sister-in-law. They discussed divorce over a barbecue. Pat said that the pain Bill had put her through caused her to become "unlovable." The word was not only exactly right, but brought Bill to mind; Bill who was constitutionally lovable, who did not withhold himself, who was born with a face that takes everything (nothing) seriously, and bears the expression of a man eternally in line for something, like a TV taping. Bill always gave his all, which was also all surface and above board; yet Pat was leaving him for his dishonesty, his disingenuousness, which she said made her unlovable.

She told her in-laws that her husband had made his philanderings so obvious to her that she could only suppose he meant them to be discovered. What she did not say directly is that when she made the discoveries, she had reacted to them on her own terms. She had ordered Bill from the house on those earlier occasions, and would do so this time as well. She would make a "scene," even though it is not certain that a scene is what Bill was seeking when he so obviously planted the evidence of his guilt. But it is a scene he would get, nevertheless, because a showdown, for all its stomping and screaming, would still be in Pat's control. It would require no thinking of anybody, no revelations and no changes. Just like Ozzie caught dancing too close to his old flame at the class reunion, Bill Loud was in the doghouse.

The divorce of the Louds, the central action of the series, was a great sadness. Why were we so unmoved? Strangely, we would have been more disturbed by the sight of Harriet going through the same experience, sitting down collectedly with Thorny the neighbor, and painfully unburdening herself of her contempt for the simpleton Ozzie, the tedium of his golf playing and boyish fakery, for David the straight, Wheaties-grown dullard, for Ricky with his narcotized eyes, for her own infernal sandwiches, and their whole vacant, sun-drenched life. Done right, that scene would have stunned us powerfully. But not Pat Loud. When she laid bare her life, it seemed as if she were talking about someone else.

Her evasion was well suited to television. In television's terms it was realism at its best. The main reason television is so offensive an instrument is that it attempts to create its own brand of realism, and to destroy our idea of reality in the process. Ordinarily this effort might not be deemed offensive because in one way or another everything that pretends to realism attempts to destroy our idea of reality, and does so, as television does, by substituting its own. What is called "realistic" in literature is always much harsher and tougher than what we recognize as real life, and the "realistic" decisions we are occasionally asked to make are inevitably the ones that disfavor us or belittle our very real imaginations. In television, however, realism represents neither the excessively harsh nor excessively practical. It is our crises, the points of highest intensity, that television calls real, and it seeks to obliterate our own sense of what is real by bombarding us with continuous and undiscriminated excitements until we are unable to tell the exciting from the tedious, the important from the trivial, and ultimately until we are unable to tell what is happening at all.

The Louds' divorce was a real event; it actually occurred. Never was there greater realism on television except in the murders of Oswald and Robert Kennedy. Nevertheless the event seemed staged because it took place within a context in which almost every event was treated with equal fervor. There is no question that the Louds and their children were upset over this business, but in fact appeared no more upset than they

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

had been elated about Delilah's tap dancing solo in school. Nor did the family seem any more or less excited by that than by their casual breakfast conversation that inaugurated the series. Everything the Louds did and apparently felt was always at the same pitch, always an extravaganza. When it came to divorce, therefore, nothing was left to heighten the situation or make it seem that it was anything but another adventure dictated by the script.

This pervasive and predominant sense of melodrama was the heart of the Louds' troubles. The reason each member of the family was interchangeable with some stock counterpart is that the Louds were playing "American Family," not living it, just as they had played "American Family" long before Craig Gilbert hit upon his brainstorm. I do not mean that the editing of the series produced an artificial dramatization. I mean that the Louds did so themselves, that they created and managed an imitation of life passing for the real thing because it was a careful imitation, accurate to the letter. The Louds were born a TV program waiting to be discovered. They had always thought of themselves as a family show.

The show they finally became was both production and reproduction, the fact and the copy. The desire to reproduce life and art accurately has become vitally important to us in the past few years. In many obvious ways we have substituted reproduction for invention, our lives made plentiful through Xerox. Photographic equipment, particularly the close-up lens, is enormously expensive, yet people buy it up eagerly. The standard for excellence in phonograph recording is "high fidelity," the precise recapturing of sound. Prints and lithographs have become very special and valuable works of art. Tape and cassette recorders are commonplace. Even video tape machines do well—all such mechanisms made and distributed in the interests of the detailed replay of our existence.

"An American Family" was a very high fidelity recording: as precise and complete a record as one could make of experience. Yet our sense of the product in this instance was that it was not true to life, that it was in fact terribly and infuriatingly false. There is a curious correspondence here with Richard Nixon, who was the real Nixon on tape, and the fake, the liar, when not on tape. This is one reason we sought those tapes so avidly: to see the real person in the nation's trust. The Louds, however, had more integrity than Nixon. They were equally unreal on and off camera, so infinite reproductions of their lives would never produce a variant. Nor were they more or less attractive or successful as reproductions of themselves than they were in the first edition. We could not see the difference; there was no difference to see.

At the first installment of the series Craig Gilbert was careful to point out that he was about to present us with *an*, not *the*, American family. His caveat was both unnecessary and untrue. Nothing could be clearer than that the Louds were chosen for presentation because of their seeming typicality, because they had teenagers, a suburban life, multiple cars, a swimming pool, because they photographed well, and because they were Californians. They were meant to be identifiable as types, and were so. No one knew this better than the Louds. Yet precisely because the externalities of their lives declared them to be *the* American family, they did not know what it is to be *an* American family, or any kind of family for that matter. They knew they were typical, all right, but believed that people are supposed to be typical. Their pathos was not that they resembled the Nelsons, but that they were pursuing the Nelsons' reality.

Where did they get such an idea? From popular culture itself, the culture in which they thrived and by which they were supported. Like the Louds, popular culture carries the illusion of intensity, but allows for no genuine tragedy, heroism or stature. Like "An American Family," too, it is to be taken seriously, but is not serious itself. At base it is the culture of the critical mind, the culture by which, if we care to, we may see most clearly our frailties and self deceptions. High culture demonstrates someone else's nobility. Popular culture plays to our own weaknesses.

The false typicality of the Louds was the cause of their downfall both as family and show. Yet in the framework of our intellectual history the Louds were indeed typically American, heirs in their way to Franklin and Whitman, a landmark in the progress of democracy. The most noticeable feature of the Loud family was their freedom. Bill was the model of free enterprise in his strip mining equipment business. The children were children of nature, free to do almost anything. Lance was free to choose the clownish and miserable character of his life. Pat was free to let it happen. The Louds were also free to destroy: the land and eventually themselves. Their ultimate exercise of freedom was to be free of each other, yet clearly before their separation was made legal, they had been free of each other, of responsibility, of feeling, consecutive thought and especially of history.

The Louds were in fact so free that they seemed constitutionally unable to make connections with any things or people. Ironically "An American Family" put a temporary end to that. Here was a context, a work of art, in which such connections could be made possible and with a vengeance. When the Louds finally became the event toward which they had been tending, they did at last reach others, ourselves, which is the function of art, popular and otherwise. What they reached us with, however, was the truth of their falsity, which was a perversion of the democratic ideal in cultural, historical and personal terms. The Louds were intensely free. Their last great freedom was the freedom to disintegrate, which we wished on them because of their falsity and because of our potential for a similar

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

falsity, of which they served as repugnant and glittering examples.

Robert Warshow asked, what use can we make of our experience in a world of mass culture? The answer, as he knew, is that mass culture produces the art of mass experience, individual experience distended into types and categories that spread over the land confusing and distorting our taste, and threatening our need for authenticity. The striving toward fictional normality shaped the Louds, tore them asunder, and left them naked before us. Their unconscious pretense was what we felt close to, and could not bear.

200 Years of Love and Hate

We and Our Machines

by Neil Harris

A season of celebrations is upon us. Scarcely a day goes by that does not mark the bicentennial of some momentous national event, and in a little more than a year we will have arrived at the grand climacteric. Celebration, however, is too lively a word to denote the kinds of commemorative enterprises currently being planned, nor does it reflect any national mood. Memorialization would be more apt, since mere survival provokes little gusto and the rate of our progress, since 1776 or 1876, has become unclear. Instead there is a dogged and sometimes desperate effort to recapture moods and settings that no longer exist. Trying to bring back the past, to be sure, is neither novel nor necessarily suspect. At our centennial celebrations in Philadelphia many Americans, embarrassed with President Grant and his friends, sought to re-create the atmosphere that produced Jefferson and Franklin. The colonial revival, in furniture and domestic architecture, was helped along by the Centennial Exposition.

But if the centennial was absorbed by the nation's past, and a bit hostile to the present, its true celebration was of the future. Its most memorable triumphs involved technology: the first major appearances of the typewriter and the telephone, for example, and the great Corliss steam engine, which called forth awe from the thousands of visitors.

It has taken historians like Lewis Mumford and John Kouwenhoven to rediscover the esthetic glory of American engineering in the Gilded Age, but many people at the time were convinced, if not of the beauty of their new conveniences, at least of their power and beneficence. Lip service was paid to the creed serving the new religion of culture, and our national claims to painting, sculpture, music and philosophy were made with renewed gravity. But most Americans knew that the world identified them with practical achievement, in engineering as in government. Machine-made products spoke more effectively for the products of our 19th-century civilization than the output of the painter's studio. Some Americans admitted this with pride; others, particularly the more cosmopolitan, with shame. For the encounter with the machine, so epochal to the American spirit and imagination, outraged some sensibilities inasmuch as it seemed to be ending certain possibilities.

Certainly anti-machine rhetoric was more vocal and articulate in England, where its involvement with a preindustrial landscape called into question history as well as nature. Carlyle, Morris, Ruskin and Butler breathed hostility to steam power, factories, railroads, cast iron, commuting, cheap newspapers and utilitarianism—the material ugliness as well as the social costs of mechanization. Their American counterparts spoke in softer tones. They did found art societies, design churches, build museums, attack "chromo civilization," and campaign against machine politics and machine-made furniture. But critics like Charles Eliot Norton and E. L. Godkin could never have hoped to accomplish their programs of reform had they outraged democratic sentiment with the aggressiveness of their English counterparts.

American novelists and poets also masked their suspicions of technology. Some, like Whitman, saw the new machine force as simply a better method for achieving the goals of the early republic, but many others belied public optimism with covert images of

NEIL HARRIS *is professor of history at the University of Chicago.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

foreboding and unease. These doubts had many sources. One principal basis for tension, as Leo Marx has shown, was the continuing strength of pastoral ideals among 19th-century Americans, notions of a landscape dotted by small, carefully tended farms, whose independent owners could resist the corruptions of greed and urban sophistication. Into this landscape the steam engine, frequently in the form of a locomotive, came like a deadly messenger from another world, threatening to destroy the delicate balance between art and nature. Hawthorne and Melville seemed convinced that village culture would inevitably be destroyed by American ambition, once the new goods and services had penetrated mass consciousness. To pastoralists the machine threatened to subvert a social order that required stability and restraint to survive.

Other Americans were less worried by the machine's threat to social stability. A few concentrated upon machine esthetics, the substitution of cheap, mass-produced ornament for the individualized expression of hand labor. Some objected to the physical intrusion, the discontinuities forced upon what little evidence of Western history that America possessed—village greens, urban cemeteries, shady squares, old neighborhoods, disfigured, engrossed or eclipsed by the presence of technology. Degradation of the labor force was also a spur to some anti-machine rhetoric, although reformers and revolutionaries here took as their target the larger economic system or the political structure. Accepting machinery as the permanent expression of a new world, they were quite aware that the preindustrial charm that captivated so many cultural critics was a myth that disguised more poverty and exploitation than the machine brought with it. Indeed, up through the early 20th century, the most forceful protests against changing technology came from elites or from professionals—architects, painters, craftsmen—outraged by technological unemployment, new expectations, and the denigration of hard-won skills and privileges.

If high culture, secure in its museums, libraries, universities and ateliers, found the artifacts of a technological era depressing and threatening, if artists, novelists and social critics foresaw an unsettled future, the great middle class, in its buying habits, tastes and ideals, showed no such revulsion. This is not to suggest that the middle classes repudiated traditional culture as an asylum for human values. The realm of art and beauty was distinguished from the world of force and efficiency—the centennial had a large and well attended art palace—but they were not seen popularly to threaten one another. Among the population at large there seemed room enough for art and necessity to cohabit easily. Some hoped the one might be absorbed by the other, that the stenciled and painted sewing machine or typewriter could sit in the parlor near the sofa and the piano. The elaborate decorating of household machinery (and even of large, industrial mechanisms) did not simply represent the meretricious refusal of industrialists and consumers to accept the logic of the machine and the beauty of engineering. Rather it was an effort at assimilation, mediation through traditional decorative devices. That the mediation was superficial and unsuccessful need not reduce the legitimacy of their intentions. Making machines look like parlor furniture was as reasonable as doing living rooms up like office reception areas. The domestication of technology did permit popular culture to tie itself, on the one hand, to an ideal of culture and refinement, and on the other, to an identification with the world of progress, best exemplified through sewing machines, telephones, central heating and the range of conveniences that have transformed work and the home in the last 100 years.

Popular toleration for new machinery in America went beyond high rate of sale of the latest products. Despite, for example, the obvious hazards to life and property that the introduction of the railroads posed, Americans made few efforts to minimize their risks, a condition that continually startled 19th-century visitors from abroad. Unprotected grade crossings, inadequate safety regulations, high injury rates to railroad employees, permissive attitudes to speed, all failed to arouse much popular resentment. With us, Anthony Trollope wrote of Englishmen, "a locomotive steam-engine is still a beast of prey, against which one has to be on one's guard." But Americans treated it as a domestic animal "and the little children run about almost among its wheels." At stations, passengers recklessly scrambled aboard moving trains; when American tourists did the same thing in Europe they found, to their surprise, stiff fines and unfriendly policemen awaiting them.

Indifference to mechanized danger was complemented by toleration for physical pollution. The menace of industrial smoke, noise and filth was not first perceived in the present century. The shock of passage from farm or small town environments to the accumulated grime and stench of mills, tanneries, mines and breweries was severe in the last century. Much pollution legislation, particularly concerning the fouling of air and water, goes back to colonial days. But enforcement was spasmodic at best. The causes for failure were complex. They involved, to name just some of the variables, suspicion of state regulation, competing jurisdictions (between city and state, between state and federal government), permissive definitions of the right of property, and finally a nonchalance and even an enthusiasm about industrial dirt that accepted it as a badge of prosperity. To some natives the stench of the Chicago stockyards and the smoke of Pittsburgh steel plants were reassuring indications of a healthy economy. Once again foreign travelers whose sensibilities had been trained in more salubrious environ-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ments, reported incredulously on American toleration of menaces either to their senses or their health. The cornucopia of American prosperity promised ultimate solutions; meanwhile there seemed little to worry about. Urban sanitation remained notoriously primitive in America until the last part of the 19th century, the condition of American streets serving as a rich source of complaint and indignation on the part of political reformers. Again the articulate demands for controls over machines, for limits to be placed on their ability to maim, pollute and irritate, came frequently from good-government types, mugwumps, often politically conservative, sometimes anti-union, and suspicious of indiscriminate philanthropy. Moments of crisis did produce outcries from labor leaders, social reformers and populist political leaders, demanding greater public protection. Jane Addams dramatized the sanitation problem in Chicago by securing a contract for collecting garbage. But these protests tended to be spasmodic and, until the legislative reforms of the Progressive Era, largely ineffective. Public opinion generally supported the arguments of investors, inventors and industrialists, that machines typified the American genius, and constraints upon them would only damage the economy and the wage earner. And in their early years the movements for public parks, wilderness conservation, protection of water and land resources, and creation of bird and animal sanctuaries, all reflected the interests of well-to-do sportsmen, nature lovers and landscape architects, rather than popular desire for more space and relief from urban congestion. The primary public complaints about the machine had to do with its administration, its distribution or its expense. Trains were fine so long as service was rapid and punctual; automobiles were seen as dangerous until their price was brought within the reach of more consumers; telephones, typewriters, central heating, synthetic materials, innovations both major and minor tended to be greeted with unreserved enthusiasm.

It is against this background of popular idealization and elite suspicion that the present relationship between mass values and technology deserves careful scrutiny. For at present we may be witnessing a historic reversal of old allegiances; the world of the machine, so long a secure source of future orientation, is succumbing to new images. Widespread anxieties and suspicions about the benefits of machine technology have contributed to the new mood. One fertile source has been the literature of technological outrage, precipitated in the mid 1960s by the Nader findings on automotive safety. Cries about the dangers of automobile culture had appeared before. Lewis Mumford had spent decades outlining the ecological consequences of highway construction and automobile pollution, but no one before Nader had so conspicuously tied the cause of safety to the evocative theme of conspiracy, so hallowed a device in American culture as a stimulant for political crusades. Nader's charges were verified by the industry's reactions, and there appeared a lot to hide. All the underground suspicions about corporate monopoly and its quick suppression of all threats—technological as well as political—now surfaced and found targets. That the Nader revelations came in the wake of a presidential assassination and its cluster of complex conspiratorial speculation, added to its dramatic power.

Along with Nader and the series of studies he helped inspire, came the ecological lobby. Once again there had been an older tradition of reflection upon the damage indiscriminate development dealt to the landscape and the quality of life. Books on the subject go back, in America, to the years preceding the Civil War. But Rachel Carson, Barry Commoner and others touched a more receptive audience. Ecological damage had become more perceptible, and the consequences were now cosmic, rather than simply regional or even national. Instruments of ecological control, particularly the Pill, increased confidence in the ability to limit growth, while the Vietnamese war, which brought to the surface submerged guilt feelings at American material wealth, added to the ecological argument: the war's physical devastation, not only upon the Vietnamese but upon their land, was made clear through television coverage of the combat and public discussions about defoliation.

The consumerist and ecological lobbies resonated as well in the rhetoric of the young, vociferously repudiating not simply the goods and services of technology, but the disciplined work that the machine demanded as its due, and rewarded with its products. The beards, long hair and old clothes were, if not a planned assault on basic values, a cunning maneuver. For the greatest triumph of technology, according to its traditional defenders, was its enhancement of physical well-being and health; no statistics were repeated more insistently than the longevity figures. Ignoring the jarring contrasts such figures masked, and the sometimes halting rate of improvement they demonstrated, supporters of technology presented the longer life span as the very symbol of the American system. And with it was associated cleanliness and improved sanitation. This marked a change from the 19th century, when supporters of industrialization concerned themselves little with health and disease. In the 20th century medicine offered itself a new ally. The real enemy of Americans, eventually to be defeated by the forces of science and technology, was disease. Those who wished to insult middle America most profoundly would insult its standards of cleanliness, and symbolically at least, associate themselves with dirt. The close association of dirt with disorder, and of both with danger, did more to arouse popular hostility than most overt statements of intention. However it was received, the revolt of the young,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which received scholarly and journalistic legitimation in a series of best selling texts, did indicate the divisions in the once massive popular support for mechanized improvements.

The consumerists, the ecologists and the young rebels appealed, naturally, to selective audiences, but these audiences, happy recipients of the warnings against technology and growth, were composed in part of people who decades earlier would have accepted oil spills, automobile accidents and urban congestion as necessary parts of the most modern civilization in the world. Then, as if to justify the suspicions, at the very start of the '70s there came a series of incidents that demonstrated the fragility of the economic system itself. There were ominous indications of the weakness of the dollar as a stable standard for international exchange. There were, for the first time since the emergency of the World War, serious shortages of various products, shortages reflecting either bad planning or an inability to obtain certain necessary materials. Demands for energy multiplied to the point that brownouts and blackouts were becoming continual features of urban life. Technological improvement in America had always been associated with plenty, with bounteousness and an expansion of material goods. Now, increasingly, it appeared that demand could outstrip supply, outstrip it so seriously that priority allocations would have to be made to ensure a reasonable level of equity and predictability. The rationing of goods had always been associated by Americans with poverty or inefficiency; the proverbial waiting lists of Europeans for automobiles and apartments, as well as their high cost of energy, were seen as failures that free enterprise and national ingenuity had successfully avoided.

Scarcity, however, was becoming a part of the American scene as well, and by 1973 this trend was climaxed by the oil crisis, an immediate result of the Yom Kippur war but, in any case, an inevitable crisis. The panic that set in during the fall and winter of 1973 was more psychological than actual: the dire predictions of massive unemployment, factory and school shut-downs, restricted travel and cold winters for thousands of homes, all proved to be exaggerated. But the most visible survival of the crisis—aside from increased prices—was the 55 mph speed limit, a symbolic as well as actual closure to the dream of indefinite increase that had powered so much of the technological dream. Speed limits had long existed, of course, but their imposition was more a matter of safety than economy. The new limit, and the new advertising emphasis on gas consumption and inexpensive maintenance, continue to remind Americans of their novel dependence.

Economic forecasting has reinforced this feeling. Newspapers publish lists of materials that Americans will increasingly rely upon others for—tungsten, manganese, sugar—and offer nervous prophecies of a society whose political, military and financial power will be challenged by suppliers whose monopoly on raw materials enables them to play the role of international blackmailers. Technology once promised the nation independence from the favors and goodwill of others. Its advocates, urging bounties, tariffs and tax advantages, once argued that manufacturing, unlike commerce or agriculture, would make America less dependent upon English producers, and would

Thoreau Stalks the Land Disguised as a Father

Thoreau stalks the land disguised as a father.
His bright children scurry before him
trampling gentians,
flushing neighborly grouse,
whacking trees with sticks
until all the animals flee
from the fierce tattoo.
But Thoreau, balding, breathless,
his coloring interior, bad,
marches to a different drumbeat.

His lamed wife hobbles after him,
calling him to wait,
to walk slower,
to help carry the enormous bundle
they live from.
But Thoreau is looking for paths,
trails, old footfalls. A way.
Thoreau is lost in the forest.
He remembers nothing of this
fury of conifers and beech.

All he remembers is a languid pond.
He looks for the pond to guide him,
to follow the pond home
as once he followed Polaris.
There! Behind the thick stand of hemlock!
The pond!
But the pond is deep in his head.
He stumbles into a ditch,
a ravine carved by the March
run-off of melting snow.

The sons howl like wolves.
The wife catches up.
He has ripped the patch on his knee
and the skin beneath it.

Tonight they will camp here.

BARRY TARGAN

BARRY TARGAN *is assistant director of the University Without Walls at Skidmore College, Saratoga, NY.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

enable the New World to keep its treasure at home. And for more than a century technologically advanced states wielded the economic balance of power, setting prices and maintaining generally higher living standards than producers of raw materials. In the '70s this apparently permanent set of relationships began to reverse itself. Complex industrial systems were shown to be extraordinarily dependent upon a few critical items. Technological sophistication had apparently produced vulnerability rather than stability; growth was not simply ecologically threatening, it had turned out to be economically dangerous. The press has been filled with elaborate analyses of the economic causes and consequences of the present crisis. What is less apparent is the effect on popular attitudes to mechanization.

And here, three interesting complementary trends have developed, none of them ever totally absent in national consciousness, but now newly strengthened. First, a higher degree of popular suspicion toward innovation and growth. Many instances point this up. There is the increasing anxiety about the safety of atomic power plants. The absence of any major incidents and the reports of governmental commissions have failed to quiet this concern about potential catastrophe. And the slow growth of atomic energy as a source of industrial fuel, compared with the optimistic postwar predictions, has increased skepticism toward official promises about technological change. The defeat of the SST, which took place before awareness of the energy crisis had spread widely, represents still another repudiation of innovation, remarkable in view of the symbolic power that speed and the airplane had seemed to exert over the American imagination. But cost and ecological threats proved enough to defeat a project that was supported by powerful lobbies. Increasing disenchantment with airport noise and congestion (although SST supporters used this as an argument for funding the new plane) aided opponents.

Suspicion extended also to synthetics of various kinds, employed in basic commodities like food and clothing. The Food and Drug Administration, nervous about the possibility for disaster in the post-thalidomide era, released information linking various manufactured substances with animal cancers, and pressed for the elimination of cyclamates, as well as postponed the introduction of various new drugs and therapies. Botulism outbreaks revealed the vulnerability of mass-produced, packaged foods to contamination. The world of medical innovation, in the years following the development of the Salk vaccine, moved less rapidly than many Americans expected. Rapid changes did take place in the pure sciences, but they were often frightening, particularly when they raised the possibilities of genetic engineering. Although few suggested (except in the areas of genetic management) that medical progress be suspended, and the response to the lack of dramatic progress in fighting cancer was to mount a glamorous multimillion dollar government campaign of research, the glamor of the microbe hunters had dimmed. Technical accomplishments like organ transplants did produce widespread admiration, but they provoked public debate as well, aroused by the high risks certain surgeons took, or because of ethical and legal issues that were raised. On the whole, disease was proving to be more stubborn, more adaptable, and more difficult to defeat than Martin Arrowsmith's generation believed possible. And the costs of medical care, along with the desirability of life maintenance when terminal disease had diminished most faculties, raised questions analogous to those the ecologists posed about the value of economic growth. The growing university interest in thanatology —the study of death and human reactions to its threat —may mark an era in the area of medical technology, an acceptance of necessity, a desire to learn better ways of coping with the inevitable rather than continually seek new ways to postpone or transcend the encounter.

And finally there were the issues raised by the computer, the key symbol of a new world of miniaturized machines that posed clear threats to human individuality even while they expanded the ability to solve controlled problems. Experts, businessmen, economists and scholars might welcome the computer and master its language. But taxpayers, credit card holders, job applicants, political dissenters and many others resented the invasion of privacy that computers, tiny new cameras, tape cassettes and other devices favored.

With an improved technology coming to mean soaring costs, unemployment, prying, economic vulnerability, pollution, danger and congestion, it was natural for less optimism to be associated with its future development. But this was accompanied by a second, complementary trend, the appearance of what might be termed technological nostalgia, an association of machines with the good times that had passed by, rather than a promise of the changing times to come. Much as patients on the edge of breakdown begin life reviews with their psychiatrists, Americans, beginning in the mid-1960s, took a series of history baths, immersing themselves in the cultures of earlier decades. The time period chosen was less important than the characteristic methods of evocation: absorption in the artifacts, fashions, objects of daily use and work, fads and details of the period. Old mail order and department store catalogues were reprinted and sold in huge editions, despite the fact that the thousands of objects they offered for sale could no longer be purchased. Comic book heroes, often associated with science fiction dreams of startling mechanical devices, reemerged in pulpy

(continued on page 32)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BENIN CITY, bronze [Nigeria]
Cast by the lost wax process for the royal families, this figure of the Oba (King) of Benin links the contemporary tribe with the great kingdom of the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries. Bronze, hgt. approx. 19". $700.

DOGON, figure [Mali]
According to the Dogon myth, the Tellem were their ancestors. This Tellem figure is often used to protect the grain. This style is always severely geometric, a characteristic of Mali art. Wood, hgt. approx. 28". $45 incl. mount.



ASHANTI, doll [Ghana]
Young women wear these dolls, which are said to embody the Ashanti ideal of beauty, in order that their child, too, will be beautiful. The disc-shape head, simplified features and geometric body are traditional. Wood, hgt. approx. 11". $25 incl. mount.



MARKA, mask [Mali]
The Marka, a sub-tribe of the Bambara, use fire and metal to give this mask special powers. The pure geometry and abstract quality are typical of the strong style of the Western Sudanese. Wood and metal, hgt. 16". $90.

The noble tribes of Africa offer

Thousands of Africans in the drought-stricken Sahelian zone are dying from starvation, malnutrition and disease. When you purchase even a single piece of African art, you help hundreds to survive — including, perhaps, the artist himself. You may also be making a very interesting investment.

Unlike the art of many ancient cultures, the strength and vitality of African art remains undiminished even after 8000 years. The tools and methods used centuries ago are the same ones used today: the object is fashioned by an iron-bladed adz from the soft wood of a young tree; a knife is used to carve the fine details; the surface is smoothed by sand rubbed with leaves; and, a patina is developed with oil and smoke, or simply through frequent handling in ceremonies.

Long before Europeans "discovered" Black Africa — the region south of the Sahara — tribal kingdoms flourished as a close-knit network of villages. The inhabitants were farmers of the rainforests and adjacent savannahs, and as their fundamentally religious art evolved, it fulfilled functional, earthly needs. Rain, fertility, power, good fortune — all of the elements necessary to the survival of these societies — became embodied in their art forms.

Sculptors worked entirely within the unique traditions of their tribal styles and design motifs and were generally anonymous. Thus, the highly functional art of Black Africa has a remarkable consistency. But while the tools, materials and methods are unchanged, fewer and fewer villages are producing their traditional art. After 8000 years the flame is flickering.

The Killing Drought

Six years ago, the vast Sahara began creeping southward. Mile by mile it overwhelmed the fragile viability of the Sahel — the broad, arid savannah that runs from the Atlantic to the Red Sea — and choked its watering holes with dust. Each year the drought has become more devastating, its impact more irreversible. Cattle have perished by the millions. Children and new mothers — always the chief victims of famine — are dying of starvation, disease, and malnutrition. Hundreds of thousands of Sahelians from Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Mauritania, Upper Volta, Mali, Senegal, as well as Ethiopians, have fled before the oncoming Sahara to already overcrowded cities and refugee centers.

Among the organizations that have responded to pleas for help is CARE, a nonprofit, nonsectarian, private agency for voluntary international aid and development. In its 29 years of existence, CARE has responded to the needs of people in 77 countries on four continents by providing them with $1.5 billion worth of aid.

The Urgent Challenge

"Half of all the world's people suffer chronic hunger or serious dietary deficiency.

"The world has many millions of persons to feed every day to keep them from starvation. But the real need — the urgent challenge — is to increase their ability to help themselves.

"We welcome the Tribal Arts Society program. It helps Africans help themselves by providing a market for their art. It also provides CARE with critically needed funds for direct Sahelian relief and rehabilitation."

— Harold S. Miner,
President, CARE

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



URUMBA. figure [Upper
bita]
his antelope god, related
agriculture, is one of the
w sculptural forms of the
urumbas. The poly-
hromed, geometric pat-
rns also appear on the
asks of the neighboring
obo tribe. Wood, hgt.
pprox. 30". $65 incl. mount.

Legend has it that Chi Wara, antelope god of the Bambara, taught man to till the soil. The single male figure and the female with baby are paired in dances related to agriculture. The openwork technique was admired by Picasso and Modigliani. Wood and raffia, hgt. approx. 37" [male], 35" [female]. $100 each incl. mount.





SENUFO. Mask [Ivory Coast]
Dance mask (kpelie) used by male initiates during their bush ceremonies. Various tribal castes, as well as wings and legs, are symbolized. This mask also serves to drive away "soul eaters" or sorcerers. Wood, hgt. approx. 20". $40.

MOSSI, mask [Upper Volta]
This mask is carved from a single piece of wood to retain the female spirit it embodies. It is danced by the Wango society in funeral ceremonies and rites of harvest. Wood, hgt. approx. 54". $180.



ou their art-to survive.

Relief and Rehabilitation

CARE is now providing all the food and medical supplies it can to starving Sahelians in Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. It is also aiding water development projects. But CARE's resources alone cannot possibly cope with the problem. The threat of famine hangs over millions of Africans as calls for help increase. Emergency relief must continue — but, all possible priority must be given to rehabilitation aid.

You can help.

The noble tribes of Africa are offering you their art to help the Sahelians survive. Depending on the piece selected, as much as 30% but not less than 10% of the regular retail price of each object sold will go directly into CARE programs in the Sahel. CARE is rated the most efficient agency of its kind in America. Even your smallest purchase will buy a nutritious meal for 216 children. $2500 builds a safe water system for 1,000 villagers.

An Investment in Life and Art

CARE will acknowledge in writing the exact contribution it received as a result of your purchase and send you a report on how this money was spent. It will make you proud to know that the art you cherish and the donation you made possible helped save lives — including, possibly, the artist's.

Your purchase also insures your election to charter membership in the Tribal Arts Society, a new organization devoted to the support and appreciation of authentic native arts. Through its direct and often exclusive arrangements with tribes the world over, the Tribal Arts Society is able to offer you prime examples of the work of master artists and craftsmen. You will have many opportunities to purchase these offerings but never any obligation.

The Prospects of Appreciation

While you may be moved to acquire one of these selected examples of tribal art for aesthetic or charitable reasons — or both — you will also be interested to know that prices for authentic African art have tripled in just the past five years. And last July, a rare antique Benin bronze figure from Nigeria brought $442,150 at Sotheby's — the highest price ever paid for a piece of "primitive" art.

TRIBAL ARTS SOCIETY, GALLERY 4
84 East 10th Street
New York, N.Y. 10003

Gentlemen: Please send me the African tribal art I have selected, accompanied by your signed certificate of authenticity. You will pay CARE between 10% and 30% of the purchase price, which will be acknowledged to me in writing by CARE, and this money will go directly into CARE programs in the African drought zone.

I will also be elected to Charter Membership in the Tribal Arts Society and receive all benefits and privileges of membership without any further cost or obligation.

I reserve the right to return my purchase within 30 days for full refund and cancel my membership if I am not satisfied.

☐ Bambara headdress — male $100
☐ Bambara headdress — female $100
☐ Mossi mask $180
☐ Kurumba figure $65
☐ Senufo mask $40
☐ Ashanti doll $25
☐ Dogon figure $45
☐ Marka mask $90
☐ Benin City Bronze $700

N.Y. residents add sales tax. TOTAL $ _____
Add 5% postage and handling charges.
Enclosed is ☐ check ☐ money order. Please charge ☐ Diners Club ☐ American Express ☐ Bank Americard ☐ Master Charge

Master Charge Interbank # _____

Account # _____ Expires _____

Signature _____

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

paperbacks. Profits were made reprinting old advertising pages, movie posters, reproductions of early telephones, automatic venders of old-fashioned candies; phonograph records packaged sounds, voices, songs and long-forgotten orchestra sounds; movies like *Bonnie and Clyde, The Last Picture Show* and *The Summer of '42* achieved some of their popularity from a meticulous attention to physical detail and artifactual verisimilitude.

Once again it wasn't that revivalism was born in '60s America; rather this particular form of nostalgia focused upon periods of time still within the living memory of its consumers, and concentrated heavily on mechanisms and objects of little inherent value, despised or at least ignored for anything but their practical use at the time of their production. Fashions in antiques had always fluctuated, but generally they involved rediscovery of items that at one time possessed real value. Now the price of box tops, bottle caps, Mickey Mouse watches, beer steins, old radios, disused stoves, early refrigerators and iceboxes, the detritus of mass consumption, soared beyond reasonable expectation. Americans were better at relating to history through mundane physical accoutrements than through personal recollection, biography or historical narrative. In a world whose periodization seemed dominated by fashions in consumption, it was becoming apparent that shifts in taste formed the markers between one era and another; hairstyles, clothing, automobiles and song hits served as the major devices for creating historical mood. And because nostalgia could now be so inexpensively created, the utensils and objects of the past assumed a new symbolic importance.



The association of machines and machine-made objects with a simpler, more pleasant age, with fewer clear problems and anxieties, represents a novel route for ideologies of mechanization. So long linked to a utopian future, representing boundless possibilities and indefinite progress, machine designs have now become legacies of quieter eras. The railroad train, a 19th-century metaphor of power, speed and majestic strength, becomes increasingly an antiquarian's dream, an evocative reentry into a world of safer, more structured relationships, or a more predictable, less costly and nonpolluting method of linking cities and regions. Writing in the 1930s Lewis Mumford argued that modern techniques imposed "a great purification of esthetics: that is, it strips off from the objects all the barnacles of association, all the sentimental and pecuniary values that have nothing whatever to do with esthetic form, and it focusses attention upon the object itself," eventually eliminating social distinctions and emphasizing the generic and the typical. But even objects made in the '20s and '30s, exemplifying the technical definition of machine esthetics that Mumford supplied, are growing new barnacles of association. The recent popularity of art deco designs, the shapes of streamlined skyscrapers and trains, which to contemporaries represented a liberation from sentiment and decoration, proves that nostalgia can encompass the smooth, the glossy and the slick. The technological object, even unadorned, now individualizes its owner. At one time only handicrafts had the ability to elicit sentimental attachment, and the era of LaFarge, Tiffany and Elbert Hubbard, with its medievalist fantasies and idealization of handwork, represented an earlier American protest at the growing uniformity of industrial production. By the 1970s, although the crafts continue to call forth loyalties, the machine-made world had become so various, and its history had grown so complex, that it could spawn within it a host of hobbyists, collectors and idealists attracted to aspects of its earlier design or mechanism.

And this leads to the third trend in contemporary concern with technology, the development of a high culture of mechanization. When only handmade or expensive artifacts demonstrated rarity, antiquity or cost, high culture was bound to spurn as demeaning or inconsequential the mundane artifacts of work, recreation, sanitation and alimentation. Preindustrial pottery, clothing and furniture were fine, but obviously collectors and cataloguers would not spend their time on Grand Rapids baroque or early plastic dinnerware. Market changes and new interests have forced

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

changes. All the apparatus of scholarship—learned articles, books, catalogues, disputes about dating, provenance and symbolism—have developed into a new kind of instant antiquarianism. Great corporations now occupy the place of ateliers and artist studios for the collector. The Coca Cola Company, whose bottles, advertising signs, metal trays, calendars, thermometers, openers and other paraphernalia offer wide scope for the cataloguer, has inspired students and curators to sort and appraise the mass of examples and to publish the results of their studies. Automobile radiator caps are gathered in museums and become subjects for serious photographers. Automotive advertising is reproduced in expensive art books, to lie on the coffee table alongside studies of Venetian painting and Byzantine mosaics.

Not only are finished machines and machine products the foci for serious artistic study, the work process and the work environment have themselves assumed a new importance. In Great Britain and the United States a school of industrial archeologists has set about to recover lost products and processes and to restore, where possible, factories and mills. Because the familiar is so frequently despised and the common so often is used up, expert and painstaking scholarship is necessary to re-create methods of production and machine functions that have become lost. Campaigns are underway to save and restore factories and factory towns, like the complex of buildings along the Merrimack at Manchester, New Hampshire, and the company town of Pullman, Illinois. Age and disuse have brought charm where once was desperation and even grimness; by comparison with the present industrial landscape the older settings appear more distinctive and also more comfortable, even if they are charged with affections their own labor forces might never have felt.

And so, aided by anxiety with the present, distrust for future innovation, and a sentimental/scholarly passion for what has been left behind, industrialization and technology are becoming folk mnemonics, methods of evoking echoes of that golden past. Old railroad stations, bus terminals, in time perhaps old airports, serve us as covered bridges and post houses served our recent ancestors. In a culture which has valued ingenuity and improvement, the manufacturing art and the mass-produced product now form a more effective means of re-creating time past than the patriotic shrine or the wilderness landscape. No longer does the machine threaten our garden; the machine has become our garden, protected by new curators and nourished by memory rather than hope. Our bicentennial celebrations may well turn into a dirge for the passing industrial age, amid bewilderment at what the coming century may look like, without its old machines.

Rejecting the Past, Designing the Future

New Religious Consciousness

by Robert N. Bellah

The disturbances and outbursts in America in the 1960s were hardly unique in modern history. Indeed in a century where irrationalities and horrors of all sorts—mass executions, mass imprisonments, wars of annihilation, revolutions, rebellions and depressions—have been common, the events of that decade in America might even be overlooked. But it is precisely the significance of that decade that the irrationalities and horrors of modern history were borne in upon Americans so seriously that for the first time mass disaffection from the common understandings of American culture and society began to occur. Far more serious than any of the startling events of the decade was the massive erosion of the legitimacy of American institutions—business, government, education, the churches, the family—that set in, particularly among young people, and that continues, if public opinion polls are to be believed, in the 1970s even when overt protest has become less frequent.

The erosion of the legitimacy of established institutions among certain sectors of the populations

ROBERT N. BELLAH *is professor of sociology and comparative studies at the University of California (Berkeley) and author of the forthcoming book,* The Broken Covenant.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of many European countries—particularly the working class and the intellectuals—began at least 100 years ago. In many of the newer third-world countries, the nation, state and modern institutions have not yet gained enough legitimacy to begin the process of erosion. But in America, in spite of a civil war, major social and religious movements, and minor disturbances of occasionally violent intensity, the fundamental legitimacy of the established order had never before been questioned on such a scale. This is in part because that order was itself a revolutionary order, the result of one of the modern world's few successful revolutions. The messianic hope generated by the successful revolution and nurtured by the defeat of slavery in the Civil War, for long made it possible to overlook or minimize the extent to which the society failed to achieve its own ideals. The promise of early fulfillment, which seemed so tangible in America, operated to mute our native critics and prevent mass disaffection, at least for a long time. But in the decade of the '60s for many, not only of the deprived but of the most privileged, that promise had begun to run out.

The interpretations of reality in America that had been most successful in providing meaning and generating loyalty up until the '60s were biblical religion and utilitarian individualism. The self-understanding of the original colonists was that they were "God's new Israel," a nation under God. (From this point of view the addition of the phrase "under God" to the pledge of allegiance in the 1950s was an indication of the erosion of the tradition not because it was an innovation but because it arose from the need to make explicit what had for generations been taken for granted.) In New England this understanding was expressed in the biblical symbol of a covenant signifying a special relationship between God and the people. American society was to be one of exemplary obedience to God's laws and subject to the grace and judgment of the Lord. The notion of Americans as an elect people with exemplary significance for the world was not abandoned but enhanced during the revolution and the period of constructing the new nation. It was dramatically reaffirmed by Lincoln in the Civil War and continued to be expressed in the 20th century in the thought of men like William Jennings Bryan and Woodrow Wilson. This biblical aspect of the national self-understanding was strongly social and collective even though it contained an element of voluntarism from its Protestant roots. Its highest conception of reality was an objective absolute God as revealed in scriptures and its conception of morality was also based on objective revelation.

A second underlying interpretation of reality that has been enormously influential in American history, utilitarian individualism, was never wholly compatible with the biblical tradition, complex as the relations of attraction and repulsion between the two were. This tradition was rooted ultimately in the sophistic, skeptical and hedonistic strands of ancient Greek philosophy but took its modern form initially in the theoretical writings of Thomas Hobbes. It became popular in America mainly through the somewhat softer and less consistent version of John Locke and his followers, a version deliberately designed to obscure the contrast with biblical religion. In its consistent original Hobbesian form, utilitarianism grew out of an effort to apply the methods of science to the understanding of man and was both atheistic and determinist. While the common-sense Lockian version that has been the most pervasive current of American thought has not been fully conscious of these implications, the relation between utilitarianism and Anglo-American social science has been close and continuous from Hobbes and Locke to the classical economists of the 18th and early 19th centuries to the social Darwinists of the late 19th century and finally to such influential present-day sociologists as George Homans.

Whereas the central term for understanding individual motivation in the biblical tradition was "conscience," the central term in the utilitarian tradition was "interest." The biblical understanding of national life was based on the notion of community with charity for all the members, a community supported by public and private virtue. The utilitarian tradition believed in a neutral state in which individuals would be allowed to pursue the maximization of their self-interest and the product would be public and private prosperity. The harshness of these contrasts was obscured, though never obliterated, by several considerations. The biblical tradition promised earthly rewards, as well as heavenly, for virtuous actions. The utilitarian tradition required self-restraint and "morality" if not as ends then as means. But the most pervasive mechanism for the harmonization of the two traditions was the corruption of the biblical tradition by utilitarian individualism so that religion itself finally became for many a means for the maximization of self-interest with no effective link to virtue, charity or community. A purely private pietism emphasizing only individual rewards that grew up in the 19th century and took many forms in the 20th, from Norman Vincent Peale to Rev. Ike, was the expression of that corruption.

The increasing dominance of utilitarian individualism was expressed not only in the corruption of religion but also in the rising prestige of science, technology and bureaucratic organization. The scientific instrumentalism that was already prominent in Hobbes became the central tenet of the most typical late American philosophy, pragmatism. The tradition of utilitarian individualism expressed no interest in shared values or ends since it considered the only significant end to be maximizing individual interest, and individual ends are essentially random. Utilitarianism tended therefore to concentrate solely on the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rationalization of means, on technical reason. As a result the rationalization of means became an end in itself. This is illustrated in the story about an American farmer who was asked why he worked so hard. To raise more corn, was his reply. But why do you want to do that? To make more money. What for? To buy more land. Why? To raise more corn. And so on *ad infinitum*. While utilitarian individualism had no interest in society as an end in itself, it was certainly not unaware of the importance of society. Society like everything else was to be used instrumentally. The key term was organization, the instrumental use of social relationships. "Effective organization" was as much a hallmark of the American ethos as technological inventiveness.

The central value for utilitarian individualism was freedom, a term that could also be used to obscure the gap between the utilitarian and the biblical traditions, since it is a central biblical term as well. But for biblical religion, freedom meant above all freedom from sin, freedom to do the right, and was almost equivalent to virtue. For utilitarianism it meant the freedom to pursue one's own ends. Everything was to be subordinate to that: nature, social relations, even personal feelings. The exclusive concentration on means rendered that final end of freedom so devoid of content that it became illusory and the rationalization of means a kind of treadmill that was in fact the opposite of freedom.

That part of the biblical tradition that remained uncorrupted or only minimally corrupted found itself deeply uneasy with the dominant utilitarian ethos. Fundamentalism in America is not simply an expression of backward yokels. Even Bryan's opposition to evolution was in part an opposition to the social Darwinism that he saw as undermining all humane values in America. But that opposition remained largely inchoate, in part because it could not penetrate the facade of biblical symbols that the society never abandoned even when it betrayed them.

It was this dual set of fundamental understandings that the eruption of the 1960s fundamentally challenged. It is important to remember that the events of the '60s were preceded and prepared for by a new articulation of Christian symbolism in the later '50s in the life and work of Martin Luther King. King stood not only for the actualization of that central and ambiguous value of freedom for those who had never fully experienced even its most formal benefits. Even more significantly he stood for the actualization of the Christian imperative of love. For him society was not to be used manipulatively for individual ends. Even in a bitter struggle one's actions were to express that fundamental love, that oneness of all men in the sight of God, that is deeper than any self interest. It was that conception, so close to America's expressed biblical values and so far from its utilitarian practice that, together with militant activism, was so profoundly unsettling.

We are accustomed to thinking of the "costs" of modernization in the developing nations: the disrupted traditions, the break-up of families and villages, the impact of vast economic and social forces that can neither be understood nor adapted to in terms of inherited wisdom and ways of living. Because it is our tradition that invented modernization we have thought that we were somehow immune to the costs or that because the process was, with us, so so slow and so gradual, we had successfully absorbed the strains of modernization. What the '60s showed us was that in America, too, the costs have been high and the strains by no means wholly absorbed. In that decade, at least among a significant proportion of the educated young of a whole generation, occurred the repudiation of the tradition of utilitarian individualism (even though it often persisted unconsciously even among those doing the repudiating) and the biblical tradition too, especially as it was seen, in part realistically, as linked to utilitarianism. Let us examine the critique.

The criticisms of American society that developed in the '60s were diverse and not always coherent, one with another. In many different forms there was a new consciousness of the question of ends. The continuous expansion of wealth and power, which is what the rationalization of means meant in practice, did not seem so self-evidently good. There were of course some sharp questions about the unequal distribution of wealth and power, but beyond that was the question whether the quality of life was a simple function of wealth and power, or whether the endless accumulation of wealth and power was not destroying the quality and meaning of life, ecologically and sociologically. If the rationalization of means, the concern for pure instrumentalism, was no longer self-evidently meaningful then those things that had been subordinated, dominated and exploited for the sake of rationalizing means took on a new significance. Nature, social relations and personal feelings could now be treated as ends rather than means, could be liberated from the repressive control of technical reason.

Among those who shared this general analysis there was a division between those who placed emphasis on overthrowing the present system as a necessary precondition for the realization of a more human society and those who emphasized the present embodiment of a new style of life "in the pores," so to speak, of the old society. The contrast was not absolute as the effort to create politically "liberated zones" in certain communities such as Berkeley and Ann Arbor indicates. And for a time in the late '60s opposition to the Vietnam war, seen as an example of technical reason gone mad, took precedence over everything else. Yet there was a contrast between those mainly oriented to political action (still, in a way, oriented to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

means rather than ends, though it was the means to overthrow the existing system) and those mainly concerned with the actual creation of alternative patterns of living. The difference between demonstrations and sit-ins on the one hand, and love-ins, be-ins and rock festivals on the other, illustrates the contrast. Political activists shared some of the personal characteristics of those they fought—they were "uptight," repressed, dominated by time and work. The cultural experimenters, represented most vividly, perhaps, by the "love, peace, groovy" flower children of the middle '60s believed in harmony with man and nature and the enjoyment of the present moment through drugs, music or meditation. In either case there was a sharp opposition to the dominant American ethos of utilitarian instrumentalism oriented to personal success. There was also a deep ambivalence to the biblical tradition to which I will return.

The question of why the old order began to lose its legitimacy just when it did is not one we have felt equipped to answer. Clearly in the '60s there was a conjuncture of dissatisfactions that did not all have the same meaning. The protests of racial minorities, middle-class youth and women had different causes and different goals. In spite of all the unsolved problems the crisis was brought on by the success of the society as much as by its failures. That education and affluence did not bring happiness or fulfillment was perhaps as important as the fact that the society did not seem to be able to solve the problem of racism and poverty. The outbreak of a particularly vicious and meaningless little war in Asia that stymied America's leadership both militarily and politically for years on end, acted as a catalyst but did not cause the crisis. The deepest cause, no matter what particular factors contributed to the actual timing, was, in my opinion, the inability of utilitarian individualism to provide a meaningful pattern of personal and social existence, especially when its alliance with biblical religion began to sag because biblical religion itself had been gutted in the process. I would thus interpret the crisis of the '60s above all as a crisis of meaning, a religious crisis, with major political, social and cultural consequences to be sure.

Religious upheaval is not new in American history. Time and time again, after a period of spiritual dryness, there has been an outbreak of the spirit. But the religious crisis was in more ways a contrast to the great awakenings of the 18th and 19th centuries than a continuation of them. By all the measures of conventional religiosity the early '50s had been a period of religious revival, but the revival of the '50s proved to be as artificial as the Cold War atmosphere that may have fostered it. The '60s saw a continuous drop in church attendance and a declining belief in the importance of religion, as measured by national polls. It is true that conservative and fundamentalist churches continued to grow and that the major losses were in the mainline Protestant denominations and in the Catholic Church after the full consequences of Vatican II began to sink in. But in terms of American culture the latter were far more important than the conservative fringe. Although clergy and laity of many denominations played an important part in the events of the '60s, the churches as such were not the locale of the major changes, even the religious ones.

Indeed it was easier for many in the biblical tradition to relate to the political than to the religious aspect of the developing counterculture. The demand for social justice had a close fit with the prophetic teachings of Judaism and Christianity. The struggle for racial equality and later the struggle against the Vietnam war drew many leaders from the churches and synagogues, even though the membership as a whole remained passive. But in spite of the leadership of Martin Luther King and the martyrdom of divinity students in the civil rights movement, and in spite of the leadership of the Berrigans and William Sloane Coffin in the peace movement, those movements as a whole remained indifferent if not hostile to religion. By the end of the '60s those churchmen who had given everything to the political struggle found themselves without influence and without a following. For most of the political activists the churches remained too closely identified with the established powers to gain much sympathy or interest. As dogmatic Marxism gained greater influence among the activists during the decade, ideological anti-religion increased as well.

But the churches were if anything even less well prepared to cope with the new spirituality of the '60s. The demand for immediate, powerful and deep religious experience, which was part of the turn away from future-oriented instrumentalism toward present meaning and fulfillment, could on the whole not be met by the religious bodies. The major Protestant churches in the course of generations of defensive struggle against secular rationalism had taken on some of the color of the enemy. Moralism and verbalism and the almost complete absence of ecstatic experience characterized the middle-class Protestant churches. The more intense religiosity of black and lower-class churches remained largely unavailable to the white middle-class members of the counterculture. The Catholic Church with its great sacramental tradition might be imagined to have been a more hospitable home for the new movement, but such was not the case. Older Catholicism had its own defensiveness that took the form of scholastic intellectualism and legalistic moralism. Nor did Vatican II really improve things. The Catholic Church finally decided to recognize the value of the modern world just when American young people were beginning to find it valueless. As if all this were not enough, the biblical arrogance toward nature and the Christian hostility toward the impulse life were both alien to the new

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

spiritual mood. Thus the religion of the counterculture was by and large not biblical. It drew from many sources including the American Indian. But its deepest influences came from Asia.

In many ways Asian spirituality provided a more thorough contrast to the rejected utilitarian individualism than did biblical religion. To external achievement it posed inner experience; to the exploitation of nature, harmony with nature; to impersonal organization, an intense relation to a guru. Mahayana Buddhism, particularly in the form of Zen, provided the most pervasive religious influence on the counterculture but elements from Taoism, Hinduism and Sufism were also influential. What drug experiences, interpreted in oriental religious terms, as Leary and Alpert did quite early, and meditation experiences, often taken up when drug use was found to have too many negative consequences, showed was the illusoriness of worldly striving. Careerism and status seeking, the sacrifice of present fulfillment for some ever-receding future goal, no longer seemed worthwhile. There was a turn away not only from utilitarian individualism but from the whole apparatus of industrial society. The new ethos preferred handicrafts and farming to business and industry and small face-to-face communities to impersonal bureaucracy and the isolated nuclear family. Simplicity and naturalness in food and clothing were the ideal even though conspicuous consumption and oneupsmanship (oh, you don't use natural salt, I see) made their inevitable appearance.

Thus the limits were pushed far beyond what any previous great awakening had seen: toward socialism in one direction, toward mysticism in the other. But perhaps the major meaning of the '60s was not anything positive at all. Neither the political movement nor the counterculture survived the decade. Important successor movements did survive, but the major meaning of the '60s was purely negative: the erosion of the legitimacy of the American way of life. On the surface what seems to have been most drastically undermined was utilitarian individualism, for the erosion of the biblical tradition seemed only to continue what had been a long-term trend. The actual situation was more complicated. Utilitarian individualism had perhaps never before been so divested of its ideological and religious facade, never before recognized in all its naked destructiveness. And yet that very exposure could become an ironic victory. If all moral restraints are illegitimate, then why should I believe in religion and morality? If those who win in American society are the big crooks and those who lose do so only because they are little crooks, why should I not try to be a big crook rather than a little one? In this way the unmasking of utilitarian individualism led to the very condition from which Hobbes sought to save us—the war of all against all. Always before, the biblical side of the American tradition has been able to bring antinomian and anarchic tendencies under some kind of control, and perhaps that is still possible today. Certainly the fragile structures of the counterculture were not able to do so. But out of the shattered hopes of the '60s there has emerged a cynical privatism, a narrowing of sympathy and concern to the smallest possible circle, that is truly frightening. What has happened to Richard Nixon should not obscure for us the meaning of his overwhelming victory in 1972. It was the victory of cynical privatism.

In this rather gloomy period of American history, and the mood of the youth culture has been predominantly gloomy—not the hope for massive change that characterized the '60s but the anxious concern for survival, physical and moral—the successor movements of the early '70s take on a special interest. We may ask whether any of them have been able to take up and preserve the positive seeds of the '60s so that under more favorable circumstances they may grow and bear fruit once again. Some of the successor movements clearly do not have that potential. The Weathermen and the SLA on the one hand, the Krishna Consciousness Society and the Divine Light Mission on the other, are parodies of the broader political and religious movements that they represent, too narrow and in some cases too self-destructive to contribute to the future solution of our problems. About others there may be more hope.

To some extent the successor movements, especially the explicitly religious ones, have been survival units in a quite literal sense. They have provided a stable social setting and a coherent set of symbols for young people disoriented by the drug culture or disillusioned with radical politics. What Synanon claims to have done for drug users, religious groups—from Zen Buddhists to Jesus people—have done for ex-hippies.

The Krishna Consciousness Society grew up for example, amidst the disintegration of Haight-Ashbury as a hippie utopia. The rescue mission aspect of the successor movements has had quite tangible results. In many instances reconciliation with parents has been facilitated by the more stable life-style and the religious ideology of acceptance rather than confrontation. A new, more positive orientation toward occupational roles has often developed. In some cases, such as followers of Meher Baba, this has meant a return to school and the resumption of a normal middle-class career pattern. For others, for example, resident devotees of the San Francisco Zen Center or ashram residents of the 3HO movement, jobs are seen only as means to subsistence, having no value in themselves. While the attitude toward work in terms of punctuality, thoroughness and politeness is, from the employer's point of view, positive, the religious devotee has no inner commitment to the job nor does he look forward to any advancement. In terms of intelligence and education the jobholder is frequently "overqualified"

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for the position he holds but this causes no personal distress because of the meaning the job has for him. For many of these groups the ideal solution would be economic self-sufficiency, so that members would not have to leave the community at all, but few are able to attain this. As in monastic orders some full-time devotees can be supported frugally by the gifts of sympathizers but they are exceptions. Many of the groups also insist on a stable sexual life, in some instances celibate but more usually monogamous, with sexual relations being confined to marriage. Such norms are found not only among Jesus people but in the oriental groups as well.

These features of stability should not be interpreted as simple adaptation to the established society though in some cases that may occur. The human potential movement may serve such an adaptive function, and perhaps Synanon also does to a certain extent. But for the more explicitly religious groups, stable patterns of personal living and occupation do not mean acceptance of the established order. Sympathizers of the oriental religions tend to be as critical of American society as political radicals, far more critical than the norm. While people sympathetic to the Jesus movement are less critical of American society, the Christian World Liberation Front, a Berkeley group, is atypical in being quite critical. All of these movements share a very negative image of established society as sunk in materialism and heading for disaster. Many of them have intense millennial expectations, viewing the present society as in the last stage of degradation before the dawning of a new era. 3HO people speak of the Aquarian age which is about to replace the dying Piscean age. Krishna Consciousness people speak of the present as the last stage of the materialistic Kali-Yuga and on the verge of a new age of peace and happiness. More traditionally biblical expectations of the millennium are common among Jesus people. All of these groups, well behaved as they are, have withdrawn fundamentally from contemporary American society, see it as corrupt and illegitimate, and place their hope in a radically different vision. We should remember that early Christians too were well behaved —Paul advised them to remain in their jobs and their marriages—yet by withholding any deep commitment to the Roman Empire they helped to bring it down and to form a society of very different type.

An important dimension of variation among the groups we have studied is the degree of openness or closure toward the outside world. However some groups with tightly controlled boundaries, that is, specific and demanding requirements for membership, are also highly conversionist, as in the case of Krishna Consciousness and Jesus movements. Nonetheless open boundaries are undoubtedly more conducive to rapid expansion. Transcendental Meditation, which claims not to be a religion and has few if any doctrinal or behavioral requirements, has attracted hundreds of thousands, even though many quickly abandon the practice. The Krishna Consciousness movement on the other hand has remained quite small, perhaps no more than 3000 or 4000 members. Recently this movement has shown distinct introversionist tendencies in sending hundreds of its followers permanently to India.

Some of the more interesting movements show a range of possibilities or a change over time on the dimension of openness and closure. Zen Buddhism is one of the most pervasive influences on the entire range of countercultural developments. Philip Kapleau's *Three Pillars of Zen* was for a time a kind of bible of the counterculture, influencing thousands who had only the most casual acquaintance with Zen meditation. Alan Watts, one of the most influential countercultural gurus, preached essentially a modified Zen. The influence of Zen on everything from psychotherapy to esthetics has been major in the last 10 years. Yet full time membership in a Zen monastery or center is an extremely demanding enterprise, leading in some cases to vows of chastity and poverty. The history of the San Francisco Zen Center from the late '50s to the present shows a continuous movement from general intellectual and cultural interest in Zen to high and demanding standards of practice. Of course Zen, perhaps more than any other movement of oriental origin, exercises an influence out of all proportion to the number of its full time devotees. Just for that reason it represents clearly the tension between general cultural influence and a tightly organized in-group that is to be found in many other movements. 3HO has undergone a shift comparable to the Zen Center in moving away from general yoga practice to the specific beliefs and rituals of Sikhism. A slight tendency in the opposite direction is to be found in the Christian World Liberation Front which has sacrificed some of its "forever family" community for more active ministries especially in the cultural field with its publications and courses. Political groups probably show something of the same spectrum of openness and closedness.

On the whole the human potential groups are open compared to the religious groups, having few requirements for participation though abstention from drugs and alcohol and avoidance of aggressive behavior may be required of participants during the actual period of training. Acceptance of certain frames of reference (I am perfect just as I am) may be a prerequisite if the training is to make sense but these views are not seen as doctrinal requirements. In general the human potential groups, and groups like Transcendental Meditation that are very similar to them, may be seen as cults rather than as sects, in the traditional sociological sense of those terms. The human potential groups are not usually membership groups, except

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

temporarily. Their leaders may be seen as charismatic but more as healers and teachers than as organizational leaders.

Sympathizers of the human potential movement seem to be less alienated from American society than followers of oriental religions or political radicals. They are, nonetheless, more critical than the norm and many of their beliefs contrast sharply with established American ideology. A tension exists within the movement over the issue of latent utilitarianism. If the techniques of the human potential movement are to be used for personal and business success (the training group movement out of which the human potential movement in part derives had tendencies in that direction) then it is no different from the mind cures and positive thinking of the most debased kinds of utilitarian religion in America. But for some in the movement the whole idea of success is viewed negatively and the training is seen in part as a way of gaining liberation from that goal. The high evaluation of bodily awareness and intrapsychic experience as well as nonmanipulative interpersonal relations place much of the movement in tension with the more usual orientations of American utilitarian individualism. Here utilitarian individualism is a hydra-headed monster that tends to survive just where it is most attacked.

Immediate experience rather than doctrinal belief continues to be central among all the religious movements, including the Jesus movements, and in the human potential movement as well. Knowledge in the sense of direct first-hand encounter has so much higher standing than abstract argument based on logic that one could almost speak of anti-intellectualism in many groups. Yet it would be a mistake to interpret this tendency as rampant irrationalism. Even though science is viewed ambivalently and the dangers of scientific progress are consciously feared by many in our groups, science as such is not rejected. There is a belief that much of what is experienced could be scientifically validated. Indeed the human potential groups (and Transcendental Meditation) believe that their teachings are in accord with science broadly understood. The study of the physiology of the brain during meditation is seen not as a threat but as a support for religious practice. Since reality inheres in the actual experience, explanatory schemes, theological or scientific, are secondary, though scientific explanations tend to be preferred to theological ones because of the general prestige of science. At a deeper level the lack of interest in critical reflective reason may be a form of anti-intellectualism but the conscious irrationalism of groups such as the romantic German youth movement is quite missing. Similarly there is a complete absence of primordial loyalties and hatreds based on race, ethnic group or even religion.

In spite of the primacy of experience, belief is not entirely missing. In some groups, as we have already seen in the case of 3HO, the stress on doctrine may be increasing. The early phase of the new left was heavily experiential. Unless you had placed your body on the line you could not understand the reality of American society. Consciousness-raising in racial and women's groups continues to emphasize the experiential aspect of oppression and the struggle against it. But new left groups became increasingly doctrinal toward the end of the '60s and remain today more oriented to doctrine than experience in comparison with religious and human potential groups.

A central belief shared by the oriental religions and diffused widely outside them is important because of how sharply it contrasts with established American views. This is the belief in the unity of all being. Our separate selves, according to Buddhism, Hinduism and their offshoots, are not ultimately real. Philosophical Hinduism and Mahayana Buddhism reject dualism. For them ultimately there is no difference between myself and yourself and this river and that mountain. We are all one and the conflict between us is therefore illusory.

While such beliefs are diametrically opposed to utilitarian individualism, for whom the individual is the ultimate ontological reality, there are elements in the Christian tradition to which they are not entirely opposed. Christian theology also felt the unity of Being and the necessity to love beings. The New Testament spoke of the church as one body of which we are all members. But Christianity has tended to maintain the ultimate dualism of creator and creation which the oriental religions would obliterate. Christian mystics have at times made statements (viewed as heretical) expressing the ultimate unity of God and man and, in mediated form, the unity of God and man through Christ is an orthodox belief. Still American Christianity has seldom emphasized the aspect of the Christian tradition that stressed the unity rather than the distinction of divinity and man so that the oriental teachings stand out as sharply divergent.

Much of the counter cultural criticism of American society is related to the belief in non-dualism. If man and nature, men and women, white and black, rich and poor are really one then there is no basis for the exploitation of the latter by the former. The ordination of women by Zen Buddhists and 3HO, even though not warranted in the earlier traditions, shows how their American followers interpret the fundamental beliefs. It is significant that from the basis of non-dualism conclusions similar to those of Marxism can be reached. But because the theoretical basis is fundamental unity rather than fundamental opposition, the criticism of existing society is non-hostile, non-confrontational and often non-political. Nonetheless the effort to construct a witness community based on unity and identity rather than opposition and oppression can itself have critical consequences is a society based

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on opposite principles.

Another feature of oriental religions that has been widely influential is their view of dogma and symbol. Believing, as many of them do, that the fundamental truth, the truth of non-dualism, is one, they also accept many beliefs and symbols as appropriate for different groups or different levels of spiritual insight. Dogmatism has by no means been missing in the oriental religions and has been traditionally more important than many of their American followers probably realize. But relative to Christianity and biblical religions generally the contrast holds. Belief in certain doctrinal or historical statements (Jesus is the Son of God, Christ rose from the tomb on the third day) has been so central in Western religion that it has been hard for Westerners to imagine religions for whom literal belief in such statements is unimportant. But the impact of oriental religion coincides with a long history of the criticism of religion in the West in which particular beliefs have been rendered questionable but the significance of religion and myth in human action has been reaffirmed. Post-critical western religion was therefore ready for a positive response to Asian religions in a way different from any earlier period. Paul Tillich's response to Zen Buddhism late in his life is an example of this. Thomas Merton's final immersion in Buddhism is an even better one. Such tendencies, however, are not to be found in the Christian World Liberation Front or other Jesus movements.

But in many of the oriental groups and certainly in the human potential movement there has been a willingness to find meaning in a wide variety of symbols and practices without regarding them literally or exclusively. The danger here as elsewhere is that post-critical religion can become purely utilitarian. This can happen if one fails to see that any religious symbol or practice, however relative and partial, is an effort to express or attain the truth about ultimate reality. If such symbols and practices become mere techniques for "self-realization" then once again we see utilitarian individualism reborn from its own ashes.

Studies in which I've been engaged began with the thought that the new religious consciousness that seemed to be developing among young people in the San Francisco Bay area might be some harbinger, some straw in the wind, that would tell us of changes to come in American culture and society. We were aware that studies of American religion based on national samples could tell us mainly about what was widely believed in the present and perhaps also in the past, since religious views change relatively slowly. Such samples, however, could not easily pick up what was incipient, especially what was radically new and as yet confined to only small groups. Even our bay area sample, weighted as it was to youth, picked up only a tiny handful of those deeply committed to new forms of religion, although it did lead us to believe that the new groups had gotten a hearing and some sympathy from a significant minority. Our studies of particular groups, based on participant-observation field studies, have told us a great deal about particular groups.

But to assess what we have discovered with respect to possible future trends remains hazardous. We must await other developments in the society as a whole. In trying to assess the possible meaning and role of our groups in the future I would like to outline three possible scenarios for American society: liberal, traditional authoritarian and revolutionary.

The future that most people seem to expect and that the futurologists describe with their projections is very much like the present society only more so. This is what I call the liberal scenario. American society would continue as in the past to devote itself to the accumulation of wealth and power. The mindless rationalization of means and the lack of concern with ends would only increase as biblical religion and morality continue to erode. Utilitarian individualism, with less biblical restraint or facade than ever before, would continue as the dominant ideology. Its economic form, capitalism, its political form, bureaucracy, and its ideological form, scientism, would each increasingly dominate its respective sphere. Among the elite, scientism, the idolization of technical reason alone, would provide some coherent meaning after traditional religion and morality had gone. But technical reason would hardly be a sufficient surrogate religion for the masses. No longer accepting the society as legitimate in any ideal terms, the masses would have to be brought to acquiesce grudgingly by a combination of coercion and material reward. In such a society one could see a certain role for oriental religious groups and the human potential movement—perhaps even for a small radical political fringe. All of these could be allowed within limits to operate and provide the possibility of expressing the frustration and rage that the system generates but in a way such that the individuals concerned were cooled out and the system itself is not threatened. The utilitarian individualism that is latent in all the countercultural successor movements, political and religious, makes this a real possibility. This scenario depicts the society as heading, mildly and gradually, into something like Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World.*

Lately, however, questions have been raised as to the viability of this direction of development. Perhaps there are inner contradictions that will lead to a drastic breakdown in the foreseeable future. Robert Heilbroner has recently predicted such a collapse, largely as a result of ecological catastrophe. But Heilbroner also envisages the possibility that tensions between the rich and the poor nations could bring disaster even sooner than ecological attrition. Even since Heilbroner wrote, the proliferation of atomic weapon capacity in India and the Middle East has strengthened this pos-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sibility. Another distinct possibility is worldwide economic collapse bringing social convulsions in train. No matter how the breakdown of the "modernization" syndrome might occur, Heilbroner envisages a relapse into traditional authoritarianism as the most likely result, providing, that is, that the worst outcome, total destruction of life on the planet, is avoided. Simpler, poorer and less free societies might be all that humans would be capable of in the wake of a global catastrophe. The social and personal coherence that the modernizing societies never attained might be supplied by the rigid myths and rituals of a new hierarchical authoritarian society. To put it in terms of the present discussion, the collapse of subjective reason, which is what technical reason ultimately is, would bring in its wake a revival of objective reason in a particularly closed and reified form. Technical reason, because it is concerned not with truth or reality but only with results, not with what is but only with what works, is ultimately completely subjective. That its domineering manipulative attitude to reality in the service of the subject leads ultimately to the destruction of any true subjectivity is only one of its many ironies. But a new traditional authoritarianism would set up some single orthodox version of what truth and reality are and enforce agreement. Some historically relative creed, belief and ritual would be asserted as identical with objective reality itself. In this way social and personal coherence would be achieved, but ultimately at the expense of any real objectivity.

If a relapse into traditional authoritarianism is a distinct possibility in America, and I believe it is, we might ask what are the likely candidates for the job of supplying the new orthodoxy. Perhaps the most likely system would be right-wing Protestant fundamentalism. We already have a good example of such a regime in Afrikaner dominated South Africa. Conservative Protestant fundamentalism has a large and, by some measures, growing following in America. It has the religious and moral absolutism that a traditional authoritarianism would require, and it is hard to see any close rival on the American scene today. The Catholic Church, which might at an earlier period have been a candidate for such a role, is certainly not, in its post Vatican II disarray. Some of the more authoritarian of our Asian religions might provide a sufficiently doctrinaire model but their small following in comparison with Protestant fundamentalism virtually rules them out. The future for most of the groups we have studied, all but the Jesus movements, would be bleak indeed under such a neo-traditional authoritarianism. It is doubtful if even a group as open as the Christian World Liberation Front could survive. Neo-authoritarian regimes are hard on non-conformity in every sphere. The new Chilean government, for example, not only sets standards of dress and hair style but also persecutes oriental religions.

There remains a third alternative, however improbable. It is this that I am calling revolutionary, not in the sense that it would be inaugurated by a bloody uprising, which I do not think likely, but because it would bring fundamental structural change, socially and culturally. It is to this rather unlikely outcome that most of the groups we have studied, at least the most flexible and open of them, would have most to contribute. Such a new order would involve, as in the case of traditional authoritarianism, an abrupt shift away from the exclusive dominance of technical reason, but it would not involve the adoption of a reified objective reason either. In accord with its concern for ends rather than means alone such a revolutionary culture would have a firm commitment to the quest for ultimate reality. But it would not imagine that any one set of religious or philosophical symbols or beliefs can adequately express that reality. Priorities would shift away from endless accumulation of wealth and power to a greater concern for harmony with nature and between human beings. Perhaps a much simpler, material life, simpler, that is, compared to present middle-class American standards, would result, but it would not be accompanied by an abandonment of free inquiry or free speech. Science, which would ultimately have to be shackled in a traditional authoritarian regime, would continue to be pursued in the revolutionary culture but it would not be idolized as in the liberal model. In all these respects the values, attitudes and beliefs of the oriental religious groups, the human potential movement and even a group like the Christian World Liberation Front, as well as the more flexible of the radical political groups, would be consonant with the new regime and its needs. Indeed many of the present activities of such groups could be seen as experiments leading to the possibility of such a new alternative. Neither safety valve nor persecuted minority, the new groups would be, under such an option, the vanguard of a new age.

Such an outcome would accord most closely with the millennial expectations which we have seen are rife among the new groups. Even if an enormous amount of thought and planning were devoted to such an alternative, thought and planning that the small struggling groups we have been studying are quite incapable at the moment of supplying, the revolutionary alternative seems quite utopian. Perhaps only a major shift in the established biblical religions, a shift away from their uneasy alliance with utilitarian individualism and toward a profound reappropriation of their own religious roots and an openness to the needs of the contemporary world, would provide the mass base for a successful effort to establish the revolutionary alternative. But that shift, too, at present seems quite utopian. It may be, however, that only the implementation of a utopian vision, a holistic reason that unites subjectivity and objectivity, will make human life in the 21st century worth living.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Stanley Kauffmann on theater

Trilogy
(La Mama)

Two years ago a young Rumanian named Andrei Serban directed a production of *Medea* at the La Mama Theater, in the East Village, that signaled the arrival of a unique talent (*TNR*, June 24, 1972). That production then toured "off-Broadway" theaters in Europe and, somewhat revised, has returned to La Mama's new annex, next door to its first building. With an expanded company Serban has now added productions of *The Trojan Women* and (Sophocles') *Electra*. Two plays are performed in an evening, so on two successive evenings one can see all three plays plus a repeat of one. To see these productions is to have the wonderful double experience of reaching back into something old and venturing forth into something new.

Serban's drive, throughout these plays, has been toward their mythic essences, to distill and crystallize the subconscious, even preconscious elements that made them part of our communal heritage centuries before the plays were written down, the elements that have kept them vital through the centuries since. I know that to describe his method is a risk because it sounds arty: it *would* be arty if it were not art. Serban doesn't use languages known to the audience: the plays are performed mostly in mixtures of the original Greek and some Latin. Also, as a result of some recent travels and studies, he has blended in elements of Asian and Central American Indian cultures. (His support has been from National Endowment and other foundation grants.) He has fused all these materials to move the performance from the plane of mundane daily recognitions to the elemental; and, to further this "submersion" process, he has not told complete stories (except, nearly, in *Medea*). For each play he has selected a series of important episodes, bursting them into life with music and light and setting and intensity of performance.

The quality of all four of these factors is what transforms mere theory, which it was in the experimental work of Peter Brook (with whom Serban has worked), into accomplishment. The music by Elizabeth Swados (who has also worked with Brook) is magnificent. It ranges all the way from solo unaccompanied voice to polyphonic choral singing, from a complex of instruments including the gamelan to mere percussive sounds on wood blocks, from the shining sound of hand-bells rung by the chorus at the end of *Electra* to something like Gregorian chant. Swados' music is most present in *The Trojan Women*, which is in fact subtitled "An Epic Opera," but in all three plays her sounds keep every moment out of the vernacular.

The lighting by Laura Rambaldi serves the same purpose. It is always simple, always stark and vivid. Sometimes she uses torches, alone; sometimes a single spotlight from high overhead, thus transforming the huge room into an even huger cavern; sometimes—rarely—an "effect" like the rippling light waves at one point in *The Trojan Women*. The structural settings by Jun Maeda—gaunt steps and platforms scattered as needed—seem to grow out of the occasion. One cannot think of these productions apart from the sound of the music and the look of the lights and scenic pieces.

Or apart from the nature of the performances. The most casually overlooked element of Serban's productions, in the generally enthusiastic reviews that I've read, is his ability to choose and teach actors, to raise them all to a level of naked power. Every reviewer mentions that Aegisthus in *Electra* comes down the steps with a live snake twined around his neck, but few mention that William Duff-Griffin, the Aegisthus, pours forth a rough river of sound from his throat as he descends that validates the snake as part of an ancient mystery. Every performer in every one of the plays is at least good, except the new Jason in *Medea* who is not as strong as Jamil Zakki was two years ago. There are four children in the plays, and all of them, too, speak the old languages and comport themselves at the same level of conviction as the adults. If one actor must be specially praised, and she must be singled out because she has two leading roles, it is Priscilla Smith, the Medea and Electra. Utter subscription, to a director who is worth it, has transmuted Smith from a gifted young woman into the creator of archetypal figures, large and passionate.

Here is a taste of one of the productions, *The Trojan Women*. The audience is made to wait outside in the lobby, which gets crowded. The lights dim, a costumed man appears through the theater doors and plays a passage on a horn, and the entire company comes down a flight of stairs into the lobby, singing a beautiful song of sorrow. They move slowly through the crowd in the lobby to the farther end, then they turn and go back into the theater itself, and we follow them into the virtual blackness. There, under dim high light, they form a circle and finish their song. The light fades; beyond a black curtain that cuts across the middle of the hall, torches flare up, wild music starts, and a voice sings in strange ecstatic lament. The curtains part, and we move into the other half of the big room (actually a former ballroom) with a stage at one end and two-tiered wooden galleries on two sides. At the far end of one gallery is Cassandra, a stunning black actress (Valois Mickens) naked to the waist, a rope halter around her neck, singing and dancing her despair to torchlight. Then she is led down and away through the crowd (us), her voice fluting into half and quarter tones as she goes.

Andromache (Priscilla Smith again) appears on the gallery opposite and anoints her small son Astyanax (Ted Lambert) for his death, intoning the while in a strange nasal voice. The boy is lowered into a cage and borne off, through us, by Greek soldiers. (The actors move back and forth to play Trojans or Greeks as needed.) Then Helen (Jo-

(continued on page 57)

Films Worth Seeing

Amarcord. Fellini's poem about the small town of his youth. Exquisite, funny, bitter, endearing.

Chinatown. Ugly, overlong, but generally clever mod mimicry of a '30s private-eye flick.

Harry and Tonto. Sentimental comedy, not too schmaltzy, about a 72-year-old man encountering America coast to coast.

Scenes from a Marriage. Bergman crammed his six-part Swedish TV series into three hours for the US, but much of it is excellent, especially Liv Ullmann.

SK

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A merrie Christmas.

Fine Print

Doris Grumbach

Books for Christmas giving are getting bigger, more expensive, and, yes, *better* every year. From the crop that 25 publishers sent to me at my request (I asked them to choose what they considered the best of their offerings), I have chosen those I liked best either because of their subject matter, their elegant bookmaking, or because they represented for their price, very good "buys." I have listed those 11 first choices and also the runners-up under category headings. These are probably as good or better than "the best of the best" if you eliminate the inescapable element of idiosyncratic choice:

There is no way around it. Put aside the two biggest books—**Jericho** (Oxmoor; $39.95/$60*) because its contents do not seem to me to justify its enormous print order or its price and **Ansel Adams,** which is a big and expensive ($65/$75; New York Graphic Society) retrospective (1923-1974) display of the famous Western photographer's rather "picturesque" art. You are then left with what is surely the Fine Print coup of the year: **The Book of Kells** (Knopf; $55/$65, boxed). Many travelers go to Trinity College, Dublin, just to see the unique and justly famous early-11th-century manuscript of the four Gospels. Now it can be owned (almost) in a spectacular, page-by-page reproduction. The volume contains a valuable section in which details of the ms. are enlarged upon in scholarly fashion, and a long, expert essay by Françoise Henry on the manuscript's decoration, iconography, history, etc. You could do no better.

Another beauty: Ben Shahn's illustrations for a single verse of Rainer Maria Rilke, **For the Sake of a Single Verse** (Clarkson N. Potter; $6.95). Twenty-four fine lithographs accompany the passage from Rilke's *Notebooks;* altogether a prime example of perfect suiting of text to artist and both to the art of bookmaking.

I never think of the great German novelist Günther Grass as a graphic artist, but **Inmarypraise** (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich; $15) has 84 of his drawings and etchings, accompanied by photographs of him and his family by Maria Rama. His affection for images of snails, mushrooms, nuns, fishheads, with all the accompanying, sometimes sexual symbolism, is captivating. An oddity in a way. The book is a rather special gift for someone who appreciates fine printing and an original mind.

Another special out-of-the-ordinary volume is **Mind In The Water,** assembled by Joan McIntyre, "a book to celebrate the consciousness of whales and dolphins" (Scribners/Sierra Club; $14.95). Aiming to raise money for Project Jonah—an attempt to save the world's remaining whales and dolphins—it is handsomely executed. So moving are Richard Ellis' drawings, so instructive is the lore assembled by many contributing writers, poets and scientists, that I can think of no one who loves beautiful books and the natural world who would not lust after it.

Last year George Braziller was responsible for a fine edition of *The Rohan Master* in his Library of Illuminated Manuscripts. This year he has published a companion volume, the 15th-century **The Belles Heures of Jean, Duke of Berry** ($45). The manuscript of this calendar book of hours is in the Cloisters in New York; next to seeing it there, this book is the best experience. For it is wonderfully illuminated, a masterly example of the book art of the late Middle Ages. The introduction by Millard Meiss and the commentaries that accompany the illustrations (by Meiss and Elizabeth H. Beatson) further illuminate the pages. Boxed and magnificently reproduced.

Following what must have been the successful publishing venture for Princeton University Press last year of *The Illustrated Walden,* the same press has brought out this year **The Illustrated Maine Woods** ($12.50/$15).This authoritative MLA-approved text of Thoreau is illustrated with photographs that Herbert W. Gleason made in 1906 of places described in the text. My only criticism of this admirable book is that I find the text's two-column page format less inviting that the one-column arrangement of *Walden.* Otherwise I recommend it highly for lovers of literature, Maine, nature.

Iona and Peter Opie have done a number of books for children. **The Classic Fairy Tales** (Oxford University Press; $12.95) is for sophisticated children, perhaps, but mainly for adults who will remember these tales and their famous illustrators, and will enjoy the explanatory notes the Opies have provided. A lovely, carefully prepared book.

Pantheon's reissue of **The Complete Grimm's Fairy Tales** with Padraic Colum's introduction ($12.95) is another good purchase, if only to have the stories together in one place, well printed and bound. The Scharl illustrations are somewhat sparse and not too exciting, but it is a fine book to have for the text and the price.

Poster collectors seem to be an increasing tribe. For them, and for general readers whose slight acquaintance with the advanced state of graphic arts in the Soviet Union during the '20s may be prejudiced by the socialist realism they recall in the '30s, **Revolutionary Soviet Film Posters** (Johns Hopkins; $12.95) will be a surprise. The relation between the posters (most of the artists are unknown; only A. Rodchenko was familiar to me) and the films they advertise is studied by Mildred Constantine and Alan Fern. These striking pages are evidence of the advanced state of Soviet art—parallel to Europe's before the Stalinist freeze.

Probably the accolade for the most impressive art book of the year must be divided between **De Kooning** by Harold Rosenberg (Abrams; $45) and **Goodbye Picasso** by David Douglas Duncan

*The first price listed is the pre-Christmas price. The second represents the price after the first of the year.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(Grosset & Dunlap; $35), a book so rich in photographs "in retrospect" of the great painter, his late art, his last house, his letters, that some are put in *before* the title page. Color plates, the magnificent jute-covered boards, layout, everything about this 292-page volume glows with the joy in life and art that was Picasso's. As was true of Duncan's earlier *The World of Pablo Picasso*, you find yourself doing more than turning these pages. You enter into them and live at Mas Notre-Dame de-Vie, Picasso's last home. Worth every cent it costs.

The deKooning is equally distinguished. No one in publishing today gives the quality of reproduction *en masse* that Harry N. Abrams does; this latest volume is no exception. It is a model of superior bookmaking: physically handsome, intellectually stimulating. As you might expect the notes to some of the work by deKooning himself are extraordinary as is the text by the distinguished art critic, Harold Rosenberg. Sixty-five plates are in color; I wish all 226 had been. But one cannot have everything; what is here is a delight to the eye and the mind.

Art

Two books that depart from the artists' usual mode. **The Drawings of Henry Moore,** with an introduction by Kenneth Clark (Harper & Row; $40). Lord Clark's strong, opinionated voice is heard in these expansive yet enlightening notes. The color reproductions, done in the Netherlands, are superior to most I have seen this season. A little smaller than the usual gargantuan folio, the volume is thus easier to read closely. The other departure: **Albrecht Dürer and the Landscape Water-Colours** (St. Martin's Press; $45). A new (to me) view of another side of the great etcher's art, these 32 prints are perfectly reproduced. Accompanying notes by Walter Koschatsky are of great help in understanding this lighter side of Dürer.

I do not cotton especially to collections of nude photographs, but William H. Gerdts' **The Great American Nude** (Praeger; $25) is a rather witty "history in art." More than 200 illustrations in black and white and color exemplify "the conflict between morality and artistic freedom" from colonial times to the 1970s. A useful addition to the excellent book Kenneth Clark wrote on *The Nude* (1956), especially since that work drew upon no American examples.

The catalog (accompanying volume might be more accurate) to the recent great retrospective show of **Alberto Giacometti** at the Guggenheim Museum in New York is now available from Praeger ($25). All the works from that exhibit are here—sculptures, prints, drawings, oils—together with a good introduction to his life and work by Reinhold Hohl. . . . And while on the subject of catalogs, the newly housed and exhibited Hirshhorn Collection has a mammoth catalog and guide, published by Abrams, **The Hirshhorn Museum and Sculpture Garden** ($40). In 770 pages it examines the astonishing range and depth of the first show, only about one-sixth of the museum's total collection. The catalog seems high-priced, but it contains indispensable essays by experts on various eras of American sculpture and painting. Almost as good as a journey to Washington.

Finally take artistic note of **Trompe L'Oeil** (The Eye Deceived) by Martin Battersby (St. Martin's; $25), the first book to trace three-dimensional realism from ancient Greece to modern surrealism. One might have wished that more than 16 of the 200 illustrations were color plates, but perhaps the point is the idea and the form, which black and white makes as evident as color.

Americana



Choicest of the many good books in this area, I think, is **American Folk Sculpture** by Robert Bishop (Dutton; $28.50) a stunning, comprehensive survey. Here are lovely photographs of hitching posts, stove figures, circus wagons, toys, weather vanes, whittling, decoys etc., as well as excellent introductory essays and informative captions.

The Century Collection of Civil War Art (American Heritage/McGraw-Hill $29.95/$35) grows out of a great find, the four-volume *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War* (1888), which contained illustrations by 56 artists, many of them on-the-scene sketches. True, they lack, as Bruce Catton points out in his introduction, "the hard, matter-of-fact realism of the camera," but they are a reflection of a wartime when, as Oliver Wendell Holmes said, "our lips were touched with fire." The drawings, water colors, engravings are superb, the whole collection a valuable "other" view of the Civil War.

This properly belongs under cookbooks, except that it is a charming piece of Americana: **The Early American Cookbook** by Hyla O'Conner (Prentice-Hall; $8.95). Recipes are simple, basic and have picturesque names, like red-flannel hash and day-after pie. The drawings are especially attractive. Don't think this a curio; these recipes suit today's high prices and our need for the early settler's ingenuity with food.

Reflections of 1776: The Colonies Revisited, text by Ellwood Parry, photographs by Nancy Sirkis (Viking; $16.95), is a handsome architectural study of pre-revolutionary buildings still remaining to us. First-rate pictures, as unadorned and simple as the houses, rooms, furnishings, gravestones, churches, etc., themselves.

The Exploration of North America, 1660-1776 is detailed, profusely illustrated with maps and period drawings, as well as primary source materials from the original documents. Useful, beautiful, informative (Putnam; $30).

Everywhere you will see displayed American Heritage's book on **The World of George Washington** (McGraw-Hill; $25/$35). Big, well printed, with wide margins and handsomely produced text, it claims to be "the true—and truly inspiring—story" of America's great President. All the documentation, portraits, drawings, maps, paintings etc., are from the colonial period. This is bound to be a popular Christmas favorite, and probably deserves to be.

The Natural World

For $12.50 the so-called Elephant Folio (it is!) of **The Birds of America** (Macmillan) is still a good buy. Reprinted over and over again since 1937 from the original Audubon (self-published) portfolios of his drawings made in 1827-1830, the book continues to serve the bird lover with 435 glowing plates, and a very good explanatory text by William Vogt

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

At the same price, specialists in owls will relish **The Book of Owls** (Knopf), "an authoritative guide to all major species of North American owls," by the noted owl expert Lewis Wayne Walker who is responsible for this extraordinary text and some of the excellent photographs. Most interesting to me is the section on the elf, the world's smallest owl, which lives in the Arizona desert; three fit neatly into a human hand.

More expensive but well worth the extra money is **Bird Life** by Jurgen Nicolai (Putnam; $25). Its author is an ethologist as well as an ornithologist. The selection of photographs, 144 of them from the collections of about 60 of the world's best bird photographers, accompany an instructive essay. Not merely a picture book but a text on bird behavior by one of the world's experts, a colleague of Nobel Prize-winning Konrad Lorenz.



The Dictionary of Birds in Color by Bruce Campbell is something more than that, an orderly collection of "specific accounts" of birds, arranged alphabetically according to scientific generic names. Viking's claim that this is "the most complete and useful reference work ever compiled" on the subject is probably entirely justified. The book begins with 1008 color photographs labeled with Latin names and sex symbols, is then followed by paragraphs of descriptions that give the searcher every kind of information about the bird pictured. A first-rate, entirely useful gift for bird lovers and watchers. The cover is properly sturdy for much handling. Random House's **The World Atlas of Birds** (put together by 14 editors from all over the world) costs $29.95 and, while instructive in the way the Campbell book is, lacks its elegance; the line drawings vary widely in quality.

If flowers are your love you will find the two-volume guides to them, **Wildflowers of Eastern America** and **Wildflowers of Western America,** of great interest. In both volumes (Knopf; $17.95 each) the descriptive material precedes the color photographs; both helpfully organize the facts according to color, time of blooming, shape, so that I would think the flower in question would be extremely easy to find and identify. The books are not too big—certainly not table-top size—and could be carried along on a hike: the covers seem well adapted for this use. Note at the same time that Macmillan has once again reprinted its Homer D. House's **Wild Flowers** ($9.95) another out-of-the-ordinary purchase for the price. Originally published in 1934, the color plates here are still fresh, have indeed never been bettered, although the descriptive material seems somewhat dated and abstruse.

The New York Times' much respected science editor, Walter Sullivan, has written a scholarly yet quite readable text on the new theories of planet formation. **Continents in Motion: The New Earth Debate** (McGraw-Hill; $17.95) makes the life history of the earth, and the recent startling theory that the continents are constantly in motion as exciting as Eric Ambler. His style is easy and comfortably colloquial, the illustrations are plentiful enough to elucidate the text. In no sense a book to riffle through while waiting for drinks to be served but a serious and important study for laymen about scientists and their discoveries and theories about the history of our planet. As background for the revolution in thinking that Sullivan describes, you might look into **Watchers of the Stars** by Patrick Moore (Putnam; $15.95), a literate, well illustrated study of astronomical thought from the Copernican theories of 1543 until the great revolution that placed the earth in its proper niche in the solar system over 150 years later, and ended with Isaac Newton. Readable, graphic, intelligent and yet large enough, I would think, to be considered a gift book.

A real picture book to leaf through and gasp at: **The Private Life of Animals** by Roger Caras (Grosset & Dunlap; $17.95) has some truly spectacular photographs of courting and mating, manipulation of environment, camouflage, etc., on the part of animals, insects, fish, birds, etc. A conversation piece because almost every page shows an intimate or little known detail of natural life, most of them actions caught as they are occurring, *viz.*, a female Ridley turtle photographed *from underneath* while egg-laying.

Finally "a tribute to the wonder and mystery of America's wildlands and wildlife," **The Wild Places** is a collection of rather highly colored, often very dramatic pictures by many photographers of fast-disappearing places, edited with comments by Ann and Myron Sutton (Harper & Row; $27.50). A book to look at and shake one's head over. Much that is pictured here will not be here too long.

Food

Beard on Food by James Beard (Knopf; $10), a compilation of Beard's favorite columns over the last four years, is more a discourse on food than a cookbook and much more fun. Over 200 recipes evolve from historical tidbits and amusing anecdotes (under titles like "The Decline and Fall of The Tomato" and "The Bean Than Won The West") The recipes as always are tempting as well as easy to prepare. Beard's distinctive style makes him the gourmet's Emerson.

René Verdon's French Cooking For The American Table by René Verdon with Carl Lyren (Doubleday; $14.95) is not a cookbook to pick up when you are deciding what to have for dinner tonight. White House chef under Kennedy and Johnson, Verdon has written a "textbook" on French cooking procedures using *fresh* American foods. Most of the 1389 recipes require a great deal of preparation but apparently the results are worth the effort.

The Clay-Pot Cookbook by Georgia MacLeod Sales and Grover Sales (Atheneum; $8.95) is an out-of-the-ordinary cookbook detailing a method of cooking originated by the ancient Etruscans. A terra-cotta pot presoaked in water for 10 minutes cooks food in its own natural juices. Great for dieters, health food devotees, as well as gourmets; cheaper cuts of meat cooked in this pot will tenderize themselves, an economical and time-saving method. The Sales' enthusiasm along with their unusual recipes (and those of converted friends), make this a fine holiday gift.

Feasts of a Militant Gastronome by Robert Courtine (Morrow; $10.95) is a vicarious adventure of 30 incredible meals. Mr. Courtine relives an epicurean menu at La Tour d'Argent in Paris (celebrating the first anniversary of de Gaulle's death) as well as a "simple"

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

meal at the home of a friend. The occasion for the meal, setting, host's anecdotes and thankfully the recipes are wittily presented in a gourmet drama.

Maida Heatter's Book of Great Desserts (Knopf; $10) contains luscious delights that can be prepared ahead of time. This is an extremely basic book containing step-by-step instructions. Followed to the *letter* (Heatter is adamant about this) even a novice will be able to turn out elegant desserts. Weight watchers should stay far away.

Greek Islands Cooking by Theonie Mark (Little, Brown; $8.95) is a travelogue of Greece that will make you yearn to go. Brought up on the island of Rhodes, Mark combines the best of island cuisine with a historical and seasonal tour (stuffed grape leaves in spring to baklavas in winter). A guide to buying Greek ingredients in the US is provided as well as a description of Greek wines.

As a result of the Diaspora, Jewish cooking is a product of adoption, adaptation and evolution. Two Jewish cookbooks, **The Best of Jewish Cooking** edited by Phyllis Frucht, Joy Rothschild, Gertrude Katz (Dial; $10) and **The Joys of Jewish Cooking** by Stephen and Ethel Longstreet (Doubleday; $10) describe this phenomenon while outlining basic Jewish dishes from around the world. Both books provide interesting background material on the origins and traditions of Jewish cuisine with charming illustrations. *The Best of Jewish Cooking*'s recipes are primarily kosher while *The Joys of Jewish Cooking* contains recipes, which though not always kosher, are I believe more ethnic and less complicated.—IBK

The Wine Diet Cookbook by Salvatore P. Lucia and Emily Chase (Abelard-Schuman Ltd; $7.95). Gimmick diets are legion, but this one has an attraction missing from most. Alcohol (California wine) is an ingredient of nearly every dish, and a four-ounce glass of it is part of each dinner menu. If this sounds like commercial promotion it should be no surprise since the book was "created by the Wine Advisory Board" in San Francisco.

New Encyclopedia of Wines and Spirits by Alexis Lichine (Knopf; $20). A weighty volume (over four and a half pounds), it contains enough information about wines and spirits, their history and production to satisfy the most inquisitive would-be wine *maven*.—DS

Sports

Sports enthusiasts are not abandoned this year. Spectators and participants alike will appreciate the big, fully illustrated **Rules of the Game,** a complete encyclopedia that will enable them to understand the play and judging of more than 400 national and international sporting events. Paddington Press/Two Continents; $14.95). For the armchair sailor there is **The History of Yachting,** full of beautiful illustrations such as a color spread of dinner aboard Cornelius Vanderbilt's steam yacht, *North Star* (Stein and Day; $22.50).

For the hockey buff there is the **Hockey Encyclopedia,** almost 400 pages of the fine points and great players of this tough, fast-moving game (Macmillan; $14.95).

Football's O. J. Simpson's story, **Born to Run,** celebrates the Juice's feat of being the first running back in NFL history to gain more than 2000 yards in a single season (Dodd, Mead; $6.95).

The growing army of tennis players will want **The Encyclopedia of Tennis,** 100 years of great players and events, that gives players tips on the game, as well as stories and anecdotes about the stars and matches of this era of competitive tennis (Viking; $22.50).

Finally, and for many the best sport of all, **The New Complete Walker,** completely revised, enlarged and updated. Colin Fletcher's ideas on how to live in the wilds with your own house on your back are practical and serviceable. Read during the winter, it will prepare you for the joys of backpacking next spring (Knopf; $8.95).—RJM

Photography

As always more books on or about photography, about famous and historic photographers, etc., are available than can possibly be noticed. I mention here only the ones that appealed to my uninstructed eye. **Bucks County,** photographs of early architecture by Aaron Siskind (Horizon Press) with text by William Morgan, is small (thank God!), relatively inexpensive ($12.95), unpretentious and extremely elegant. Everything you want to know about the historic county is here, due to the foresight of The Bucks County Historical Society that bought up all of Aaron Siskind's splendid pictures.

Take note of the availability of the Grossman/Viking **ICP Library of Photographers** that devotes a volume each (hardcover and paper) to noted socially concerned photographers. Thus far they have included **Robert Capa, Werner Bischof, David Seymour, Lewis W. Hine** (my personal favorite), **Dan Weiner** and **Roman Vishniac.** In cloth they are $10 (Capa; $12.50); in paper they range from $5.95 to $7.95. Accompanying texts are really good—appreciative essays by well-known persons who knew the artist. In the case of the Capa volume, these include Saroyan, Hersey, Aragon, Irwin Shaw and Hemingway.

Another estimable series is the Alskog/Crowell **Masters of Contemporary Photography,** which is especially good for the serious lens-enthusiast because each volume ends with a technical section loved by all professionals. The series thus far contains: **Bert Stern: The Photo Illustration; Elliott Erwitt: The Private Experience; Paul Fusco and Will McBride: The Photo Essay;** and my own favorite, **Annie Leibovitz and Mary Ellen Mark: Photojournalism.**

Photographs of the 1890s and 1900s by Mark Silber, **The Family Album** ($7.95 softcover), is available from Godine. These photographs taken by two young Maine amateurs at the turn of the century are accompanied by an oral narrative describing the people and places in the pictures, taken down from relatives of the photographers. Fine pictures fine text, fine bookmaking.

A record of his 1972-1973 journey, **About Russia** by Henri Cartier-Bresson is a collection of revealing photographs that make no attempt to preach or teach, but nonetheless do, by virtue of being superlative (Viking; $18.95).

A record of an exhibit in Great Britain of the early years of documentary photography (up to about 1884), **Reality Recorded** by Gail Buckland (New York Graphic Society; $12.50) is a good pre-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cursor to the Concerned Photographers series, beautifully and lovingly composed.

The best of the collections of old photographs (the nostalgia craze this year may have encouraged the production of these books) is Jeffrey Simpson's compilation **The Way Life Was** (Praeger; $19.95), a portrait of America, 1870-1918. Done by amateurs and professionals alike, the book does just what the title promises it will. Nostalgia-minded viewers will not be able to put it away.

I keep an eye out for pictures of old New York, being an old New Yorker: **New York: Sunshine and Shadow,** by Roger Whitehouse (Harper & Row; $12.50/$15) restores the city to its old 19th-century self. If you love the city, even its corrupted present, you will want this collection, and the seasonal price is unusually low. As you consider Whitehouse, notice the handsome **Photography in America** that Random House ($25) has published. Edited by Robert Doty, it is a record of the Whitney Museum's present exhibition (until January '75).

As you might expect, all the great names are here, represented by their best work. A survey, and a fine, complete and comprehensive one it is, with an excellent introduction by Minor White.

Miscellany

The Book of Pipes and Tobacco by Carl Ehwa, Jr. (Random House/Ridge Press Book; $12.95). Two hundred pages about smoking and not an intrusive word about cancer. Pipes here are a passion, a love object. Carl Ehwa does for pipe fancy what Alex Comfort did for sex.

The Cat and Man by Gillette Grilhe (Putnam; $27.50). Hundreds of illustrations and a clear text are combined in a handsome volume designed to delight cat enthusiasts and such.—DS

Odd as it may seem I cannot gather up enough notable examples of religious books for a special category in this column, so I conclude it with three recommended books, one on the Shakers and their way of life, **Work and Worship** by Edward Deming Andrews and Faith Andrews, a graphic and moving tribute to the declining yet memorable religious order (NY Graphic Society; $9.95). The second, **The Monastic World** by Christopher Brooke with photographs by Wim Swaan (Random House; $35), is big and moving, picturing and describing places and orders in the 10th to 15th centuries. This reverential book proves how great our debt is, artistically, architecturally and spiritually, to the monastic orders. Philip Garvin's **Religious America** (McGraw-Hill; $12.95) is the result of the several years Garvin spent making a TV documentary of various religious groups in the US. The result is a sympathetic photo-essay on personal religious experience, a fine book for the religious holiday season, which after all is what all this publishing and buying and selling is said to be about.

Cuts on pages 43 through 46 are courtesy: Dover Publications, *Quaint Cuts in the Chap Book Style* by Joseph Crawhall, selected and arranged by Theodore Menten; $2.50.

Initials of contributors to the Sports and Food sections follow their reviews.

Reconsideration

One Hundred Years Later

In November 1874 when Hardy published *Far from the Madding Crowd,* his literary ambitions were moderate. As a young man faced with the necessity of earning a living, hopefully by writing, he admitted unashamedly that he would gladly prostitute his literary

---

Far from the Madding Crowd
by Thomas Hardy
(Published in hardcover by St. Martin's Press, Harper & Row; paper: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Bantam, New American Library, St. Martin's Press)

---

abilities. He wrote to Leslie Stephen, editor of the *Cornhill* in which the novel was appearing as a serial:

> *The truth is that I am willing, and indeed anxious, to give up any points which may be desirable in a story when read as a whole, for the sake of*

Prose poetry that reads like a novel



by Anne Stevenson

Correspondences
A Family History in Letters

Correspondences is a book of poems, and as poetry it displays the characteristics of Miss Stevenson's previous work—an often classical spareness of language, a sureness of rhythm and an uncontrived intensity of feeling. But it is more: a sensitive and intelligent attempt to view part of American society from the perspective of the past, to consider in a vivid and moving act of the imagination some of the historical causes of the great emotional unrest of contemporary America.

"*Correspondences* . . . is an epistolary record of the history of a New England family over 150 years, skilfully variegated in tone and alive with the sense of a complex history which has been poetically transmuted without damage to its knotty reality. It yields the enjoyments of an absorbing novel as well as representing an original poetic venture; and it brings home to direct experience the fascinating conflicts and commitments of a phase of the puritan mind."
—*The Times Literary Supplement*

$6.95

Wesleyan University Press
Middletown, Connecticut 06457

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Caroline is starving to death. Slowly.

Yes, and it's happening right here in the U.S.A. Right this minute as you read these words. Who's Caroline? One of thousands of hungry children throughout the rural South suffering from a lack of nourishment so severe it affects her present health as well as the development of her mind and body.

In the words of a white Southern doctor to a Senate committee . . . "*Malnutrition* is not quite what we found; the boys and girls were hungry, weak, in pain, sick . . . suffering from hunger and disease and, directly or indirectly, they are dying from them—which is exactly what *starvation* means."

A few years ago, the NAACP Emergency Relief Fund was established to do something about this critical situation. And it's working. In the last three years, alone, 112,988 of the neediest people have been assisted. What's more, by providing the money for buying Federal food stamps, the food purchasing value of this assistance has multiplied an average of nine-fold!

Thus your tax-deductible $10 contribution to the NAACP Emergency Relief Fund buys about $90 worth of urgently needed meat, milk and bread. Just $25 can feed a large family for a month!

Please help by sending as little or as much as you can.

Thank you.

NAACP
Emergency Relief Fund,
Dept. E4, Box 121,
Radio City Sta.,
New York, N.Y. 10019



others which shall please those who read it in numbers. Perhaps I may have higher aims some day, and be a great stickler for the proper artistic balance of the completed work, but for the present, circumstances lead me to wish merely to be considered a good hand at a serial.

The wonder is that Hardy with such an attitude managed to get so much of "the proper artistic balance" into this early novel. He had already published three novels—*Desperate Remedies, Under the Greenwood Tree* and *A Pair of Blue Eyes*—and had achieved a fluency and a manner. These three have some of the elements that are distinctively Hardyan, but it was in *Far from the Madding Crowd* that Hardy literally came home. Writing to Leslie Stephen from Higher Bockhampton, Hardy explained, "I have decided to finish it [the novel] here, which is within a walk of the district in which the incidents are supposed to occur. I find it a great advantage to be among the people described at the time of describing them." The novel gives the impression of having been produced by one who walks with confidence on familiar ground.

Any consideration of a novel 100 years after its composition poses the question of how much vitality it has kept and how much of its significance and interest it has lost during the century. A reading of *Far from the Madding Crowd* reveals a quantity of melodrama which is dead, a respectable amount of timelessness related to natural phenomena—spring will come and rain will fall forever—and a surprising degree of modernity in fictional technique and characterization.

Manuscript evidence indicates that this novel, like others, did not spring fully armed from Hardy's head but went through a series of enriching accretions. He originally conceived a plot involving three characters: a woman farmer, a shepherd and a soldier. Presumably the rustics would constitute a part of the landscape. There is only a little evidence to suggest how Hardy intended to develop a plot from this triangle. A rejected fragment in manuscript in the Hardy archives of the Dorset County Museum in spite of its title, "Details of Sheep-rot," is directly relevant to Hardy's original conception of the novel. In the fragment Sgt. Troy has married Bathsheba and has taken an active and unprincipled part in the management of the farm, especially of the sheep. Oak's discovery that Troy

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

s giving the sheep access to recently irrigated pastures in which they will become infected by a parasite that produces a pathological plumpness in the appearance of an animal leads to a confrontation and physical encounter between Troy and Oak. Troy is shown as the consummate villain resorting to unethical practices to make a profit.

Between this early version and the final one, Hardy changed the character of Troy from vicious to happy-go-lucky and somewhat irresponsible and added two characters who were to play major roles: Fanny Robin and Farmer Boldwood. The first probably contributed to the contemporary interest in the novel as the innocent housemaid seduced by the dashing soldier. She ultimately serves as a kind of nemesis but is more important as agent than as character. The creation of the character of Boldwood, however, is a different matter. He adds a dimension to the novel which is hard to delimit but which I shall attempt to define further on.

Far from the Madding Crowd seems modern in its impressionistic and expressionistic use of setting to objectify mental and emotional states of the characters. That Shakespeare makes the storm on the heath correspond to the storm going on within the mind of the desperate king in no way precludes calling Hardy's use of this device modern. Perhaps it is in what is symbolized that Hardy's distinction lies. Though much is said about sex in *King Lear*, there is nothing in the play comparable to the plethora of sexual symbols constituting the scene of the sword exercise in the hollow amid the ferns. From the rejected fragment of the earliest version of the novel Hardy salvaged the vivid description of the sinister bog on the edge of which Bathsheba awakes after spending the night in the woods. The novel never mentions the morass before that episode or afterward, but nothing could more effectively objectify the ugly reality in whose proximity Bathsheba has comfortably and unconsciously lived until she learns the extent of her husband's involvement with Fanny Robin.

Hardy the nonrealist, or surrealist—the man of imagination—never appears to better advantage than in the episode in which Joseph Poorgrass nearly brings Fanny Robin's body back to Weatherbury. Here Hardy had at hand all of the materials that he understood best and at his best manipulated as no other 19th-century novelist did. Every sense is appealed to as Poorgrass moves more deeply into the fog-dim wood. The condensing fog drips upon the casket, and we hear the hollow sound. Our sight is obscured by the fog and our flesh is chilled by it. We are made to feel that the Buckshead Inn is some illusion of comfort created by spirits to waylay the unwary. The scene within it seems literally out of this world. The faces of the drinkers that Poorgrass finds there are not faces but "copper-coloured discs." Across the table from each other they are comparable to "the setting sun and the full moon shining *vis-à-vis* across the globe," cosmic in their appearance, Olympian in their perspective. It is fitting that they should discuss the ways of God to man. Oak's entrance is as startling as the knocking on the gate in *Macbeth*, only the effect is reversed. Here, sober reason destroys the cozy illusion which has dispelled the awareness of darkness and death. As usual, Hardy ends such a scene in time. The grotesquery, the fantasy under the guise of realism is developed so gradually that only the most cynical is incapable of enjoying "a temporary suspension of disbelief."

But it is in characterization that Hardy arrives at full stature. It has been said that Bathsheba Everdene is one of the few women characters that Hardy permits to grow up. She learns the difference between romantic dream and probability in a world not designed for human happiness, and like Elizabeth Jane in *The Mayor of Casterbridge* finds reality bearable. It is significant that in marrying Gabriel Oak, Bathsheba smiles—she laughs "less readily now," and one wonders if in sharing life with Oak she will learn again to laugh. Oak, the eternal shepherd, watching his flocks by night, is the typical quiet, nonaggressive man, cousin if not brother to Donald Farfree in the reasonableness with which he carries on his life including his courtship. Ecstasy and selfishness are equally alien to both. In two of Oak's most memorable moments he shuts the door upon irresponsible men and goes out alone into the dark to perform his tasks.

It is Boldwood who gives *Far from the Madding Crowd* an element of tragic depth. Hardy's almost Yeatsian concern for growing old served him well as a novelist. There is something poignant about his middle-aged characters; Boldwood, Michael Henchard of *The Mayor of Casterbridge*, Phillotson in *Jude* and Pierston in *The Well-Beloved* are distinguished by a tragic inflexibility. All have obsessive tendencies although Boldwood is the only one of the four whose obsession is so overwhelming as to account completely for his downfall. Hardy carefully prepares one for Boldwood's actions. He is depicted as the lay monk. His stable is his cloister, and in that refuge among the innocent animals, Boldwood communes with his own soul. Though alone he is apparently unaware of his loneliness until aroused to consciousness by the caprice of Bathsheba whose vanity will not permit her to let a man ignore her. Boldwood, once awakened, like his Hardyan confrère Henchard, in middle age feels a painful need for a love object. Having acquired material prosperity they become aware of the irony of moving into old age with nothing to expend their goods or affections upon.

More sharply than any other character in Hardy, Boldwood illustrates the destructive power of obsession. From an efficient, self-possessed and self-respecting man, he becomes a pathetic but also demonic externalization of Bathsheba's guilty conscience. In a disagreeable chapter in which Hardy permits Troy to slip back into the role of the cunning villain, Boldwood discovers Troy's marriage to Bathsheba. Though Hardy's allusions are at times a

EGON SCHIELE'S

PORTRAITS

Alessandra Comini

THIS first substantial study of Schiele's art focuses on the human figure, the most compelling motif in his work. By examining Schiele's portraits and self-portraits in the context of the egocentric and erotic culture of Vienna in the early 1900s, Comini reveals the artist's major stylistic changes and provides a fascinating view of his intense private life.

"Alessandra Comini's study of these portraits establishes her as the leading expert of Schiele **anywhere.**"
— Peter Selz

556 pages Lavishly illustrated $65

At your bookseller

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS
Berkeley · Los Angeles · New York

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

distraction rather than an enhancement of a context, at times they strengthen a passage, vivify a character. Having been shamed and scorned by the triumphant Troy, "throughout the whole of that night Boldwood's dark form might have been seen walking about the hills and downs of Weatherbury like an unhappy Shade in the Mournful Fields of Acheron."

Foregoing allusion and resorting simply to the external manifestations of a state of mind, Hardy describes Boldwood as he rides within sight of Oak and Coggan after the night of wandering:

> *The horse bore him away, and the very step of the animal seemed significant of dogged despair. Gabriel, for a minute, rose above his own grief in noticing Boldwood's. He saw the square figure sitting erect upon the horse, the head turned to neither side, the elbows steady by the hips, the brim of the hat level and undisturbed in its onward glide, until the keen edges of Boldwood's shape sank by degrees over the hill. To one who knew the man and his story there was something more striking in this immobility than in a collapse. The clash of discord between mood and matter here was forced painfully home to the heart; and as in laughter there are more dreadful phases than in tears, so was there in the steadiness of this agonized man an expression deeper than a cry.*

Hardy was to write greater novels than *Far from the Madding Crowd*, but he was never to write better than at certain points in that novel. The rustics who relax in the low sun as Bathsheba sings at the end of the shearing supper, Poorgrass with the body of Fanny Robin penetrating deeper and deeper into the fog-grey wood, Boldwood, riding away, statuesque in his misery are pure Hardy—and that is saying a great deal.

Clarice Short

CLARICE SHORT *is professor of English at the University of Utah, Salt Lake City. She is author of a recent book of poems,* The Old One and the Wind *(University of Utah).*

Coming
Malcolm Cowley
reconsiders
Robert M. Coates'
Yesterday's Burdens

Told by Design

Truth to Life: The Art of Biography in the Nineteenth Century by A. O. J. Cockshut

(Harcourt Brace Jovanovich; $7.50)

Wilde was right enough in saying that it was style—or as he paradoxically exaggerated, lying—that made the greatest portraitists the most believable. Without art, truth of fact remains incredible. Biography is a true-life *story*, an artful tale, of which the elements correspond to the data of some actual experience selected, arranged, passed through the biographer's modifying fire. It is not fiction's contrary but its twin, making of human inconsistency a "character" and of the pile-up of mortal days, with all their accidents, some species of plot. Yet the biographer is the servant of inconsistent and accidental life. He may believe that under the disorder of his evidence, as under the chaos of things generally, there exists some hidden design visible only to the angels, or he may have no such confidence but strive nevertheless to "make sense" of his bit of human history, to impose some governing principle, to distinguish the crucial from the trivial. But all the time if he is responsible he knows that there is a little or a greater degree of fraud in all this—that any life is frequently meaningless and self-contradictory, defiant of form. There are biographers who, in the face of this realization, simply abdicate behind a mass of materials—letters and dates and anecdotes. Their works are soon forgotten or become the raw stuff for the shaping efforts of others. But sometimes the interpretive will come up against stuff that cannot be subdued and may not be ignored; for the biographer of genius these are the occasions when his greatest efforts of imagination are exerted to reconcile his matter and his theme.

We seem to be in an age of heroic biographic enterprise; never have biographers brought more resources to their undertakings, struggled so manfully to make life interpretable even as the world shows fewer and fewer signs of resistance to the universal tendency to disorder. Our serious biographies ar ambitious books, long in the making Yet some of the most impressive ar partial failures, handicapped by th nature of the task that seems, except i rare instances, to make the choic between total truthfulness and false-to life form almost unresolvable. The tasl is the more difficult because our biog raphers do their research so conscien tiously, because they know so much. S over the great expanse of Leon Edel' *Henry James* there broods a spirit to compulsively eager to explain—Ede will not leave his man alone enough; h must understand every particle of deec and thought and bring these under th sway of the obsessional motives he has identified in his subject. Quentin Bell on the other hand, is too scrupulously modest in his biography of Virginia Woolf; he abstains from using her fiction as a clue to her life as strenuously as Edel recruits the writings of James to serve his purpose. And Carlos Baker, swamped by his accumulations of detail about Hemingway, practices a still more severe abstention; he chooses to give us just the daily man in all his dailiness, scanting heroic drama and inner mystery. Yet we have had biographies, too, in which the subject seems to have yielded without strain to the inspired placing of pressures by the biographer, and the sense of fact and the sense of fictional form appear miraculously in balance (the list should certainly include Ellmann's *Joyce* and Schorer's *Sinclair Lewis).*

As one attempts such judgments it is clear that it is time we recognized the art of biography for the important literary genre that it is. There is little critical theory and hardly any practical criticism in this field. We still read biographies with small appreciation of the esthetics that underlie their capacity to give us pleasure. Hence the importance of the recent book about 19th-century English biography by A. O. J. Cockshut, an Oxford don who has already written on three masters of fiction in the same age—Scott, Dickens and Trollope. It is a work that runs the danger of being overlooked as a specialist's survey of a dusty subject. But there is nothing dusty about Cockshut's concise and thoughtful volume. He not only makes us want to read again such near-forgotten masterpieces as Stanley's *Arnold*, Trevelyan's *Macaulay*, Froude's *Carlyle*, Morley's *Gladstone* and Ward's *Newman*, but also he analyzes success and failure in these works and shows how each biographer, with his particular expecta-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ions of design, wrestled with his more or less intractable body of information. Working against this effort, to some degree, was the almost universal trust in documents that made for the traditionally inclusive "life and letters" format as it still makes for the swollen volumes of American biographies that have gone all too often to the well of research. Of course it is possible, as I have suggested, that we are also too ready with our theories. The 20th-century psychologies have schooled us to expect that childhood, for example, should provide certain primary explanations. But when Southey describes how the boy John Wesley was rescued out of a burning house and later used the motto for his adult portraits, "Is not this a brand plucked out of the burning?" he does not make this kind of connection at all. Like Wesley himself he sees the event as simply emblematic of the preacher's conviction of salvation. And that is not necessarily an evasion of biographic responsibility. Cockshut reminds us: are we not wrong to assume that some incident, just because we happen to know about it (though we don't know about others) is the formative stroke of fate?

But the important 19th-century biographers were governed by conceptions of form that derived from their own theories about the nature of human development. They tended to see their subjects as working to realize some sort of destiny, engaged with forces that helped or hindered. John Morley views Gladstone's long career in a simplified retrospective as the epic of a man of great gifts gradually working himself free of early prejudices. The result is one of the most readable of Victorian biographies because of the way it orders a vast amount of information into scheme. Too simplified, actually, Cockshut believes, for Morley fails to ponder sufficiently the complexities of the stateman's decisions; he irons out the difficulties that stand in the way of his view. And the book, splendid in its evocation of a hero, sets him out too isolately; it does not develop the other figures in the story—Disraeli for example—to a sufficient degree. It is precisely the virtue of W. P. Ward's account of Newman's later life that it surrounds the central character by living men acting on principles of their own.

A striking use of a simple progression is to be found in the less distinguished but extremely influential writing of Samuel Smiles who wrote a long series of *Lives* stressing the power of industrious individuals to overcome hard circumstances. Smiles' histories are propaganda rather than art partly because he was actuated by the desire to find in his examples the paradigm for the upward mobility desired by millions of poor Englishmen. He tended to overlook the unfair advantage awarded by talent and he did not give its due to the assistance of evil qualities. "His Napoleon is equally devoid of genius and wickedness. He becomes mainly, like the Duke of Wellington, a first rate man of business," says Cockshut. But the hero worship of the biographer of this time also often included a recognition that the forces opposing the hero came from within. There was the type of the hero with a flaw as illustrated by Southey's Nelson, with his fatal love of glory; Lockhart's Scott, with his unconquerable financial irresponsibility; and Burns and Coleridge, with their more impulsive weaknesses of the flesh, as seen by Lockhart and Cottle.

In contrast to Smiles' linear formula in a profounder fashion than any of these is the biography that Cockshut thinks

Voice in the Wilderness

Collected Essays of Fifty Years

by Corliss Lamont

"This is the strong, sustained voice of an orderly, liberal mind and compassionate heart . . . The reader will lay down this book with heightened respect for one of America's great liberals."
—*The Churchman*

". . . His intellectual and moral vision is impressive as he addresses himself to . . . the moral and spiritual implications of humanism as a philosophy."
—*The Humanist*



346 Pages
Cloth $10.00

and NEW from Prometheus

The Making of the TVA by Arthur E. Morgan
By taking us *inside* politics, this book forces us to revise our view of the history of an era. (Cloth $10.95)

Humanizing the Workplace edited by Roy P. Fairfield
Twenty-one leaders from labor, industry, and the university deal with ways of humanizing industry and the workplace. (Cloth $11.95)

Order from your bookstore or direct from

Prometheus Books 923 Kensington Avenue, Buffalo, New York 14215

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the greatest of all the Victorian life-histories, James Anthony Froude's study of Carlyle. This stirring book is organized upon a dialectical principle that permits the author to see the kind of career that might have suited Smiles' purpose—the rise of the industrious apprentice—as that of a man pursuing and attaining a chimerical success, driven by the desire not merely to make a mark but to speak with prophetic voice to mankind for its own good. Unlike Smiles Froude was capable of discovering in Carlyle an example of the tragic disparity of the public and private life. He had a sense, like Pascal, of the greatness and littleness of man. This viewpoint made for a superb ironic control in the organization of the biography. The sense of mixed human nature seems to assist, even, Froude's ability to comprehend the whole of Carlyle's political attitude. It is well to have our attention drawn again to his analysis in view of the "discovery" of Carlyle's radicalism claimed by Philip Rosenberg in his recent biography. Froude, it should be remembered, realized in 1882 that a unity connected Carlyle's contempt for upper-class irresponsibility and his critique of laissez-faire economics with his so-called "Fascist" ideas about leadership. The thinker who saw the justice of heaven in the French Revolution also, we know, wrote the pro-slavery *The Nigger Question* but this, Froude argued, was an instance too of his radical authoritarian-paternalistic solution to the failure of capitalism and of capitalist democracy that he foresaw.

Yet Froude, like other biographers of the time, also fell under the spell of the myth of the hero to some extent. Although he showed that Carlyle's greatness was disfigured by a savage irritability, he sometimes failed to acknowledge striking consequences of this weakness—the self-contradiction and intemperance involved in his attack upon Newman, for example. And out of respect for his subject as well as the reticence concerning sexuality that restrained the Victorian man of letters whether writing history, biography or fiction, Froude's vivid account of Carlyle's marriage lacks the final explanatory element (which was available to the biographer)—the fact of his subject's impotence.

Yet Froude was less the captive of the desire to write a panegric than most—less than A. P. Stanley, for example, who created a new variety of school-master-hero in Arnold of Rugby, the man whose greatness was to be found in his ability to exert influence, particularly moral influence, on sixth formers, one of whom he had been. Unlike Froude he adds but never subtracts from his account, yet Froude, like Boswell, who had the same tragic vision of his adored Dr. Johnson, was no less an admirer and disciple than Stanley. It was, in fact, typical of Victorian biographies that if not written by a relative they were written by someone who felt a sort of filial relationship to the biographee. It was a relationship that gave enormous opportunities of sympathy and comprehension yet limited critical vision. Macaulay's life was written by G. O. Trevelyan, the son of the sister for whom Macaulay cherished a dependent affection so great that her marriage produced in him profound depression relieved only by the arrangement whereby he was to live in their home with the married pair. Does his nephew understand the full measure of the abnormality of what he reports? Cockshut asks. A filial tact, Victorian reticence, or simply failure to comment, lie heavily upon his superior biography.

And Cockshut offers another explanation for Trevelyan's failure to understand the cause of the condition he describes, that Macaulay remained a child all his life. The uncle had been born in the heart of the Clapham sect, that close-connected group of upper-class families animated by evangelical piety, though he later became a Whig who seemed indifferent to the spiritual intensities of many of his contemporaries. On the other hand, the nephew, born a Whig, had never felt the kind of atmosphere that nurtured Macaulay and though he thoroughly understood his uncle's mature viewpoint, he does not attempt to explain how he had chosen to reject his parents' example. Yet this rejection requires some explanation, particularly because it may be related to Macaulay's curious personality.

It is Cockshut's conviction that no influence, whether embraced or rejected, touched the lives of most of the notable Victorians more significantly than evangelical protestantism. In an interesting chapter he offers this as a clue to the interpretation of many famous lives. As he points out it was a paradoxical force that combined the idea of a powerful heavenly and parental authority along with the demanding expectation of individual inspiration. It is this tradition, he maintains, that produced such divergent results as the

THE NEW REPUBLIC

☐ A Year of The New Republic, $17
☐ Two Years of The New Republic, $29
ADDITIONAL POSTAGE—Outside USA—$3

My Check for $_____ is enclosed.

Name _____
Address _____
City State Zip Code

If Gift, card to read from _____

381 West Center Street, Marion, Ohio 43302 D1090

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Oxford movement, the reverent agnosticism of George Eliot, and Gladstonian liberalism—each in its own way an expression of the enormous responsibility of conscience. In the next generation his strain is still felt by the children of Clapham, like the leading members of Bloomsbury in whose elitism there was the same emphasis upon elevated tastes and principles, on the discovery of a personal style. Such insights suggest that Cockshut's own talents lie not only in the appraisal of biography but in the creation of new biographic structures for containing the eminent lives of the past.

Millicent Bell

MILLICENT BELL *is the author of* Edith Wharton and Henry James *(Braziller).*

Recent Fiction

The Last Days of Louisiana Red by Ishmael Reed

(Random House; $5.95)

One of the many critical studies of Afro-American literature that needs to be written might be entitled "Irony and the Black Literary Tradition." Except for the serious odes of Phillis Wheatley, there is hardly a work by an Afro-American author that would not be illuminated by such an approach. On second thought, even Wheatley's poems embody the inherent irony of a black poetic spirit cramped into a white poetic mold. Irony is an essential element in black artistic expression because it is so integral a part of black life.

When this study is written the works of Ishmael Reed will have at least a chapter devoted to them. His new novel, *The Last Days of Louisiana Red*, might serve as a textbook on irony. In it he blends paradox, hyperbole, understatement and signifyin' so expertly that you can almost hear a droll black voice telling the tale as you read it.

One of Reed's best satiric methods is the interweaving of fantastic verbal absurdities with the familiar absurdities of everyday life. He compares the entrance of *Louisiana Red*'s hero, Ed Yellings, into Berkeley, California to the entrance of Osiris into Egypt at a time when "cannibalism was in vogue":

> *When Ed Yellings entered Berkeley "men were not eating men"; men were inflicting psychological stress on one another. Driving one another to strokes, high blood pressure, hardening of the arteries, which only made it worse since the stabbings, rapings, muggings went on as usual.*

This is of course comic irony; in Reed's hands it is a mighty weapon.

The primary targets of Reed's wit are the black revolutionary organizations that sprang up in places like Berkeley in the 1960s. He condemns their use of revolutionary violence, which was at times indistinguishable from old-fashioned crime. The posturing, the rhetoric and the exploitation that sometimes characterized actual movements symbolize the forces of foolishness and evil in Reed's hoodoo drama.

Reed calls the members of the movement the Moochers, a term taken from a Cab Calloway song, and terms their mindlessly bloody tactics "Louisiana Red," which is also a kind of hot sauce. He explains:

> *Moochers are people who, when they are to blame, say it's the other fellow's fault for bringing it up. Moochers don't return stuff they borrow. Moochers ask you to share when they have nothing to share . . . God, do they suffer . . . Though Moochers wrap themselves in the full T-shirt of ideology, their only ideology is Mooching.*

The opposing forces of righteousness are led by Ed Yellings, founder of the Solid Gumbo Works and discoverer of a cure for cancer. Actually the Gumbo Works is a highly sophisticated voodoo operation, but Reed hilariously appropriates the slogans and symbols of capitalistic enterprise to describe its activities.

The plot of *Louisiana Red* is impossible to recount. Like Reed's last novel,

Skiing Difficult? NONSENSE!



Skidans Make It Fun And Easy For The Whole Family.
An all-new kind of ski from Sweden. Shorter and even wider than the shorty. In a matter of hours Skidans give beginners of all ages the confidence and feel of the slopes like they were born to ski, and enable intermediate and advanced skiers to do all the stunts, tricks, and spins of an ice skater. And Skidans eliminate the need for boots, poles, bindings and other expensive equipment.

We Guarantee Satisfaction
If Skidans do not meet with your approval and turn you and your family into at least proficient skiers, and give you a heck of a lot of fun, return them postpaid within 30 days for a full refund.

Time is short. Send your order today and we will ship your Skidans within 48 hours.

SKIDANS
5128 Goodland Avenue North Hollywood, CA 91607
Please send me Skidans as ordered. If I am not 100% satisfied I can return them postpaid within 30 days for a full refund.
☐ 1 pair Skidans at $16.95 ☐ 2 pairs Skidans at $28.95
☐ 3 pairs Skidans at $39.95
Add $1.00 per pair for postage and handling.
Total enclosed $____ ☐ Cash ☐ Check ☐ Money Order
Name _____
Address _____
City _____ State _____ Zip _____
a1

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Sharing of Land and Resources In America

Peter Barnes' six-part series on the distribution of land and wealth in America is now available as a 64-page booklet. Price [including postage and handling]:

1-10—$1.00 per copy
11-50—90 cents
over 50—75 cents

Address orders to
THE NEW REPUBLIC
1244 19th St., NW
Washington, DC 20036
prepaid orders only
D. C. residents add 5% tax

Book Publishing
Manuscripts invited for prompt review and terms of publication. All subjects. Professional editing, design, production and marketing since 1920. Send inquiry or manuscript, or call (215) 563-3553. Ask for free *Authors' Guide* B-20.
DORRANCE & COMPANY
1617 J.F. Kennedy Blvd. Philadelphia, Pa. 19103

WRITERS WHY WAIT?
PUBLISH YOUR BOOK IN 90 DAYS
. . . and get expert editing, design, manufacture, publicity, promotion and advertising—all under one roof at low costs. Two **free books** and literature give details and success stories. Write or call Dept.107
EXPOSITION PRESS, INC.
900 So. Oyster Bay Rd., Hicksville, N.Y. 11801
(516) 822-5700

Mumbo Jumbo, it takes the form of a hoodoo detective thriller, features the master practitioner Papa LaBas, and generally focuses upon the struggle between the upright Gumbo Workers and the dangerous advocates of "Louisiana Red." For so many story lines and themes, however, a concept as linear as "plot" seems inadequate.

Consider, for example, that one of the characters is named Chorus, a performer supposedly in his 30s who has been out of work since people started writing plays like *Antigone*. Or that Reed draws constant parallels between the Antigone myth and his own tale. Or that contemporary versions of Kingfish, Amos and Andy appear. Or that a white teacher of Afro-American literature is undone by his study of Richard Wright's *Native Son* and is captured roaming the Berkeley Hills in a chauffeur's uniform, raving in black Mississippi-Chicago dialect of the 1940s. All of this is peculiar and improbable but somehow in the context Reed creates it fits together logically and even makes sense.

Reed can sometimes lapse into seriousness. He describes Moochism and similar phenomena as the legacy of slavery. Papa La Bas muses:

> *Slavery. The experience of slavery. I'm afraid it's going to be a long time before we get over that nightmare which left such scars in our souls—scars that no amount of bandaids or sutures, no amount of stitches will heal.*

Reed appears deeply concerned with the relationship between the sexes, but on this topic his perspective is frighteningly distorted. Throughout *Louisiana Red* there is joking contempt toward women, particularly black women. When he satirizes the women's movement his originality disappears and he falls back on the tired stereotype of feminists as man-hating dykes. The method for subduing these "fierce, rough-looking women" is attack and rape.

Reed's most astounding statements occur in a confrontation between Papa LaBas and Minnie, a Moocher leader. LaBas accuses Minnie and all black women as co-conspirators with white men in keeping black men in submission. LaBas intones: "Women use our children as hostages against us. . . The original blood-sucking vampire was a woman . . . I can't understand why you want to be liberated. Hell . . . you already liberated."

The violence and humorlessness of this diatribe, delivered by a character whom Reed respects, indicate that he wants his opinions to be taken straight. Reed's views on a difficult problem are antediluvian and for this reader they cloud the entire impact of his work. If he is so insensitive in this area, how can he be so incisive in others? (Can I laugh with a man who seems so hostile toward me?) As a critic I found *The Last Days of Louisiana Red* brilliant. As a black woman I am not nearly so enthusiastic.

Barbara Smith

BARBARA SMITH *is book editor of* The National Observer.

Louis D. Rubin, Jr. on baseball

"The Ruth," Heywood Broun once wrote, "is mighty and shall prevail." George Herman Ruth, Sultan of Swat, has prevailed, a quarter-century since his death and close to 40 years since he hung up his uniform as an active baseball player, to the extent of having four book-length accounts of his life and times appear this year. For a man who read and wrote only with difficulty, that is quite a bit of posthumous attention.

The immediate occasion, of course, was the recent assault upon the Babe's lifetime record of 714 home runs by Henry Aaron of the Atlanta Braves. With Aaron edging up upon Ruth's seemingly impregnable mark, various publishing houses agreed that Ruth would be in the news, that a biography might be a profitable venture. So we have four new biographies, about two too many.

By far the best of the new books is

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Robert W. Creamer's, which was serialized in *Sports Illustrated*. Also worth notice is Kal Wagenheim's *Babe Ruth: His Life and Legend*, which though written rather clumsily has much good material in it. (Oddly, only Wagenheim has thought to include a compilation of Ruth's lifetime record in his compendium.) Ken Sobol's *Babe Ruth and the American Dream* is a gauzy, debunking affair, mainly intent upon showing that the Babe was crude, lecherous, vulgar, stupid, swell-headed, cowardly, etc. (If Sobol were to write a book on the Battle of Gettysburg, I'm sure he would concentrate upon the fact that Gen. Lee had diarrhea during the fighting.) Finally Robert Smith's *Babe Ruth's America* uses Ruth's career mainly to give us random discourse on political, social and economic life at the time. If the reader desires an 1800-word account of the kidnapping of the Lindbergh baby, this is the book to read. On the other hand, if the reader wishes to learn about Babe Ruth, the other biographies will prove more useful. Also, if the reader wishes to tax his eyesight, the blurred sans-serif typography in Smith is made to order.

Ruth was a fairly elemental person, raised in a reformatory and greatly lacking in taste, but he was one of the most colorful of all athletes and by far the greatest power hitter in baseball history. He could hit a ball harder, longer and more frequently than any other player before or since. Ty Cobb had a higher batting average, but only because Ruth disdained punching out hits for his average and went for the fences. Aaron has now hit more home runs, but went to bat three times for every two of Ruth's. And Ruth dominated the game during his day to an incredible extent: in 1921, for example, when he hit 59 home runs, the two next leading home run hitters had 24 apiece, and only eight of the 16 major league teams had as many for their total team output. He also drove in 190 runs, hit for a .378 average, received 144 bases on balls, stole 17 bases, and had an incredible slugging percentage of .846.

In the 1920s the press, the economy and the *Zeitgeist* combined to make athletic heroes into figures of incomparable grandeur. Every sport had its paragons. Ruth, it seems to me, is the only one whose achievements do not depend, in part at least, upon the peculiar magnification of the period to give them their dominance. Reading Creamer's and Wagenheim's books, or for that matter just looking at the statistics of

Babe: The Legend Comes to Life
by Robert W. Creamer
(Simon & Schuster; $9.95)

Babe Ruth: His Life and Legend
by Kal Wagenheim
(Praeger; $8.95)

Babe Ruth and the American Dream
by Ken Sobol
(Ballantine; $1.50)

Babe Ruth's America
by Robert Smith
(Crowell; $10)

Coming Fiction Reviews

Saul Maloff on Nabokov
James Boatwright on
Gore Vidal
Jonathan Yardley on
Peter de Vries



At your local bookstore or write:

ORBIS BOOKS
Maryknoll, N.Y. 10545

A NEW MORAL ORDER
Development Ethics and Liberation Theology *by Denis Goulet*

The traditional economic approach to "aid to the developing nations" has shown itself bankrupt. Ethical questions have rarely been asked by either the have or have not nations. Denis Goulet, a foremost authority in the development field, brings up these questions and offers a challenge to live the answers. *Paperback $3.95*

A RICHER HARVEST
by Sudhir Sen

Dr. Sen, a noted Indian expert on agriculture, shows how the new "miracle seeds" can double the yield of wheat and rice in most of the undeveloped nations. "Lucid, sensible and always interesting." *Sir John Crawford, Consultant on Agriculture to the World Bank*
Hardbound $10.95

CHRISTIANS AND SOCIALISM
edited by John Eagleson

Important documentation on the *Movement of Christians for Socialism in Latin America*. This movement is popping up all over the world, even in Europe. *Hardbound $7.95 Paperback $4.95*

CLASH OF TITANS
Africa and US Foreign Policy
by Edward W. Chester

Full-scale assessment of U.S. relations with African nations. Chester is the first to have drawn on the State Department's official correspondence relating to that continent.
Hardbound $12.95

MARX AND THE BIBLE
A Critique of the Philosophy of Oppression *by Jose P. Miranda*

A profound study of the Bible and its basic message of justice for the poor and oppressed. A searing challenge to age old tenets of the West. *Hardbound $8.95 Paperback $4.95*

From our backlist:

Development: Lessons for the Future
by Thomas Melady and Robert Suhartono
This authoritative book analyzes the past and suggests an antidote to the present pessimism found among the *have* nations and the near despair gripping the *have nots*. *Hardbound $6.95*

The Law and the Poor
by Frank Parker
This readable, practical and reliable book is the first one designed to help poverty agencies and social workers through the legal maze towards justice for the poor. *Hardbound $8.95 Paperback $4.95*

Picture Tube Imperialism: The Impact of U.S. Television on Latin America
by Alan Wells
"This book is a must for anyone interested in the effect that U.S. television has in Latin America." *Prairie Messenger* *Hardbound $4.95*

Why is the Third World Poor?
by Piero Gheddo
"Undoubtedly one of the most useful manuals on world poverty we have seen in a long time. Warmly recommended for church study and action groups." *Worldview.* *Paperback $3.95*

Politics and Society in the Third World
by Jean-Yves Calvez
A study of societies in the process of development, particularly those factors which can help or hinder the total human development within those societies.
Hardbound $6.95

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Ruth's record, makes one realize how magnificent an athlete he was. That he had the personality to match, and that the age demanded the image of its own accelerated bemusement, were fortuitous; his skill at hitting a baseball would have been sufficient.

The best way to convey what he was and did and what he represented was simply to relate the facts and quote the witnesses, and this is largely what Creamer and Wagenheim have done. In Creamer's words: "nobody else ever looked like Babe Ruth. Or behaved like him. Or did all the things he did in his repressed, explosive, truncated life." It is good to have it told so well in print.

All of the familiar Babe Ruth stories are in these books. They are related factually and judiciously by Creamer, breathlessly by Wagenheim, sardonically by Sobol, and occasionally by Smith. Most of the stories have long been known, though Creamer in particular came up with some that I had never heard before, usually having to do with the Babe's innocent vulgarity. Wagenheim has one, however, that is a classic, almost worth the price of his book. It has to do with a writer-friend of the Babe's who journeyed up to Ruth's farm near Sudbury, Massachusetts in the early 1920s to visit him. He was ushered into the living room, where he noticed a grand piano, with the top badly scratched up. Remarking upon this, he was informed by Ruth that it was one of his best tricks.

Ruth left the room, returned with a cat, placed it upon a rocking chair, waited until it went to sleep, then opened the window a few inches, went into another room and returned with a shotgun. "My God," his friend thought to himself, "the sonofabitch is gonna shoot a cat for my benefit."

Ruth thrust the muzzle of the gun out of the window and fired. Whereupon the cat made a magnificent leap, hit the floor once, and landed upon the piano, putting out its landing gear to brake the descent and adding a few more scratches.

"Babe," the friend asked, "what kind of cat is this that you can keep playing the same miserable trick on him?"

"I dunno, " the Babe replied, "but he does it every time!"

Louis D. Rubin, Jr.

LOUIS D. RUBIN, JR. *is professor of American literature at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.*

A Communication

In reviewing my *Peace in the Middle East? (TNR,* Oct. 26), Theodore Draper makes some serious charges. Not one withstands analysis. I submitted a letter giving an exhaustive analysis of the errors that entirely vitiate his charges. This was too long for publication; interested readers may contact me directly for a copy. A sample will, however, suffice to illustrate Draper's method.

Draper claims that some statements in this collection of essays (1969-74) were false when written. As his sole example, he cites my 1971 statement that "at no time has the Soviet Union . . . given any concrete indication of a desire for further military conflict in the region." The context is a discussion of developments *after the 1967 war,* specifically, Soviet policies in this period. Draper rejects my statement on the grounds that Russia contributed to the *outbreak* of the 1967 war. Plainly this contention has no bearing on my observation on Russian attitudes toward *"further* military conflict" during the postwar period.

Applying similar logic, Draper tries to show that my treatment of a Palestinian state is "unsatisfactory." He notes that I think it conceivable that "a Palestinian state of some sort" will be established, while elsewhere I point out that "an independent Palestinian entity of some sort is illusory." He sees a problem here, but there is none. A Palestinian state might be established, but it will not be independent; rather, as I explain, it will be subordinated to Jordan and Israel. Draper's other examples of alleged confusion or inconsistency also raise no problem whatsoever for anyone who takes the trouble to comprehend what is being said.

To illustrate my alleged "penchant for playing fast and loose with quotations," Draper cites my comments on a 1964 *Dissent* editorial. A careful look at his analysis shows that the shoe is on the other foot. According to Draper, "Chomsky implies that *Dissent* had called for 'a United States-Saigon victory' entailing a 'murderous assault on the opposition . . .' " That is an outright falsehood. I stated that the editors *opposed* the US war of attrition against the Vietnamese as "inhumane." Draper lifted the phrases he gives in quotes from the following sentence: "They seemed oblivious to the likely consequences of a United States-Saigon victory, though the story of Diem's murderous assault on the opposition (with American backing) in the post-1954 period was already well known." I noted that the *Dissent* editors also opposed US withdrawal as "inhumane" and I objected to "the unspoken assumption that the United States has the authority to intervene in Vietnam to impose its concept of 'humanity.'" My remarks further suggest (without "implying") that the continued intervention advocated by *Dissent* could only lead to the war of attrition they opposed and to an effort to gain a US-Saigon victory, with further consequences to which they "seemed oblivious." Nothing I say even vaguely hints at Draper's conclusion: that they "called for" such an outcome. To fail to see the consequences of one's positions is not to "call for" these consequences. Draper's claim that I "utterly distorted the plain sense of the editorial" is derived by omission of what I said, a gross error of reasoning, and an equally gross misuse of quoted fragments.

Draper then proceeds to give a revealing twist to the argument. The editorial, he asserts, "patiently explained that its aim was *not* 'a "total victory" which would destroy the Vietcong in the South' but rather 'a political arrangement for the coexistence of South and North Vietnam' and even 'a US promise to underwrite developmental aid for *both* countries.'" My point was that the US had no right to intervene, whether this involved "total victory" over the Vietcong or something less. Draper responds with a proposal for accommodation between North and South Vietnam—the typical move of US government propaganda, which seeks to shift debate over US intervention into the "interstate framework" of North-South conflict.

Draper makes a similar move in responding to my critique of right-wing Zionist positions. He objects that these "do not threaten the existence of any Arab state." True, but irrelevant. My explicit point was that they threaten the national existence of the Palestinians. My book is largely concerned with the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ocal conflict between Jews and Palesinians. It condemns the tendency to hift discussion to the regional intertate framework, which is seriously nisconceived when the local conflict s ignored or inaccurately portrayed. Naturally the Zionist right prefers to imit discussion to the regional conlict. In this frame of reference, Israel's noral position is strong; matters are nore complex when the Palestinian problem is honestly addressed. It is striking that on both issues—Vietnam and the Middle East—Draper reinterprets the argument, completely evading its point, along the lines of right-wing propaganda.

Draper claims that I am guilty of "fabrication" in my comments on Berrigan's speech. I rebutted the claim that Berrigan calls for an end to the state of Israel, observing that the position he found "reasonable" included "a declaration of de facto respect [by the Arab states] for the existence of Israel, a de facto state." Again evading my argument, Draper notes that Berrigan attributed this position to Sadat, adding that "Chomsky did not bother to check up on Berrigan's version of the Egyptian statement; he presented it to his readers as if it could be taken at face value." In fact I nowhere said that Berrigan was giving his version of Egyptian statements, since this was irrelevant to my discussion of Berrigan's alleged views on Israel's right to exist, in the broader context of discussion of misrepresentation of views expressed within the peace movement. Thus, I could hardly have misled my readers on the accuracy of Sadat's proposals, never mentioned. Draper also claims that I "fabricated" my version of Berrigan's proposal by attributing it to Berrigan rather than Sadat. The reader will note that my statements give an accurate rendition of Berrigan's notion of a "reasonable" settlement, properly introduced in refutation of false claims about what he "asserts." I leave it to the reader to decide who is guilty of a "wayward way with quotations."

Draper claims that though I pretend to objectivity, I find many demands, "almost invariably" by the Arabs, "far more just and compelling than others." As his sole illustration, he cites a remark on socialist binationalism. But as he knows well, this is a position that the Arabs have always *rejected*. He argues further that I failed to inquire into the politics of *Fatah*, citing in particular a May 6, 1970 declaration calling for the destruction of all Israeli institutions. He fails to mention that in chapter 2 (1970) I quoted this very document, using it as the basis for a harsh critique of PLO doctrine.

Draper claims that I "mistakenly foist . . . the idea" of a Palestinian state "onto the UN Security Council Resolution 242." His source is a statement that attributes this idea to a possible "settlement along the lines of" the UN resolution as generally interpreted, not to the resolution itself. I now see that the statement is technically ambiguous, and should have been rephrased to avoid misreading by a hypothetical reader capable of believing that a UN resolution might state that "perhaps" a Palestine state will be established, "subordinated to Jordan and Israel"—my phrase, at this point.

Draper "rubs [his] eyes in wonder" at my 1969 statement that the Soviet attempt to intervene in Iraq "was no less of a catastrophe" than Western efforts in the Middle East heartland in the period under discussion: the late 1950s and early 1960s. I cite as a source Safran's *From War to War*, where Russian efforts are described with such terms as "abject failure" and "costly disappointment." Draper objects on the irrelevant grounds that the Russians later recovered their position (as I note in the 1974 introduction).

Draper's discussion of the Middle East situation itself is as full of deception as his treatment of my book. Thus, he states that "one reason why [a West Bank state] is still problematic is that the West Bankers have been so slow in reaching a point where they think they can settle their own fate." Why have they been "so slow"? One reason is Israel's refusal to permit free political expression and organization in the occupied territories. The closest Draper comes to addressing this crucial matter is in his statement that "one of the most serious and costly faults of the *previous* Israeli government was its persistent failure to *encourage political organization* inside the West Bank . . ." (my emphasis). He chooses to ignore the fact that under the *present* government, a wave of administrative detentions in the past months has virtually destroyed the newly organized "Palestinian National Front"; those arrested include all active leaders of the Jordanian Communist party and numerous Arab intellectuals well known in the territories, many of whom have spent long periods in Jordanian jails. Evidently the problem is not the failure of the "previous" government to "encourage" political organization.

It is unfortunate that in the US it has been difficult to discuss the problems of the Middle East in a serious way, in part because of the endless stream of falsification, misrepresentation, irrational argument and evasion of facts, illustrated here in Draper's review, but common in journals that might otherwise make a contribution to resolving difficult and explosive problems.

Noam Chomsky

Kauffmann, *from page 42*

anna Peled), the cause of the war, is brought forth in a tumbrel. Women pelt her with straw, climb in and shave off her long curls (figuratively: they take off her wig, revealing her shaved head) and strip her naked and smear her with mud. Then they set a bear on her to violate her, as the citizens scattered among us, incite and exult. . . .

At the end of an hour or so (the audience long since cleared off the floor and seated in the galleries), the captive women move down the center of the hall to the stage, led by a man carrying a tall pole with a looped banner. They are singing softly their song of farewell. Up on the stage they gather in golden light around the upright pole, which begins to sway slightly, thus becoming the mast of the ship that is taking them into exile. Their voices die and the light dies on them, so slowly that we think we can still see them in the black after the light has gone.

I have had no theater experience comparable to this trilogy since the first production of *Boesman and Lena* in 1970,

We can win through research.
With your help
Give to
United
Cerebral
Palsy—

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have seen nothing that struck so boldly into the past and the future since the Grotowski company in 1969. But I must note that these three productions are tragedies only for those who already know the plays as tragedies. Few could miss the power of these productions, but what makes the originals great tragedies, as against great scaffoldings for tremendous Jungian images, is their characters, their language (as rendered in our own), their linkage of poetry and inner action. None of this is given to us here. What Serban has done, with superb theatrical imagination, is to scrape down to the psychic-tribal essences that made these legends material for tragedy in the first place. For me his work doesn't supplant the best traditional tragic performances of these plays (if and when they are available), but it is a brilliant revolt against the drudgery and trudgery of the merely conventional, a refreshment of the theater's bloodstream at the source.

Ellen Stewart, the founder of La Mama, is responsible for discovering Serban in eastern Europe and bringing him here. Any festival, any university that wants to present something fine should be in touch with her about this trilogy. La Mama Theater Club, 74a East 4th St., New York, New York 10003, 212—254-6468.

AUTHORS WANTED BY NEW YORK PUBLISHER

Leading book publisher seeks manuscripts of all types: fiction, non-fiction, poetry, scholarly and juvenile works, etc. New authors welcomed. For complete information, send for booklet NR-1. It's free. Vantage Press, 516 West 34 St., New York, N.Y. 10001.

Peace Personals

PARTICIPATE IN PEACE SEMINAR to Soviet Union-Moscow, Leningrad, Odessa. Institutional conferences, people contacts. Limited places for university students and young workers. Two weeks, leaving December 29, 1974. Write Promoting Enduring Peace, Box 103, Woodmont, Connecticut 06460

Personals

AT LEAST $1,000 MONTHLY TELEPHONE BILL? Cut costs. Write for free bulletin. Robert's Consultants, 14 South Lafayette Avenue, Ventnor, New Jersey 08406.

NEED SOMETHING FROM WASHINGTON? Information government/private agencies; housing/employment. $7.50. M. Michales, Box 472, McLean, Virginia.

HOLIDAY CARDS WITH A MESSAGE. For brochure, Zero Population Growth, 50 West 40th Street, New York, New York 10018.

STOCKING STUFFERS—Gold-plated toothpaste tube miser $1.95; "God Bless This Car" dashboard mini-plaque $1.00 3/$2.75; "Eschew Obfuscation" plaque $5.00. Wry Idea, Rye, New York 10580.

GENTLEMAN 42 alone, seeks correspondence with female with similar life style. Middle-class. Liberal thinking. Literate. No addiction to TV or cigarettes. RSVP. New Republic 6745

HANDWRITING ANALYSIS IN DEPTH, $10.00 and sample to Elisabeth King, 41 E. 29th Street, New York 10016

EXPERIENCED DRAMA PROFESSOR desires escape from harsh winters. New Republic Box 6755

SINGLE BOOKLOVERS gets the cultured marriage-oriented acquainted. Box AE, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania 19081

WIN BUTTONS! 100/$10.00; 500/$25.00; 1000/$39.50. Check our prices on all political materials! BUTTON-KING, Box 3893, Merchandise Mart, Chicago, Illinois 60654

THE SCHOOL DROP OUT RATE for American Indian children of the Southwest remains extraordinarily high. Help keep a Navajo or Pueblo child in school and make a personal friend for only $15 per month. Write for information to Futures for Children, 4401 Montgomery, N.E., Albuquerque, New Mexico 87109

NEW ENGLAND DIVORCEE in fifties seeks masculine relationship, open-ended for occasional weekends. Maybe more. Interests: alternate lifestyles, skiing, theatre, music. New Republic Box 6750

Bumperstickers

"IMPEACH MR. & MRS. AMERICA" 2/$1.00. Potpourri $10.00. Century Apex, Box 2138, Youngstown, Ohio 44504

"PARDON ME," Black on red; forgives all offenses, past, present, and future. 2/$1.00 airmailed. Just Us, Box 551, Missoula, Montana 59801

BUMPERSTICKERS, DECALS, BUTTONS. Low-cost, custom made advertising for your Business, Special Event, Organization or Political Campaign. Buy direct from manufacturer and SAVE! Please state intended use for appropriate samples. Write for FREE Brochure. Price List and Samples. REFLECTIVE ADVERTISING INC. Dept. NR, 8551 Page Boulevard, St. Louis, Missouri 63114. Phone (314) 423-5495.

Literature

REVITALIZE YOUR CLASSROOM! Detailed transcripts of University of California lectures help teachers acquire, organize, and communicate new ideas. 241 courses, $1.40-$5. Ask for free sampler (selections from 9 assorted courses) and catalog: $15 Fybate, 2440 Bancroft, Berkeley, California 94704.

YOU CAN REACH 400,000 READERS

for only 60¢ per word

Special Introductory Offer
3 insertions for the price of 2

The New Republic's classified section is an effective, economical way to make the unknown known to a large responsive audience. Special introductory offer 3 insertions for the price of 2—only 60¢ per word (with this coupon only).

Please run the enclosed advertisement _____ times in THE NEW REPUBLIC. Advance payment of $_____ is enclosed.

_____

_____

_____

_____

(See frequency rates next page)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SCHOLARLY SALE BOOKS. Kramerbooks Distributors offers hundreds of titles in a broad range of academic fields from university presses, academic and trade publishers, all at a substantial savings. Write for catalog. 1217 4th Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20001. Attn: NR.

HUMANIST/RATIONALIST literature, etc. Free catalog. Independent Publications, Box 162, Park Station, Paterson, New Jersey 07513.

BOOK FORUM, the new quarterly review of books and ideas, presents a special 154-page issue. Fifteen provocative essays: sexuality, women, childhood, work, politics, poverty, history, art literature—all related to PSYCHOTHERAPY AND THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE. $10 annually, prepaid; libraries, $20. BOOK FORUM, Rhinecliff, New York 12574.

GUIDE TO ALTERNATIVE ORGANIZATIONS/MEDIA. $1. Guide plus year's trial subscription to newsletter for activists. $3. Gazette, 109 8th N.E. (#101) Washington, D. C. 20002.

A SHORT HISTORY OF CARPATHO RUSSIA, by Dr. Simeon Pysh. Price $2.00. Andrew Yurkovsky, 98 Meadow Park Drive. Milford, Connecticut.

THE COST OF DYING. A consumer's alternative to the $3000 American funeral. By Raymond Paavo Arvio. $6.95 at your bookseller or Harper & Row: 10 East 53rd Street, New York City 10022

PRIVACY JOURNAL—Monthly newsletter on privacy/computers. $15.00 a year. P.O. Box 8844, Washington, D. C. 20003

MICHAEL HARRINGTON'S NEWSLETTER of the Democratic Left: political, feminist, labor developments plus informed analysis of energy, Watergate, economic crisis and future of socialism. $5/year. Newsletter, 31 Union Square, 1112A, New York 10003

READ THE GUARDIAN—Newsweekly gives MARXIST viewpoint on national and international news. Special 8-week trial sub., $1.00 GUARDIAN, Dept. N.R., 33 West 17th Street, New York, New York 10011 (Full year $12.50, student $7.50)

FREE BOOK. Prophet Elijah Coming Before Christ Megiddo Mission, Dept. 72, 481 Thurston Road, Rochester, New York 14619

BOOKS FOUND! Free quotes! Fair prices! Bookstock, Box 95N, Mendham, New Jersey 07945

Literary Services

PUBLISH YOUR BOOK! Join our successful authors: publicity, advertising, promotion, beautiful books. All subject invited. Send for free manuscript report and detailed booklet. Carlton Press, Dept. RZK, 84 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York 10011.

WRITERS—"UNSALABLE" MANUSCRIPT? Try AUTHOR AID ASSOCIATES, 340 East 52nd Street, New York City 10022

PUBLISH YOUR OWN BOOK. We print as few as 200 copies paperback, hard cover, pamphlets. Quality, economy, and cooperation. FREE Details. Graphic-copy, Box 285R, Floral Park, New York 11011

Schools

INSTITUTE ADVANCED THINKING. Drop-outs only. 22 Salmond, Belfast, Maine 04915.

MINNESOTA INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY. Earn your Ph.D. in materialist philosophy by correspondence: Send $10 to Garry De Young, Chancellor; 688 Euclid, St. Paul, Minnesota 55106.

Foreign Studies

MEET RUSSIANS FACE-TO-FACE on 3-week non-political non-profit exchange visits to the USSR. Open to qualified Americans, all ages, occupations. Departures June through December. Write-Wire-Phone Citizen Exchange Corps, Dept. NR, 101 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10017 (212) 889-7960

Employment Opportunities

MASS MEDIA INTERN PROGRAM—The American Association for the Advancement of Science announces a program permitting up to ten advanced social and natural science graduate students to spend the summer of 1975 as intern reporters, researchers, or production assistants in a variety of media. Interested students should contact Wendy Weisman-Dermer, AAAS, 1776 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20036.

TEACHERS-ADMINISTRATORS—Current school, college openings list in U. S. $5.00; Foreign; $5.00. EIS, Box 662, Newton, Massachusetts 02162.

WANTED: Perceptive writer-editor for political newsletter. Write Box 208, Okemos, Michigan.

Property—Sale/Rent

RETIREMENT CLIMATE, Pecos Valley New Mexico City. Elevation 3600. For sale: 3 bedroom house. Central air-heat. Excellent condition. Panoramic view mountains. $18,000. Wilma Field, Snell Realtors, Box 1330, Roswell, New Mexico 88201.

HOUSE HUNTING IN SAN FRANCISCO—Stanford area? Write or call Alice Paul with Doug Couch Inc., Realtors, 560 Oxford Avenue, Palo Alto, California 94306. Expert personalized service. Phone (415) 322-4621. Access to many listings.

GOVERNMENT LANDS . . . FROM $7.50 Acre! Vacationing, Farming, Investment! Exclusive "Government Land Buyer's Guide" . . . plus "Land Opportunity Review" listing lands throughout U. S. Send $2.00. Surplus Lands, Box 6588-SN, Washington, DC 20009.

Vacations/Travel

CARIBBEAN VILLA, with cook-housekeeper, on warm, tranquil Grenada. Swimming from own land; scuba, sailing, tennis, golf available. $225 weekly, lower for season. Robert Martin, 4952 Sentinel Drive, Washington, D. C. 20016 (301) 320-3408.

TOUR ENGLISH WATERWAYS on history professor's private boat. $175.00 weekly. Brochure. England Afloat, Box 2083, Springfield, Massachusetts 01101.

VISITING TURKEY? We can arrange single or group tours. 1001 Nights Tourism. P.O. Box 789, Izmir, Turkey.

Arts and Crafts

50,000,000 YEAR OLD FOSSILIZED FISH. Oregon Petrified wood, Brazil agate slabs. Museum quality decorator pieces, $25.00 or $50.00. Money Back Guarantee. Nature's Own, 17263 Catsden, Chagrin Falls, Ohio 44022.

HANDWOVEN PLACE MATS. Fashioned in Sunburst Yellow by the Monte Christi Indians of Ecuador. Set of 8, only $5.95 plus $1.40 shipping. W. F. Mellott & Co., Dept. 1-B, 121 West North Street, Wooster, Ohio 44691.

"GETTING STARTED IN STAINED GLASS" 50¢ Whittemore, Box 2065PP, Hanover, Mass. 02339

The Copper Puzzle
Pure copper puzzle mounted between plexiglass and cork with solid brass screws. Mounted size 5" x 7". Each puzzle is original and completely handcrafted. Send $30 for each puzzle to:
thom hickam
809 n. wayne st. #3b
arlington va. 22201

JAPANESE WOODBLOCK PRINT REPRODUCTIONS. Masterpieces by Utamaro, Hokusai, Hiroshige, etc. Catalog fully illustrated with 486 subjects. $8.00. Write Adachi Institute, CPO Box 362, Tokyo, Japan or Fuji Ueda, 17841 Golfview Road. Homewood, Illinois 60430.

CELESTIAL MAP: Professional astronomer's wall-sized chart simulates nighttime skies. Measures 6½ x 3½ feet. Shows 5,179 stars, 88 constellations, Yale Catalogue numbers, degree scale. Decorative reference tool. $9.95 postpaid. ASTROGRAPHICS, Dept N, P.O. Box 2411, San Francisco, California 94126. Master Charge and BankAmericard accepted.

Gourmet/Cookery

GOURMET COFFEES AND TEAS OFFERED in unique gift assortments for Christmas or any special occasion. Write for free brochure. House of Coffee Beans, Inc. 1728 Westheimer, Houston, Texas 77006.

WILD RICE FANCY $4.00 pound prepaid. 5 pound minimum shipment. Eugene Floura, Blackduck, Minnesota 56630

Music

FREE RECORD CATALOG—Many out of print LP's. LOW PRICES—TOP LABELS. Treasury House, Dept. NRW, P.O. Box 165 Bay Station, Brooklyn, New York 11235.

HARPSICHORDS, CLAVICHORDS by Sperrhake. Dependable, beautiful, moderately priced. Robert S. Taylor, 8710 Garfield Street, Bethesda, Maryland.

CLASSIFIED RATES

Per word (single insertion) . . . . . 60¢
Per word 6 times in one contract year . . . . . 55¢
Per word 12 times in one contract year . . . . 50¢
Per word 24 times in one contract year . . . . 45¢
Per word 48 times in one contract year . . . . 40¢
Payment in Advance of Insertion Required for Less Than 24 Insertions in One Year
24 & 48 Insertions Billed Monthly with One Month's Payment in Advance

Copy Deadline: 19 days prior to Saturday issue date.

THE NEW REPUBLIC
1244 Nineteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

artist: bayer

chromatic amassment



The ideal
A society in balance. A healthy, well housed, fully employed peacetime population—with clear air, clean water and equal opportunity for everyone.

RITTER LIBRARY
BALDWIN-WALLACE
COLLEGE

NOV 20 1974

The real
We move in different directions, disregarding our neighbor's goal. We dilute our efforts. We fail to reach the equilibrium our strength could give us.

artist: escher



Achieving national goals requires a balanced effort. We must continue to seek new ways to reduce air and water pollution... raise the standard of living of men and women whose potential contribution to society is not being realized... and maintain a sound economy, which will be necessary to achieve environmental and social goals.

Above all, we must broaden our perspective to weigh all our goals in making decisions. For these goals are interrelated. We cannot afford to pursue any one of them at the cost of another.

AtlanticRichfieldCompany

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED